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ABSTRACT 
China brings a novel setting for corporate social responsibility (CSR) featuring 
a state-led model. The often lagged and inflexible top-down regulation 
approach to CSR in China has yielded less productive responses, providing a 
silver lining to collaborative governance engagement from NGOs. Bearing 
extensive hybridity characteristics, government-organised non-governmental 
organisations (GONGOs) in China have played important roles in forging 
governance networks to tackle social and environmental challenges. Despite 
this, extant literature lacks a network-level, contextualised examination of this 
phenomenon. Embracing the networked governance perspective in responsive 
regulation theory, this research seeks to enrich the CSR literature by offering 
new governance insights into the GONGO-regulator-business interactions. This 
research purposively selects the Red Cross Society of China as an exemplar 
GONGO to pursue a two-stage case study approach to data collection and 
analysis. The first stage investigates how GONGOs enhance CSR governance 
capacity and legitimacy through interactions with internal and external 
networked actors; the second stage examines how networked governance 
approaches are applied to business actors and how companies perceive and 
respond to such governance. The findings suggest that GONGOs strategically 
trade on their hybrid identity and capitalise on their governance network to 
coordinate the escalation of rewarding incentives, threatening punishment, and 
capacity building on CSR practices. Such networked governance efforts yield 
mixed responses from business actors in which improved self-regulation, 
sustained co-regulation, co-optation, forum shifting, and disengagement are 
observed. This research contributes to a rich, contextual and in-depth empirical 
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investigation, providing insight and understanding of the role of networked 
governance on CSR in China. This research is the first known study to 
specifically explore the role of GONGOs’ governance in CSR. 
 
Key Words: Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisations 
(GONGOs), Networked Governance, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Responsive Regulation Theory, China 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The understanding and practices of corporate social responsibility (CSR) have 
been closely intertwined with the ever-changing social and environmental 
challenges that have been outgrowing the boundaries of existing laws and 
regulations (Fransen & Burgoon 2013; Schembera 2016). In response, the 
public, the private, and the third sectors are compelled to seek a broader range 
of regulatory options in facing the widest spectrum of CSR governance 
conundrums (Braithwaite 2011; Gunningham, Neil & Sinclair 1999). In facing 
struggles of efficiently holding businesses accountable to their non-financial 
footprints, the role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has been 
particularly accentuated to the fore (Doh & Guay 2006; Doh & Teegen 2002; 
O'Dwyer, Unerman & Bradley 2005; Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Much of this 
growing interest is centred upon the role of civil governance (Williams, Abbott 
& Heery 2015), in which NGOs’ more flexible and agile governance responses 
become a potent complementary force to tackle complex social and 
environmental problems that constantly outgrow the regulatory capacities of the 
government. Although governance by non-state actors should not be 
considered a complete substitute for state authority, it essentially embeds 
governance systems with mechanisms that can compensate government’s 
regulatory deficiencies in shaping corporate attitudes and actions (Vogel 2009).  
Since the turn of the millennium, contemporary regulation has evolved beyond 
the traditional understanding of administrative law and government red tape. 
According to Haines (2011, p. 8), the broadening phenomenon of regulation is 
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“better conceptualised as governance where control originates from various 
public and private actors and is given effect not only through law but also by 
private agreements, the implementation of non-government standards, 
accreditation schemes and a multitude of other potential control mechanisms”. 
In this sense, cross-sector control mechanisms – often in forms of “networked 
governance” (Braithwaite, J 2006, p. 890) – are conceived as offering new 
possibilities for CSR governance by integrating the governance efforts from 
government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and business actors 
collectively to not only rectify faults but also elicit continuous improvements in 
CSR practices. Not only does this echo the increasingly prominent political 
perspective on CSR which views it more as a mode of governance (Scherer & 
Palazzo 2007, 2011), it also elicits the quest of deploying unconventional 
control mechanisms to promote socially responsible business practices 
(Gunningham, Neil, Kagan & Thornton 2004).  
Central to this query is that the specific forms of networked governance heavily 
depend on the social and political context in which it takes place (Baur & Arenas 
2012). In the western contexts, NGOs – as an independent actor from their 
public and private counterparts – have pervasively engaged in both 
confrontational and collaborative CSR activities. They range from anti-
corporate campaigning, forming corporate partnerships to promote social and 
environmental agendas, designing CSR standards and agreements, to auditing 
CSR procedures and disclosures (Arenas, Lozano & Albareda 2009; Bendell 
2000; Dahan, Doh & Teegen 2009; Doh & Guay 2006). However, embracing a 
synthesis of rapid economic upsurge and distinctive culture and political 
heritage, China has brought about a novel setting for both CSR and NGOs in 
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terms of its prominent roles of the government and its regulation system (Ip 
2008).  
The emergence of CSR in contemporary China was born with stronger 
regulatory involvement than similar initiatives in western settings, where CSR 
is mostly driven by the voluntary spirit. Matten and Moon (2008, p. 408) 
describe such a state-driven approach to CSR as “implicit” CSR which is 
significantly divergent from the more “explicit” Western approach. In 2005, the 
political concept of “Socialist Harmonious Society” was initially put forward by 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and signified 
the first turning-point of China from GDP maximisation towards sustainable 
growth (See 2009). The spread of CSR has since rapidly developed and fuelled 
by multiple regulatory attempts. These efforts include the new Corporate Law 
enacted in 2006 urging all companies to assume social responsibility (Moon, J, 
Muthuri & Idemudia 2010) ， the encouragement of CSR in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) by the State Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission, and various CSR reporting requirements made by the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (Levine 2008; Whitehead 2014). Almost a 
decade later in 2016, the Chinese government announced China’s entrance 
into the “New Normal” phase of economic development, further urging 
companies to recalibrate their moral compass from aggressive expansions to a 
consolidation between profitability and sustainability (Mayer 2016).  
Although mandatory CSR regulations in China have gained momentum, they 
lack the detail in clarifying what actually qualifies as a socially responsible 
business and the sanctions and rewards that companies may face in the 
regulatory realm. In the absence of specified regulatory responses, disturbing 
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scandals continue to prevail regardless of the Chinese government’s 
command-and-control efforts. These include the dairy giant Sanlu Group 
producing tainted baby milk powder in 2008 (Moon, HC et al. 2011), and 
massive employee suicides triggered by overtime labour exploitation in Apple’s 
biggest assembly supplier Foxconn in 2012 (Cheung et al. 2014). 
Unsurprisingly, the regulatory failures raise widespread concerns about the top-
down regulation approach on Chinese CSR. In the meantime, “new forms of 
governance” emerged from cases where Chinese environmental NGOs held 
the textile industry accountable to chemical pollution (Davis, SM & Moosmayer 
2014) and the successful collaboration between Alxa SEE, an NGO, and the 
Ant Financial Services Group in large scale carbon-neutralising projects (China 
Daily 2017). The prominent role Chinese NGOs play in CSR engagement has 
prompted recognition that the CSR vision in China could not be achieved by the 
government’s one-sided endeavour alone. 
In terms of NGOs, the Chinese context also manifests unique features when it 
is compared with western settings. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2019), there are 817,000 registered 
social organisations nationwide employing over 9.8 million people. However, 
despite the proliferation of diversified NGO types in China, a typical NGO form 
with Chinese characteristics remains dominant in the civil society sector – they 
are often labelled as “government-organised non-governmental organisations 
(GONGOs)” or “government-owned non-governmental organisations” 
(Johnson, JM & Ni 2015; Lee, EWY & Liu 2012). These GONGOs are generally 
established and funded by the government, or composed of staff transferred 
from the government (Brenner 2012; Hasmath & Hsu 2008; Hsu, CL 2015). 
Given the high-handed NGO supervisory system in China, some scholars 
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contend that all Chinese NGOs are GO-ish to some extent (Hasmath, 
Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016; Hsu, CL 2010). GONGOs in China generally enjoy 
preferential access to international philanthropic donations and government 
contracts over NGOs (Teets 2009). They are also involved in policy-making and 
legislation processes of their particular service areas on a regular basis 
(Johnson, JM & Ni 2015). According to the State Commission Office for Public 
Sector Reform of PRC (2010), there are around 200 national GONGOs fully 
supported by national financial allocations and structurally embedded in 
governmental institutions or public institutions among which 22 national 
GONGOs operate directly under the State Council. Though limited in number, 
they stand out for their distinctive bonds with the government, time-honoured 
social impacts, and extensive networking outreach (Hsu, CL & Jiang 2015; Lu 
2007; Teets 2009). These features have been especially vivid in the case of 
forging networked governance to cope with social and environmental 
challenges. For example, as one of the most iconic GONGOs in China, the Red 
Cross Society of China (RCSC) demonstrated remarkable networking power 
during the relief and reconstruction period of Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 by 
mobilising hundreds of volunteer groups, billions of RMB in corporate donations, 
and vigorous support from the government (Teets 2009). At an international 
level, Spires (2011c) found that 85% of international aid funding directed at 
China went to GONGOs whereas the remainder (15%) was spread among 
diverse institutions including academic institutions, government agencies and 
other NGOs. In spite of the thriving phenomenon of GONGOs in China, 
confusion persists as to the internal system of their organisational structure and 
their external relationships with the government and businesses, particularly in 
their overlapping sphere concerning CSR. 
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The unique attributes of both CSR and NGOs in China give rise to many 
thought-provoking questions – How do GONGOs with heavy political overtones 
construct networked governance on CSR in such a distinctive setting? How can 
GONGOs and businesses be held accountable in such a networked 
governance relationship? And more importantly, how do dynamic interactions 
among GONGOs, businesses and other networked actors shape and influence 
CSR practices? Although both CSR and GONGOs in China are often 
conceptualised in imprecise and tendentious ways, they have demonstrated 
considerable significance in practice and hence warrant in-depth research. In 
this light, it poses a strong appeal to explore the role of GONGO’s networked 
governance on CSR practices in China.  
1.2 Research Rationale 
As cross-sector interactions continue to provoke social transformation, 
commentators call for further research to better understand NGO’s and their 
influence on CSR (Arenas, Lozano & Albareda 2009; Deegan & Islam 2014). 
Prior literature has extensively examined the role of NGO with regard to CSR 
as: isomorphic actors (Doh & Teegen 2002; Teegen 2003; Vachani, Doh & 
Teegen 2009); substantial pressure enforcers (Deegan & Blomquist 2006; 
Deegan & Islam 2014; Islam & Deegan 2008; Tilt 1994); underrepresented 
stakeholders (de Bakker & den Hond 2007; Hossain et al. 2016; O'Sullivan & 
O'Dwyer 2009b); and professional agents with expertise (Doh & Guay 2006; 
Guay, Doh & Sinclair 2004; Jamali & Keshishian 2008). However, careful 
investigation of NGO’s influences on CSR from a governance perspective is 
still scant. Although there is a growing interest in how NGOs regulate 
corporations to behave in more socially responsible ways, much of the extant 
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research falls within the ambit of private regulation (Williams, Abbott & Heery 
2015). Thus, they are largely restricted to the examination of business 
associations and their production of industry guidelines and standards 
(Williams, Abbott & Heery 2015). 
Embracing a different theoretical perspective – the networked governance 
perspective in responsive regulation theory (Braithwaite, J 2006) – this research 
seeks to enrich rather than challenge conventional CSR theoretical 
perspectives. The alternative offered here is to understand the role of NGO, 
GONGOs more specifically, in Chinese CSR in a different way so as to include 
a wider range of considerations on the potency of stakeholders’ governance 
role in CSR. The responsive regulation theory contends that no single 
regulatory method – neither government’s command-and-control regulation, 
businesses’ self-regulation, nor civil regulation alone – is optimal (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2011). That is, every regulatory approach has its 
strengths and weaknesses; therefore, none will be flexible enough to address 
arising issues in all contexts. On the one hand, government regulation 
employing one-size-fits-all mechanisms is incapable of covering all ever-
changing situations that confront the business world. On the other hand, 
although self-regulation demonstrates certain agility, it is difficult and even 
impossible for all businesses of varying sizes and capabilities, especially small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), to sustain a viable and independent CSR 
compliance unit. Consequently, it makes CSR governance less likely to be 
effective without the involvement of third parties, like NGOs. However, the 
sanctioning and rewarding mechanisms available to NGOs are rarely adequate 
and highly dependent on other public and private actors. In other words, the 
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preferred strategy is a dynamic combination of various approaches that harness 
the strengths of one to compensate the weaknesses of the others.  
Responsive regulation theory portrays a dynamic mix of regulatory strategies 
with different degrees of coerciveness featuring responsiveness. NGOs, as one 
of the most collaborative and dialogue-prone regulatory actors, have the 
capacity to escalate or de-escalate their governance approach in various forms 
to control when to punish, when to persuade, and when to reward (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2011; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000). The 
networked governance perspective of responsive regulation theory further 
provides answers to address the questions of how to punish, how to persuade, 
and how to reward. The prescription for NGOs under responsive regulation 
theory, especially for NGOs who seek additional regulatory power, is to actively 
network with stronger actors when a deficit of governance capacity arises 
(Braithwaite, J 2006; Braithwaite 2008). What makes it appealing to this 
research is the reallocation of regulatory resources instead of a multiplication 
of resources. It is a shift from expenditure on costly interventions to expenditure 
on flexible persuasive mechanisms of control. The scarce regulatory resources 
are therefore directed away from companies with effective self-regulatory 
systems to companies that play fast and loose. 
This proposed theoretical perspective is favoured for this research based on 
four principal considerations. Firstly, it provides a systematic and pragmatic 
rationalisation of NGOs’ governance efficacy in CSR issues. Secondly, it 
captures an extensive array of networked governance approaches featuring in 
responsiveness that are often resorted by NGO-business engagements in 
present day and age. Thirdly, it highlights the potential of non-state regulatory 
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actors, such as NGOs and GONGOs, in strategically mobilising resources and 
the power of the State. The punitive power of the State – “the benign big gun” 
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, p. 47) - is a critical element of ensuring the efficiency 
in the responsive regulation model. In other words, the reason that NGOs’ soft 
and dialogue-based governance approach can function is precisely because “it 
operates in the shadow of the state” (Gunningham, N. 2009, p. 181). Although 
this claim has been criticised for being overly state-centric in the western world, 
it provides compatibility to the existing institutional setting in China. Lastly, the 
ultimate goal of networked governance matches the spirit of CSR regulation in 
that governance does not end at mere compliance but continues with further 
improvement.  
Therefore, this study draws attention on how GONGOs in China, who 
seemingly possess a hybridity of both governmental and non-governmental 
attributes, can leverage both government’s enforcement and NGO’s persuasion 
dynamically in pursuit of CSR governance. This quest will offer insights about 
how GONGOs in China have been and can be further mobilised to achieve 
CSR regulatory efficiency when government and market regulations alone 
could not achieve intended CSR outcomes. Also, such an inquiry will constitute 
a part of a broader re-evaluation of stakeholders’ multifaceted control and 
governance roles in CSR. 
1.3 Research Significance 
In addition to extending the limited knowledge and understanding about 
GONGOs’ governance potency in CSR, this research is called to address three 
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significant issues which tend to be scarce and void in previous research 
explorations. 
First, regarding the CSR theme, a focus on dyadic NGO-business relations has 
preoccupied CSR research while considerations of network relations are given 
short shrift. Previous studies have placed attention on addressing NGO-
business relationships in terms of one-to-one interactions (Rowley 1997), 
delineating them as either intimate alliances strategically aiming to maximise 
common interest or hostile opponents advocating divergent self-interests 
(Dahan et al. 2010; Doh & Guay 2004; Yaziji & Doh 2009). However, it remains 
unknown how NGOs catalyse collaborative supports and deterrent sections by 
enlisting various actors to achieve intended CSR governance goals within a 
dynamic web where the actors interact in a multilateral fashion. Despite the fact 
that all networks involve interactions among its participants, an emphasis on 
governance engages systematic authority, control, and influence mechanisms 
to allocate resources and coordinate joint actions across the network as a whole 
(Provan & Kenis 2007). As stated by Provan and Kenis (2007), these 
interactions are largely different from dyad-based operational links, which often 
appear in forms of information sharing and bilateral cooperation. It, therefore, 
would be incomplete to assess exchange between dyads “without reference to 
the nature of other ties in the network or how they fit together” (Jones, Hesterly 
& Borgatti 1997, p. 922). This is especially true for CSR governance issues, 
which often demand critical and complex multilateral coordination to achieve 
social goals beyond individual organisations. Hence, it is imperative to reconcile 
the discrepancy between the acclamation given to NGO-business interface and 
the knowledge we have about the overall functioning of networked governance 
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mechanisms, just as Powell et al. (2005, p. 1133) designated as “illuminating 
the structure of collective action”. 
Second, regarding the research approach, a call for contextualised research on 
CSR in China integrating both macro and micro considerations is pivotal (Davis, 
SM & Moosmayer 2014; Tilt 2016; Whitehead 2014). Notwithstanding the 
explosion of studies on CSR in China in the last decade, the research focus of 
existing studies is excessively partial. Primarily, only since 2005 did stakeholder 
focus feature in CSR research in China, signifying a considerable lag compared 
with CSR research in the West (Lockett, Moon & Visser 2006; Moon, J & Shen 
2010). More specifically, in a review of literature on CSR in China between 1993 
to 2007, only 8% have given attention to the stakeholders’ perspective (Moon, 
J & Shen 2010), even less to NGOs explicitly (Cooke & He 2010; Gao, Y 2007). 
Equally important is the dominant emphasis of existing research on the 
environmental aspects of CSR issues in China, leaving socially focused 
research thin on the ground (Moon, J & Shen 2010). Furthermore, enrichment 
of qualitative insights is particularly expected given an overwhelming 
preponderance of quantitative research in existing literature (Lockett, Moon & 
Visser 2006; Yin, J & Zhang 2012). Thus, the lack of balance and diversity in 
CSR research in China not only inspires but also warrants the surfacing of this 
research: focusing on the stakeholder perspective, addressing social issues, 
and eliciting rich qualitative insights. 
Last but not least, regarding the research focus, targeting at Chinese NGOs in 
particular, an in-depth investigation on GONGO is expected. Although 
GONGOs have exhibited remarkable uniqueness and significance across the 
public and the civil society sectors, it is evident that understanding about this 
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thriving phenomenon is thin (Ho 2016; Wu 2002). While GONGOs merge and 
fuse boundaries between governments and NGOs, confusion about their 
opaque accountability structures arise. As a mutant form of NGO, GONGOs are 
expected to conform to a mixture of accountability preserving principles and 
rules from both the governmental and non-governmental territories they set foot 
on. NGOs are upwardly accountable to donors, downwardly accountable to 
beneficiaries; their accountabilities are imposed by external stakeholders and 
intrinsically felt by internal practitioners; their accountabilities are shaped by 
relations with those who can affect and be affected by their work and guided by 
self-identification of their mission and staff (Ebrahim 2003a; Edwards & Hulme 
2014; O'Dwyer & Boomsma 2015; Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b). Accordingly, 
the accountability tensions manifest on many fronts: multiple and competing 
accountabilities, power and resource asymmetry among involved parties, and 
the difficulties of balancing internal growth with external benchmarking 
(Ebrahim & Weisband 2007). For GONGOs, the pressure to take advantage of 
their governmental attributes has been as equally strong as pressure to 
safeguard the features that have traditionally been regarded as distinctive to 
government agencies. On the one hand, GONGOs need to remain spatially 
close to the government to acquire and attain its legal status and maintain 
adequate resources, as well as confront acute public expectation to maintain 
its independence and secure organisational legitimacy. Therefore, it is high on 
the agenda to understand how these accountability tensions are perceived by 
GONGOs in their CSR governance practices. The scarcity of relevant existing 
research on GONGOs is mainly due to two reasons. Foremost, given its 
distinctive political identity and prerogative, access to GONGOs is often hard to 
obtain (Kirby 2013). Bearing quasi-government elements in nature, GONGOs 
are mostly resistant to participate in research conducted by external parties, 
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which builds considerable barriers for intended researchers to collect primary 
data (Zhan & Tang 2016). Secondly, the term “GONGO” itself has been 
vigorously contested and yet to attain a broad consensus, rendering a 
challenging task to make well-balanced breakthroughs in conducting relevant 
research (Wu 2003). The key criteria of what qualifies a GONGO have been 
swirling over the legal dependence on the government, due registration 
requirements, institutional forms, funding resources, along with organisational 
compositions (Bai 2007; Ho 2016; Tang & Lo 2009; Wang, Shizong, Fei & Song 
2015; Yang, G 2005). This research purposively selects the Red Cross Society 
of China (RCSC) as the research object to pursue furtherance of pertinent 
queries. Given the RCSC is a GONGO officially listed in the national 
administrative setup and it is one of the 22 national GONGOs which operate 
directly under the State Council of PRC (State Commission Office for Public 
Sector Reform of PRC 2010), its representativeness and revealingness can 
facilitate investigation of the GONGO phenomenon. 
The uniqueness of CSR and NGOs in China and the tensions discussed above 
highlight palpable urgency and merit to conduct this research. On these 
grounds, this research presents an effort to address preceding issues by 
focusing on the critical role of networked governance on CSR in China from the 
perspective of GONGOs. 
1.4 Research Aim and Research Question 
Following the premises of addressing significant issues identified above, the 
purpose of this research is accordingly raised. The overall objective of this 
research is to offer an in-depth, rich in context empirical insight in understanding 
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the role of GONGO’s networked governance on CSR in China. This overarching 
objective will be achieved by two separate aims specifically. 
First, this research aims to examine how the hybridity characteristics of 
GONGOs affect their CSR governance legitimacy and capacity in networked 
governance relationships. This aim prompts this research to answer both how 
GONGO’s hybrid identity is recognised by internal and external parties closely 
involved in CSR engagement activities; and how GONGO’s perceived hybrid 
features are operationalised in its intra-organisational configurations and inter-
organisational connections. Prior research on networked governance relies 
mostly on two approaches: firstly, the “network analytical” approach which 
focuses on the nodal organisations and their specific positions situated in the 
network; secondly, the “network as a form of governance” approach which 
focuses on the relations between networked organisations (Provan & Kenis 
2007, p. 232). This research proposes to combine those streams of research. 
While the former captures GONGO’s individual characteristics as a node, actor, 
or position in the network, the latter portrays its outward edges, ties, and links 
with regard to its impact on CSR practices. The rationale for this approach is 
that networked governance is more than a simple sum of individual actors. Both 
the links, present or absent, and the independent nodes of interest equally 
deserve to be studied in their own rights. By addressing GONGO’s hybrid-
organisation manifestations, this research seeks to explore the implication of 
GONGO’s hybridity on its governance capacity in CSR domains. 
Second, this research aims to investigate how networked governance 
approaches are applied to companies and how companies perceive and 
respond to GONGO’s networked governance efforts. This perspective is 
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valuable in that it pieces together the implementation of specific networked 
governance mechanisms and the CSR reactions from the companies’ 
perspectives, complementing this research into a coherent and holistic 
investigation. GONGO’s networked governance may be essential in form, yet 
its effectiveness remains unknown until its corresponding consequences on 
companies are examined. This perspective answers a critical question of 
attainment, allowing an assessment of function and outcome from the 
exemplary cases. A key contribution of this research intends to make is to 
identify critical contingencies which are likely to forge an effective networked 
governance relationship in CSR governance. Of course, coordinated networked 
governance could turn out to be a one-sided effort of GONGOs, from which 
companies may choose to stay detached. In this case, offering insight from 
companies’ perspective also clarifies the determinants of effective design, 
formulation and employment of networked governance approaches. Either way, 
an echo from the companies’ side is indispensable in obtaining a full 
understanding of GONGO’s networked governance phenomenon. 
In accordance with the two preceding aims, this research seeks to answer the 
following research question: 
RQ: How does GONGO’s hybridity shape its capacity and application of 
networked governance to influence CSR practices in China? 
1.5 An Overview of Research Design 
To answer the proposed research question, this thesis adopts a case study 
approach to capitalise on its methodological strength in investigating in-depth, 
real-life cases (Yin, RK 2009a). Known as a triangulated research strategy, a 
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case study is a preferred strategy to conduct multiple-perspective research that 
this research seeks to perform (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg 1991). Since this study 
comprises a network-level exploration, this research will adopt an embedded 
single-case strategy to address the richness, depth and completeness of the 
case. While a single, typical GONGO is chosen to allow a maximum level of 
relevancy and intensity given on the central case organisation at the macro-
level, multiple internal and external actors and relationships embedded in the 
ties and connections with the central case organisation will allow 
complementary perspectives at micro-levels. The Red Cross Society of China 
(RCSC) is purposively selected as the central case based on its representative 
and revelatory merits. The RCSC is one of the most well-known and time-
honoured GONGOs in China. At the international level, red cross organisations 
are widely recognised as the most famous and typical NGOs. However, at the 
national level, the identity of the RCSC is often mixed up with Chinese 
government agencies. The RCSC is one of the twenty-two national GONGOs 
that officially listed in the administrative set-up under the State Council of PRC. 
Its hybrid identity and operationalised hybrid features make it a representative 
GONGO case for this research. As our current understanding of GONGOs in 
China and their impacts on CSR is extremely limited and constrained, an 
exploration on the RCSC will elicit critical insights that have not been made 
available before.  
This research implements a two-stage sequential design to seek an answer to 
the proposed research question, whereby data collection and analysis 
originated from the RCSC link to an examination of its associated government 
agencies, NGOs, and other GONGOs in the first stage and associated 
companies in the second stage. Data are collected in three forms, namely 
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documentation, archival records, and semi-structured interviews. All three types 
of data are employed at stage one and two but collected from different sources. 
While data collection in stage one focuses on the RCSC and its networked 
actors, data collection in stage two targets at the responding companies and 
their joint CSR engagements. All three types of data are employed in a 
triangulated manner to capitalise on each other’s strengths and complement 
each other’s weaknesses. Document analysis, mainly comprised of analysing 
external legal and administrative documents, provides a general background 
information about the research issue. Archival records, mostly consisting of 
organisational reports issued by the participant organisations, are used to bring 
in historical and comparative insights. Both documents and archival records 
jointly inform semi-structured interviews in terms of identifying relevant 
interviewees, shaping the interview questions, and validating and interpreting 
interview answers. Employing a combination of institutional invitation and 
snowballing techniques, 52 interviewees were recruited based on their 
knowledge and relevant experience in GONGO’s networked governance on 
CSR activities. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to ensure 
participants’ perceptions and experience from multiple perspectives were 
included. In the data analysis process, a two-cycle coding approach was 
adopted by including techniques such as descriptive coding, attribute coding, 
and process coding. An integrated interpretation and analysis were conducted, 
incorporating evidence from both stage one and stage two. Throughout the data 
collection and analysis stages, analytical memos and a clear chain of evidence 
were maintained to ensure the robustness of research findings. It is expected 
that through a comprehensive investigation of the mechanisms of networked 
governance and actors embedded within, their influence on CSR practice in 
China can be adequately elucidated.  
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1.6 Research Contribution 
Through the lens of responsive regulation theory, this study aims to contribute 
to the CSR literature by offering new insights in examining the NGO-business 
relationships, which will constitute a broader reassessment of stakeholders’ 
governance potency in CSR. The contribution this thesis aims to make is 
threefold. 
Firstly, previous CSR research failed to adequately address the governance 
role of NGOs. This research specifically seeks to extend John Braithwaite and 
his colleagues’ efforts on networked governance (Braithwaite, J 2006; 
Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) to the CSR arena. Building on responsive 
regulation theory, Braithwaite’s networked governance model provides a 
practical framework to further understand NGOs’ governance mechanisms. 
While highlighting the distinctive features of the Chinese context, this research 
is expected to be the first known study to specifically explore GONGOs 
governance role in CSR. By addressing the limitations in the extant literature, 
this study will contribute to the CSR literature by directing attention to a network-
level understanding of governance mechanisms in contrast to static, dyadic 
NGO-business engagements in conventional wisdom. In this sense, this 
research will provide critical evidence in scrutinising GONGO-business 
relations as in to whom they are responsive and by what mechanisms.  
Secondly, this thesis responds to the call for more contextualised research on 
CSR in China. Existing Chinese CSR research features an imbalanced focus 
on research topic and application of research method. Extant Chinese CSR 
research lacks empirical insights from the stakeholders’ perspective, especially 
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the NGOs’ or GONGOs’ perspective (Cooke & He 2010; Gao, Y 2007; Moon, J 
& Shen 2010). The dominant emphasis of existing CSR research in China is on 
environmental-related issues, leaving social-related issues underexplored 
(Moon, J & Shen 2010). In addition, there is a preponderance of quantitative 
research in existing Chinese CSR literature, whereas qualitative research is 
scant (Lockett, Moon & Visser 2006; Yin, J & Zhang 2012). The contribution this 
thesis makes to the specific context of China is to address the stakeholders’ 
perspective by focusing on GONGOs, examining social issues in CSR practices, 
and employing a qualitative case study design. Additionally, this study presents 
an effort of a cross-discipline investigation by incorporating multiple lenses from 
accounting, sociology, law and political science.  
Thirdly, in terms of practical considerations, this research precisely rides on the 
trend that is concurrently transforming China. According to the 2017 
Government Work Report (State Council 2017) and the Communiqué of the 
18th Central Committee of the CPC (2016), “modernising governance 
capacities” and “promoting innovative forms of shared governance” have now 
been placed at the top of China’s reform agenda. The issuance of GB/T 36000 
(Standardisation Administration of the PRC 2015), a Chinese equivalent of ISO 
26000, coupled with the newly enacted Charity Law (National People's 
Congress of the PRC 2016a) also signal an increasingly prominent role of 
NGOs in Chinese CSR. The significant practical contribution this research 
offered is a timely broadening of understanding about governance options in 
Chinese CSR. For regulators, this research may provide evidence on how to 
mobilise social forces to achieve regulatory goals in a more collaborative and 
cost-effective manner. For regulatees, this research may provide suggestions 
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on how to respond more efficiently to favour less onerous modes of 
enforcement. 
1.7 Structure of Remaining Sections 
Chapter 2 begins by explicating what NGOs and GONGOs mean in extant 
literature. This leads to a more detailed review of their unique attributes in the 
Chinese context and further distinguishes Chinese GONGOs from their western 
counterparts. Subsequently, this chapter provides an overview of the notions of 
CSR and explores the significance of NGOs in international CSR movement. 
Several extant theories generally used to rationalise NGOs role in CSR 
activities in scholarly research are critically reviewed. Chapter 3 then proposes 
an alternative theoretical perspective – networked governance in responsive 
regulation - in an effort to enrich a more extensive understanding of 
stakeholders’ governance role in CSR. This theoretical perspective serves as a 
foundation, locating the starting point and guiding the inquiry throughout the 
study. In chapter 4, a two-stage research design is proposed with justifications 
on the research paradigm, followed by descriptions of relevant methodology, 
data collection and analysis methods at each stage. The role of the researcher 
and relevant ethical considerations are also discussed. Chapter 5 and Chapter 
6 present findings generated from data analysis in stage I and stage II 
respectively. This is followed by Chapter 7 interpreting the key results and 
discussing the significance of the research by comparing findings with previous 
studies. Chapter 8 outlines the concluding remarks, contributions, and 
limitations of this study.   
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of prior literature to identify what is 
known about GONGOs and CSR and what is left to be explored in GONGOs’ 
role in CSR. This chapter begins by clarifying the concepts of NGOs and 
GONGOs and then provides an overview of their implications in the Chinese 
context. A critical review of the literature regarding accountability of NGOs and 
GONGOs are then provided. This is followed by presenting a review of the 
notion of CSR and the features of Chinese CSR literature. This chapter then 
reviews the role of NGOs in CSR with reference to theoretical explanations that 
are frequently applied in extant research. Key findings in prior research are also 
discussed with reference to the themes and theories in previous studies. 
2.2 The Notion of NGO and GONGO 
The labels of “NGO” and “GONGO” are both self-explanatory and perplexing. 
Therefore, an exploration of what they mean is necessary and pivotal before 
going deeper into this study. 
2.2.1 What is NGO? 
Non-governmental organisations are multifaceted structures that are 
interestingly defined by what they are not. They have been identified as a pivotal 
element of civil society which Gramsci conceives as lying between “coercive 
relations of the state and the economic sphere of production” (Abercrombie 
1994, p. 38). As opposed to the public and private sector, they are also referred 
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to as a distinct sector - the “third sector” (Teegen, Doh & Vachani 2004). In this 
sense, their definition is contingently based on the boundary of other actors and 
elements in society (Gray et al. 2006). The United Nation (UN) originally coined 
this expression in an effort to distinguish private, non-profit organisations from 
the governments in 1950 (Yaziji & Doh 2009). According to the UN’s definition, 
NGOs comprise “any non-profit, voluntary citizens group which is organised on 
a local, national or international level” (United Nations 1998, p. 2). In an attempt 
to investigate NGO’s role in global governance, Teegen, Doh and Vachani 
(2004, p. 466) proposed a more operationalised definition of NGOs as “not-for-
profit organisations that aim to serve particular societal interests by focusing 
advocacy and/or operational efforts on social, political and economic goals, 
including equity, education, health, environmental protection and human rights”. 
The NGO label describes a wide range of organisations which have very little 
in common beyond the label “NGO”. Vakil (1997) suggests that NGOs vary in 
their essential organisational attributes, the level of operation, and the types of 
activities they engage in, which range from welfare, development, education, 
networking, research to advocacy. The term has often been used 
interchangeably with the term “non-profit organisation” (NPO) and “not-for-profit 
organisation” (NFP) in practice and literature. While the differences between 
NGO, NPO, and NFP bear diverse interpretation, conventional wisdom 
suggests that the former emphasises the functional dimensions of the NGOs 
and the latter two (NPO and NFP) call for attention on the organisations’ tax 
status and economic attributes (Vakil 1997). More recently, the equivalent term, 
civil society organisation (CSO), has become more prevalent to pinpoint NGOs 
more on what they represent rather than what they are not (Gray et al. 2006). 
Nonetheless, NGO remains to be the most commonly used term in the literature. 
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The negatively constructed definition of NGOs seemingly suggests that NGOs 
naturally emerge and exist in a situation of ambiguity and have a fluid 
organisational boundary straddling across the public and the private sectors. At 
the centre of this contradiction is the extent to which NGOs act on behalf of civil 
society and the extent to which they differ from the public and private actors. 
Gray et al. (2006) contend that although the ambiguities may somewhat 
compromise NGOs’ perceived legitimacy and accountability, they are 
essentially critical elements to ensure NGOs’ effective functioning and success. 
While some scholars maintain that the exponential growth of NGOs is due to 
failures and withdrawal of government from public services (Gray et al. 2006; 
Hsu, JYJ 2014; Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006a; Vakil 1997), others note the rise of 
NGOs is actually a push-back reaction against the repression and alienation 
from the state and market (Bendell 2000; Teegen, Doh & Vachani 2004). 
Although the debate over the root cause of the rising NGOs, this type of 
organisation continues to grow in number, size, vitality and practical 
significance worldwide. 
2.2.2 What is GONGO? 
While progress has been made to unravel the complexity of NGOs, new 
paradoxes continue to arise from an already perplexing collection of NGOs that 
continue to mutate, diverge, and fuse (Billis 2010). The escalating social, 
economic, and political challenges have seen stand-alone NGOs engaging in 
complex forms of cross-sectoral collaboration and explore different ways to 
absorb complimentary ingredients of other sectors. Mushrooming from various 
contexts, these increasingly complex organisational forms manifest in different 
shapes and structures. These include the emergence of social enterprises, 
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quasi-autonomous NGOs, corporate-funded voluntary organisations, spin-off 
for-profit centres, business-NGO partnerships, and private conversation 
networks (Billis 2010; Koppell 2001). In the NGO literature, this heterogeneity 
has developed a lexicon of often unflattering acronyms for these “not-exactly 
NGOs”, such as QUANGOs (quasi-autonomous NGOs), DONGOs (donor-
organised NGOs), BONGOs (Business-organised NGOs), and PONGOs 
(party-organised NGOs) (Florini 2008; Fowler 2013; Hasmath, Hildebrandt & 
Hsu 2016). Among the lengthy list of these paradoxical terms lies the intriguing 
yet underexplored category, the government-organised non-governmental 
organisations (GONGOs) which straddle across the boundary between the 
public and the third sector.  
A with the definition of NGOs, the notion of GONGOs is born with paradoxes 
and contestable assumptions. GONGOs are characteristically distinguished 
from other NGOs by the degree of “closeness to the state” (Hasmath, 
Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016, p. 3). Gordenker (1995) argue that GONGOs is more 
of a mutant than a subcategory of NGOs as they somewhat compromise their 
private and self-governing status. If NGOs are deemed to fill the vacuum 
between the governments and the markets, GONGOs further blur the 
boundaries between NGOs and governments (Hasmath, Hildebrandt & Hsu 
2016). GONGOs usually incorporate functional significance in providing social 
services which governments are unable or unwilling to provide (Davis, D 1989; 
Ho 2016). In essence, GONGOs capture elements of both government and 
NGOs in their palette, whereas they are also qualitatively different from either 
the government or NGOs. 
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The current yet limited understanding of GONGOs has been mostly generated 
from authoritarian contexts. Some scholars call for caution that GONGOs 
present substantial threats to authentic civil society. For example, Naím (2007) 
denotes that although some GONGOs are benign and irrelevant, many are 
acting as “the thuggish arm of repressive governments”. In observation of royal 
NGOs in Jordan, Wiktorowicz (2002) notes GONGOs exert administrative 
repression to squeeze independence of grassroots NGOs. In stark contrast, 
Mulligan (2007) documents Azam, a Malaysian GONGO, in spite of its 
ambiguous bond with the government, has made significant achievements in 
environmental and sustainable missions. In a similar vein, Hsu, Hildebrandt and 
Hasmath (2016, p. 426) contend that Chinese GONGOs act as active 
constructs and “transmission belts” among the state, the CPC and the people. 
Nonetheless, GONGO is not an exclusive phenomenon in authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian contexts. For example, March of Dimes was founded as a 
GONGO under US President Franklin Roosevelt’s administration to tackle 
congenital disabilities (Rose 2010). Established in 1983, the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) sets another GONGO example fully funded 
by the democratic US government (Lowe 2014; Naím 2007). The implication, 
however, is that GONGOs are more likely to thrive in authoritarian contexts 
(Hasmath, Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016). 
GONGOs have long been easily interpreted as NGOs initially established and 
funded by governments. Nevertheless, in an effort to construct a working 
definition for GONGOs, Hasmath, Hildebrandt and Hsu (2016) indicate that an 
over-emphasis on the origin of GONGOs could overshadow the more pressing 
matter of where they are now. For example, although the China Foundation for 
Poverty Alleviation was initially founded and financed by the government, its 
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personnel and finances have been entirely independent of the government 
since its reform in 1999 (Hsu, JYJ, Hildebrandt & Hasmath 2016). Also, the 
megatrends and evolutionary roles of GONGOs can hardly be overlooked. First, 
there have been visible tendencies that even grassroots NGOs are becoming 
closer to the government and receiving considerable financial support from the 
government (Martens 2002). Second, GONGOs have expanded their scopes 
in global governance with their roles and functions becoming much more 
diversified (Carapico 2000). It is suggested that looking at what functions 
GONGOs are serving in practice is more helpful than entangling with what they 
are created for in theory (Hasmath, Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016).  
2.3 An Overview of NGOs and GONGOs in China 
Chinese society perceives NGOs as an imported foreign phenomenon instead 
of a cultural convention. In 2008, Hsu, CL (2010) in her research found that 
while neither rural or urban interviewees in China were familiar with the term 
‘NGO’, rural beneficiaries assumed NGOs were state or party agencies. After 
reviewing civil society literature over a span of 30 years, Hsu, JYJ (2014) 
documented that NGOs in China do not conform to the ideals developed in the 
Western world. The term “non-government organisation” in China has yet to 
arrive at a precise and coherent consensus (Spires, Tao & Chan 2014). It has 
been used interchangeably with “social organisation”, “public benefit 
organisation”, “charitable organisation”, and “popular organisation” (Spires, Tao 
& Chan 2014). These diverse labels present an effort to avoid a misleading 
translation of “non-governmental organisation”, as the prefix “non” can be easily 
interpreted as “anti” in Chinese (Spires 2011c).  
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Figure 2-1 Evolvement of NGO Labels in China 
Given the caution in official wording, the Chinese label of NGOs has been 
modified multiple times in past decades. Figure 2-1 presents a timeline of how 
NGOs in China have been regrouped and renamed since 1998. Before formally 
titled, NGOs in China had generally been called “Social Groups”. In 1998, the 
State Council of China promulgated its 250th and 251th Decree, which initially 
categorised NGOs in China as People-Run Non-Enterprise Unit and Social 
Group while clearly outlining their scope of activities in legal terms. In 1999, 
“Circular on Further Strengthening the Administration of Civil Organisation 
Management” was released and officially named NGOs in China after “Civil 
Organisations”. The 400th Decree of the State Council was issued five years 
later, which further separated “Foundations” from “Social Groups” to be a new 
type of NGO. Until then, three exclusively independent types of NGOs were 
officially defined composing “Civil Organisations” in China: Social Groups, 
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People-Run Non-Enterprise Units, and Foundations. In recent years, the title 
“Civil Organisation” has been gradually replaced by “Social Organisation” in 
attempts to establish lingual consistency in legal documents. In March 2016, 
the National People’s Congress voted in favour of the Charity Law which took 
effect on 1st September 2016. The new Charity Law regrouped “People-Run 
Non-Enterprise Units” into “Social Service Agencies” in response to a 
transformation in latitudes and functions of such organisations. 
Before 1979, China was a totalitarian society in which individuals rely on 
collective arrangements to access social services (Deng 2010). During this time, 
the Chinese government was highly successful in providing primary education 
and basic health care to a broad population. Therefore, NGOs did not have 
institutional space to survive and grow (Deng 2010). However, the market 
reforms pitching massive de-collectivisation across China started in 1979, 
which made social welfare benefits no longer accessible through collective units 
(Hsu, CL 2010). These reforms, coupled with imbalanced economic growth 
between eastern and western China, shifted the burden of social services 
delivery from the central government to independent associations and 
individuals (Davis, D 1989). In the early 1980s, students and intellectuals took 
advantage of the lax regulation and form a large number of independent 
associations and NGOs (Ma 2005). The upsurge of civil life led to the 1989 
student protest at the symbolic heart of China - Tiananmen Square (Spires 
2007). The post-Tiananmen aftermath coupled with the threatening “Colour 
Revolution” in East Europe drove Chinese authority to implement a series of 
restrictive civil legislation, placing all NGOs under the supervisory and 
management of the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Hsu, CL 2010).  
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According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC (2019), there were only 4,544 
registered NGOs in 1989, but the number had proliferated beyond 817,000 by 
the end of 2018. These emerging Chinese NGOs operate in a wide spectrum 
of areas including education, health, environment, poverty alleviation, 
community development, and support for minority groups in the society (Hsu, 
JYJ & Hasmath 2015). The dramatic increase in the number of NGOs was 
afforded with two major explanations. The first is that it reflects the upsurge in 
social and environmental consequences caused by rapid economic 
liberalisation in China, ranging from environmental deterioration to questionable 
food safety issues (Xu 2008). The second explanation is that NGOs in China 
have grown exponentially due to the limited but increasingly wider political 
space afforded them by the state (Hsu, JYJ & Hasmath 2014; Liu 2008). 
While the emerging NGOs in China demonstrates the potential for non-state 
actors to advance social agendas, they have to face various constraints from 
the CPC and government agencies. Contrary to many countries, China’s NGO 
regulation features two aspects: the “dual management system” (Wang, M & 
Liu 2009, p. 27) and the “one NGO per sector” policy (Deng 2010). The “dual 
management system” requires that besides registration with the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, NGOs in China are required to find a host supervisory agent willing to 
manage its professional operation (Li, Song & Wu 2014; Ministry of Civil Affairs 
of the PRC 2016; Wang, M & Liu 2009). The “one NGO per sector” policy 
mandates that only one NGO is allowed to be set up in a particular professional 
field, and no inter-provincial or cross-regional associations are permitted (Deng 
2010). Also, NGOs with more than three CPC members are required to 
establish a party branch (Spires 2007). NGOs with different political licenses 
are subject to different treatments in terms of supervision, management, 
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support and annual review from the civil affairs departments. Therefore, despite 
the ongoing naming and regulatory reforms, Chinese NGO’s source of power 
and closeness to the state continues to be paramount in examining their roles. 
In this sense, the party-state institutional antecedent of China has rendered 
multiple types of NGOs, among which government-owned NGOs (GONGOs), 
grassroots NGOs, and multinational NGOs are most identifiable in terms of 
different positions in the state-society relations. 
2.3.1 GONGOs in China 
GONGO is not a new phenomenon in contemporary China. What is new is its 
unprecedented dominance in the civil society sector and the concomitant 
debates lavished upon them over the past decade. Dating as early as the Song 
Dynasty (AD 960-1276) in China, the ancient GONGOs in forms of nursing 
homes and orphanages predate the Government of the PRC and the CPC (Tan 
2005). Nonetheless, their present reincarnation has been fertilised and is 
flourishing with the PRC administration and the party. The first generation of 
contemporary Chinese GONGOs was mostly founded in the 1950s, intending 
to function as a “transmission belt” between the state and society to encourage 
popular participation in political life (Hsu, CL 2010). After China embarked on 
its economic reforms in 1978, it became a common practice for government 
institutions to set up GONGOs in order to channel private money to public 
causes or tap into international expertise and donation (Hsu, CL & Jiang 2015). 
After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, GONGOs in China have been further 
promoted to be dominant players in the civil society sector (Spires 2011c). 
The literature suggests that GONGOs in China are established quasi-
government in nature and basically funded by the government (Zhan & Tang 
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2016). Some scholars believe they are originally founded to offer social services 
which the State is unable or unwilling to provide and to promote a particular 
ideology (Davis, D 1989; Ho 2016). Some others claim that the motives to 
establish GONGOs were to find resting positions for retired cadres and 
redundant staff whose jobs were cut during government downsizing (Spires 
2011c; Zhan & Tang 2016). Further, some even document that the influx of 
GONGOs in the 1990s was a political strategy to secure advisory seats in the 
United Nations (Hasmath, Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016). Despite the origin story, a 
multitude of GONGOs have been created over the past two decades, 
dedicating in healthcare, environmental protection, labour rights, education, 
and poverty relief (Ma 2005; Saich 2009; Unger 2009; Wu 2002).  
While scholars describe these GONGOs as “bridges” to the state (Unger 2009) 
or “arms” of the state (Spires 2011b), the Chinese government has frequently 
chosen to use the term “mass organisation” when referring to nation-level 
GONGOs (State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform of PRC 2010). 
According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2018b), there are 22 national GONGOs 
officially embedded within the administration and directly operating under the 
State Council. Among them, the most typical ones include the Red Cross 
Society of China, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the Communist Youth 
League of China, and the All-China Women's Federation (State Commission 
Office for Public Sector Reform of PRC 2010). Although non-governmental 
organisations in nature, GONGOs, to a certain extent, exercise the 
government’s regulatory powers alike.  
The key criteria of distinguishing Chinese GONGOs from other NGOs is 
whether the initiative to establish a GONGO is taken by the government (Wu 
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2002). Following this logic, prior researchers have raised doubts about the 
autonomy of GONGOs, as the government is inherently embedded in the 
activities and operations of GONGOs by the nature of their funding relationships 
(Hsu, CL 2010; Lu 2007; Zhang, L 2011). GONGOs, therefore, are seen as 
creatures purposively established in-between the state and society to 
communicate the philosophy of the Chinese government and the CPC 
(Whitehead 2014). Instead of representing the societal interest and acting as 
watchdogs against the state from the bottom up, they are meant to shape the 
opinions of social groups from the top down (Spires 2011c). In this sense, many 
scholars, both domestically and internationally, view GONGOs simply as 
extended organs of the government (Unger 2008). They believe GONGOs are 
structurally tied by financial, personnel and operational links with the 
government but do not carry out operational activities in forms of formal 
administrative actions. 
However, another stream of literature denotes GONGOs not as mere arms of 
the government but rather more as supportive service institutions at both 
national and provincial level (Wu 2002). Since fewer restrictions are imposed, 
GONGOs enjoy considerable leeway and are able to take full advantage of their 
expertise and personal connections to facilitate the interaction between the 
government and local communities, to work with professional groups and 
associations, and to cooperate with for-profit organisations (Wu 2002). They 
tend to leverage their administrative identities to shape policymaking and foster 
their own operations (Ho 2016). Further, since the government and CPC have 
been pushing GONGOs to become financially self-sufficient and partially 
separate from their affiliated government agencies, GONGOs also rely on 
cooperative relationships with research institutes, other NGOs, and 
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international groups to sustain their legitimacy (Johnson, JM & Ni 2015). This 
stream believes that western-based assumptions fail to recognise that 
GONGOs strategically exploit their political strengths to accomplish their own 
goals (Johnson, JM & Ni 2015). Black (2002b) argues that autonomy is not in 
the sense of freedom from interference by government, rather it is the idea that 
actors will continue to develop or act in their own way in the absence of 
intervention. Confirming this idea, Lu (2007, p. 176) further states that “just 
because an NGO is launched by a government agency with government 
resources do not mean that it will not find ways to pursue its own independent 
agenda.” From a functional dimension, GONGOs in China are often preferred 
over fully autonomous NGOs as they are less likely to present a threat to the 
government and more capable of fulfilling a specific social agenda (Hasmath, 
Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016). In this sense, Chinese GONGOs are not simply 
safeguarding the government’s benefits but also to reduce the government’s 
political and economic costs and risks by exercising certain degrees of 
autonomy. 
2.3.2 Grassroots NGOs in China 
Another visible group of NGOs in China is called grassroots NGOs. In 1995, 
the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing, during which an 
NGO forum was also held, and an increasing number of independent, 
grassroots NGOs began to appear in China (Deng 2010). They originated from 
private individuals and are more comparable to their counterparts in developed 
countries. However, unlike leaders of NGOs in Western society, who either have 
industrial experiences or non-profit backgrounds, executives of NGOs in China 
are mostly social elites who possess or have access to social resources (Ho 
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2016; Ru & Ortolano 2009). Also, in contrast to GONGOs, the defining 
characteristic of grassroots NGOs is that they have much less or no official 
government ties and official government support, which places grassroots 
NGOs in a lack of official sponsorship and approval (Spires 2011b). However, 
Ho (2016) argues that China’s political system both restricts and supports 
grassroots NGOs activities, and such a path of civil society development has 
significantly reduced the possibility of social instability.  
The registration requirement for all NGOs to locate a supervisory agent to “allow 
the government to regulate, organise, and monitor NGOs better” is widely seen 
as the most prominent legal obstacle for grassroots NGOs who wish to become 
properly registered (Spires 2011b, p. 8). For GONGOs, the requirement to find 
a supervisory agent is readily met, as the government itself sponsors GONGOs. 
Nevertheless, it is extremely challenging for grassroots NGOs to secure a 
supervisory agent in the government departments (Deng 2010). Further, the 
“one NGO per sector” policy also hinders grassroots NGOs from obtaining legal 
status. In case a GONGO already exists in the given professional sector, 
grassroots NGOs with similar professional functions will not be granted a legal 
license (Deng 2010). To sidestep the registration threshold, many grassroots 
NGOs have to work under the cover of voluntary groups in rural areas, register 
as business entities, or simply remain unregistered in order to sustain their 
operations (Kang, X & Han 2008; Zhang, X & Baum 2004). Many empirical 
studies suggest that these organisations aim to shield themselves from 
government interference and avoid being integrated into the existing regulation 
system (Zhang, X & Baum 2004). Many scholars have estimated the numbers 
of unregistered NGOs in China. According to Wang and He (2004), the total 
number of unregistered NGOs and associations is over 1 million. Jia (2005) 
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estimates the number to be around 1.4 million, whereas Watson’s (2008) 
estimate is close to 2.7 million. The emergence of social media and increasingly 
vibrant online sphere drove some grassroots NGOs to run in forms of Internet-
based groups without physical entities (Hsu, CL 2011). Some scholars 
highlighted that this trend was not simply a result of the registration system that 
puts up high barriers of entry but was also a reflection of state preferences and 
limitations (Deng 2009; Hildebrandt 2012). Especially at local levels, 
government agencies tend to lack the staff and resources to register and 
supervise NGOs, so they are more willing to turn a blind eye to domestic and 
international NGOs even those that are improperly registered or unregistered 
as long as they provide beneficial services or serve other economic needs. 
However, the Chinese government has adjusted its strategy in managing 
government–NGO relations by both containing and empowering grassroots 
NGOs in recent years (Jing 2015; Kang, X & Han 2008). Heurlin (2009) 
documents that the Chinese government has moved from an exclusionary 
approach to an inclusive strategy in managing relations between government 
and grassroots organisations. It is further observed that various pilot programs 
in NGO registration and management underway at the provincial level in recent 
years have been indicative of greater state tolerance for grassroots NGOs and 
also the desire for “grassroots reform” (Hsu, JYJ 2014). Similarly, Spires (2011b) 
further suggests that government and grassroots NGOs have been coexisting 
in some form of contingent symbiosis, with government officials willing to draw 
on support from grassroots NGOs to boost their performance rating when the 
NGOs are considered politically non-threatening.   
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2.3.3 Multinational NGOs 
Multinational NGOs are subsidiaries of transnational NGOs originated from 
foreign countries. They are sometimes labelled as “foreign agents” and 
restrictive regulations are applied to control their activities (Hsu, JYJ 2014). Hsu 
(2014) argues that the withdrawal of the Chinese party-state from its previously 
dominant role in social welfare services is the root cause for an increasing 
number of foreign NGOs emerged to fill this gap. In 1978, the Chinese central 
government began to receive international development aid from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), and it prompted China to develop a 
more welcoming attitude to foreign aid (Hsia & White 2016). In 1984, the United 
Nations specifically pressed the Chinese government to open doors to foreign 
NGOs in exchange for international aid (Yong 2011). Ever since then, foreign 
NGOs have gained increasing visibility and salience in the Chinese civil society 
sector. However, unlike African and Latin American countries where foreign 
donors and organisations actively participate in deciding how funds are spent, 
the Chinese government limited contacts between foreigners and nationals, 
especially during early years (Hsia & White 2016). By imposing restrictions, the 
state prevented Chinese social organisations from forming partnerships with 
larger international counterparts.  
Though constrained in legal form, multinational NGOs have made a salient 
contribution to Chinese CSR advancement. China’s rocky transition to a mixed 
economy has made evident the need for foreign NGOs to contribute their time, 
funds, and experience in areas such as healthcare and job retraining. Non-
Chinese NGOs have played a considerable role in delivering such services. For 
example, the people affected by the 1998 summer floods, which claimed an 
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estimated 2,500 lives and destroyed 6 million homes, were supported by 
organisations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (Hsia & White 2016). 
Foreign NGOs also provide technical expertise in many areas and offer diverse 
services, from teaching English to funding micro-credit programs (Yin, D 2009). 
Some groups, such as the Ford Foundation, are not involved in implementing 
programs directly but provide large amounts of money for development work 
(Howell 2010). 
Although recognising the potential contributions of foreign social groups, the 
Chinese government has not relinquished reviews and assessment on them. 
Brook and Frolic (2015, p. 57) argue that the Chinese government seeks to 
foster certain types of foreign NGOs and to quell those with politically sensitive 
agendas which leads the government-NGO relationship to “a marriage of 
convenience rather than a catalyst for citizen resistance”. Only foreign groups 
whose interests coincide with those of the state are permitted to operate 
relatively freely within Chinese parameters (Hsia & White 2016). Prior to 2017, 
the Social Organisation Administration Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs was 
in charge of the registration and annual review of foreign NGOs in China (Yin, 
D 2009). However, the recently enacted Foreign NGO Law puts all foreign 
NGOs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security (2016). The 
controversial new law prohibits foreign NGOs from engaging in political and 
religious activities at odds with the government (Guo 2017). The existing 7000 
plus foreign NGOs are subject to police supervision and must declare their 
sources of funding (Griffths & Jiang 2016). 
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2.4 The Characteristics of Chinese GONGOs  
GONGOs in China are both governmental and non-governmental in rhetoric 
and practice. Given the distinct political and social context in China, a careful 
examination of GONGOs’ “government-organised” attributes and “non-
governmental” attributes are needed. At the centre of this examination is to 
compare and contrast them with their counterparts. 
2.4.1 The “Government-Organised” Attributes – Corporatism Framework 
The “government-organised” attributes of GONGOs in China manifest in their 
intimate and intertwined bonds with the Chinese government. Nee and Opper 
(2010) described the “government-organised” attribute as “political capital” 
through which agents leverage political connections to secure privileges while 
the state is able to achieve political screening. Therefore, most scholars have 
applied the “corporatism” framework to analyse the GO-ish features of 
GONGOs (Gu & Wang 2005; Unger & Chan 1995). The corporatism framework 
regards GONGOs as the “instruments of the state rules” (Streeck & Kenworthy 
2005, p. 444). Within the framework, GONGOs are organised in a “singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, and hierarchically order”, and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly in their own field (Schmitter 1974, p. 93). 
In exchange, the claims of demands, the appointment of leaders, and the 
supply of resources are subject to certain controls of the state. Unger and Chan 
(1995) conclude that “corporatism” is of considerable assistance and 
substantial explanatory value in making sense of the multifaceted associations 
in China. The “government-organised” attributes of Chinese GONGOs are 
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highly visible in three aspects: legal and political privileges, financial support, 
and staff composition. 
2.4.1.1 Legal and Political Privileges 
Chinese GONGOs enjoy substantial privileges in terms of their legal and 
political status over their Chinese NGO counterparts. The legal requirements 
for registration set by the Chinese government are, in practice, stringent for 
most NGOs who wish to become properly registered legal entities. Under the 
Chinese government’s “dual management system”, NGOs must be able to 
assume the cost of both a willing “supervisory agency” and a “management 
agency” at the same administrative level within the government departments. 
Since the initiative of establishing most GONGOs are led by the government, 
such requirements are often undemanding for GONGOs. For example, 
GONGOs who are led by the State Council are exempt from the registration 
and annual review constraints (Spires 2011b). These requirements, on the 
other hand, prove to be extremely challenging for most grassroots NGOs and 
foreign NGOs. According to Spires (2011c), only thirteen foreign foundations 
had obtained legal approval in China by the end of 2008. In practice, many 
grassroots NGOs find the ‘supervisory agency’ hurdle virtually impossible to 
overcome and thus either register as businesses or forgo any type of legal 
registration (Spires 2007, 2011b). However, Hildebrandt (2012) argues that 
unregistered status may actually provide other NGOs with certain competitive 
advantages over GONGOs. Exploring the complicated process or NGO 
registration, Hildebrandt (2012) found that unregistered NGOs may secure a 
wider source of support from overseas more easily, which a GONGO may not 
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otherwise receive. Nevertheless, he concluded that NGOs in China are 
ultimately bounded by the State, whether GONGOs or not. 
2.4.1.2 Financial Support 
While grassroots NGOs face enormous difficulties in securing necessary 
resources, most GONGOs enjoy preferential access to a variety of support from 
the government and international aid groups. Hsu (2010) documented that 
GONGOs in China receive generous international donations, whereas many 
grassroots NGO leaders complained that volunteers were the only resource 
they had in abundance. According to Kang and Han (2008), Chinese GONGOs 
who rely on government funds experience very little government interference, 
whereas financially independent NGOs attract more government control. 
Especially for NGOs focusing on politically sensitive areas, such as religion, 
ethnicity, and human rights, they are more likely to be reliant on foreign funding 
and therefore more likely to attract a higher level of surveillance (Kang, X & Han 
2008). Hsu’s (2008, 2015) investigations on China Youth Development 
Foundation found that GONGOs who engage in sensitive areas may avoid high 
levels of state control when they “have powerful allies in the party-state 
bureaucracy” (Hsu, CL 2011, p. 124). 
However, Wu’s (2003) study reveals that government funding is not necessarily 
the most decisive element of the “government-organised” attribute. For 
example, the Chinese government provides the Chinese Environmental 
Science Association with RMB 20,000 (approximately AUD 4,000) per year, the 
same amount the organisation received in 1981 (Wu 2003). This amount is far 
below the organisation’s current operational costs; thus, additional financial 
support from membership fees, training and research grants must be raised by 
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the organisation itself. Nevertheless, the lack of financial support does not 
compromise the organisation’s practices in pushing governmental agenda. 
2.4.1.3 Staff Composition 
Leaders and employees of GONGOs in China have close ties with the 
government. Such government ties manifest in three aspects: political ties, 
professional ties, and personal ties. Political ties refer to connections with 
leaders who are current or former government officials or legislative body 
members (Zhan & Tang 2016). Professional ties suggest that GONGO 
employees maintain current or former affiliations with public sector institutes 
controlled by the government (Tang & Lo 2009). Personal ties indicate that 
certain GONGO leaders have maintained close personal relationships with the 
government and own certain degrees of political power and influences (Xin & 
Pearce 1996). Gu and Wang (2005) explore the government-organised 
professional associations and indicate that the State effectively control the 
activities of professional associations by selecting their leaders. In order to 
maintain their monopoly position, most leaders and professional associations 
will not actively seek to strengthen their autonomy. Moreover, many scholars 
contend that the bonds between GONGO’s leaders and the government are 
underpinned and fostered by the Chinese philosophy – “guanxi” (Du 2015; 
Johnson, JM & Ni 2015; Xie & Mol 2006; Xin & Pearce 1996) – in which trust 
and cooperation are more likely to be established. 
Unger and Chan (1995) are the pioneers to examine GONGOs through the 
framework of corporatism. They argue that state corporatism could describe the 
relationship between GONGOs and government more precisely as it 
emphasised the government dominance in the top-down decision-making 
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structures. Based on their investigations of government-organised industrial 
associations, Unger and his colleagues (2008, 2009; 1995) conclude that these 
Go-ish organisations act as the extension or “transmission belt” of the state. 
Kang and Han (2008) observed the differences in the closeness to state among 
various types of NGOs in China and adopted the graduated control system to 
explain these differences. Although the deliberate distinctions between 
graduated control and corporatism are drawn by these two scholars, the 
graduated control system can still be regarded as a delicate modification of 
state corporatism. Furthermore, based on the analysis of GONGOs’ 
characteristics which emerged in its interactions with the local government, Hsu 
and Hasmath (2012) concluded that while the central government is actively 
involved in the development of GONGOs, the success of GONGOs is 
determined by their interactions with local governments. Therefore, they 
proposed the concept of the local corporatist state to emphasise the critical 
position of local governments. 
Within an ideal corporatist framework, the state recognises one and only one 
organisation as the sole representative of the sectoral interests. Furthermore, 
the state-sponsored organisations are channelled into the policy-making 
process and often help implement state policy on the government’s behalf. In 
the context of China, these can be apparently observed from the GONGOs’ 
prerogative in “one NGO per sector” policy and their dominance in the “Political 
Consultative System”. GONGOs, serving as the representative leader in their 
own sector, have more power in uniting and networking other NGOs in their 
respective sectors. Networked NGOs, in return, heavily rely on channelling their 
demands to the top through GONGOs. Also, to ensure the national common 
good supersedes the parochial interests of each sector, the state often act as 
45 
 
a mediator to foster the relations between the various sectoral organisations. 
Therefore, organised consensus and cooperation among different 
organisations are more easily achieved in pursuit of a common goal. As Unger 
and Chan (1995, p. 32) conclude, “harmony is the catchword of a corporatist 
system, regardless of whether the harmony is truly consensual of imposed from 
above”.  
2.4.2 The “Non-Governmental” Attributes – Civil Society Framework 
Although most scholars fail to conclude that China has experienced the 
authentic civil society similar to what Salamon and Anheier (1997) find in other 
countries, most scholars tend to apply the analytical framework of “civil society” 
in examining the “non-governmental” attributes of GONGOs (Hasmath, 
Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016; Ma 2005; Saich 2009; Spires 2007; White 1993; Wu 
2002). The civil society framework portrays civil actors – often represented by 
NGOs – as separable, distinct spheres to be equated to the public and private 
actors. Scholars believe that China has developed a civil society (Gao, 
Bingzhong & Yuan 2008) or is moving towards that direction (Wang, M 2008). 
Some scholars even indicate objection on the use of the term “civil society” in 
Chinese context because of its Western origin of thought and argue that it is 
misleading to describe China with the term “civil society” under the one-party 
leadership system (Zheng 2011; Zhou, B 2011). It has been proposed that 
variations of strictly defined civil society frameworks, such as “semi civil society” 
and “state-led civil society” can be employed to describe better what is 
observed from GONGOs (Shieh 2015). 
As a main advocate of the civil society approach, White (1993) argues that the 
concept of civil society has its analytical advantages in China. He states that 
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even though certain NGOs are government-organised, nascent organisations 
such as industry associations place more of their focus on group interests than 
the government’s will and may often have a certain space for their own activities. 
Taking a similar approach, Hasmath, Hildebrandt and Hsu (2016) argue that 
GONGOs in China can be used as a safe proving ground wherein the state can 
test experimental policies. The perceived distance between the government 
and GONGOs can insulate the state from negative consequences when such 
policies go wrong. Similarly, when GONGOs do well, their ties can be used to 
credit the government; when they fail, their distance can be used to insulate the 
state from criticism. The application of civil society framework in China provides 
for GONGOs to enjoy a degree of autonomy, but they cannot be called 
independent organisations; they encompass voluntary elements but cannot be 
called real voluntary organisations (Wang, Shizong, Fei & Song 2015). Although 
civil society advocates argue that the autonomy of GONGOs is compromised, 
some studies suggest that they may also push forward the development of 
other NGOs and open the political system to authentic civil society (Ma 2005; 
Saich 2009; Wu 2002). 
2.5 Accountability of NGOs and GONGOs 
Accountability provides a useful lens to understand GONGO’s internal and 
external interactions with networked actors in CSR governance relationships. 
On a broad level, the concept of accountability is linked to a variety of desirable 
elements – transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility, and 
responsiveness (Koppell 2005). Historically tracing its semantical roots to 
accounting, Bovens (2007, p. 450) defines accountability in a contemporary 
setting as a specific “relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the 
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actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences.” In a similar vein, Edwards and Hulme (2014, p. 9) interpret 
accountability as “the means by which individuals and organisations report to a 
recognised authority, or authorities, and are held responsible for their actions.” 
The concept of accountability thus broadly comprises not only the answerability 
of action or inaction but also enforcement of sanctions and rewards that follow. 
In narrower terms, accountability relationships are operationalised in a 
sequence of formal and informal stages involving account giving, questioning 
the adequacy of the information and the legitimacy of the conduct, and the 
passing of judgement (Bovens 2007). When the dyadic interaction between the 
accountor and acounttee is translated into NGOs and GONGOs, the 
accountability relationship becomes more complex as NGOs and GONGOs 
navigate dynamic relationships with multiple stakeholders, including donors, 
beneficiaries, staff, and the public (Najam 1996). The multiplicity of actors 
involved and different roles to play not only complicates the relations of 
accountability but also infuses the power and demands of accountability 
experienced by NGO and GONGO actors. There are three theoretical 
dimensions of NGO accountability usefully constituting analytical lens to 
understand GONGOs’ accountability: the upward-downward dimension 
(Ebrahim 2003a; Edwards & Hulme 2014), the relational-identity dimension 
(Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b), and the imposed-felt dimension (O'Dwyer & 
Boomsma 2015). 
The term ‘upward accountability’ is used to refer NGO’s relationship with 
contributors (such as donors, funders, and host governments) whereas 
‘downward accountability’ refers to relationships with those “to whom NGOs 
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provide goods or services”, including direct and indirect beneficiaries, as well  
as the community at large (Edwards & Hulme 2014; Najam 1996, p. 345). Whilst 
most organisations face complex and conflicting accountability demands from 
a variety of stakeholders, NGOs tend to experience these contradictory 
demands more regularly and acutely (Ebrahim 2005a, 2009). At both ends of 
upward accountability and downward accountability, the asymmetry of power 
and resource control between the two parties has become an inherent dilemma 
for all NGOs. For GONGOs, the already complex scenario can become more 
distorted when government sponsorship and aid enters into the relationships. 
As the apparent financial and political muscle of governments increases, doubts 
persist as to whether government resource contributions may reorient 
accountability more upwards and further away from the downward beneficiaries. 
Unerman and O'Dwyer (2006b) distinguished identity forms of accountability 
from relational accountability by emphasising the role of internal mission, 
motivation, and value of NGO actors. The identity accountability is described 
as “a form of accountability occurs in situations where the people running an 
NGO feel accountable only to what they themselves believe is the right thing to 
do” (Unerman & O'Dwyer 2012, p. 149). Identity accountability is, therefore, 
practised by NGOs who maintain their specific identity and are satisfied as long 
as their identity remains pure to their “cause” (Unerman & O'Dwyer 2012, p. 
149). Driven by the passion and belief of the correctness of what they are doing, 
NGOs practising identity accountability may pay less attention to the 
accountability rights of other stakeholders, including funding and resource 
contributors (Unerman & O'Dwyer 2010). Relational accountability, on the other 
hand, conceives accountability primarily from a stakeholder’s perspective by 
emphasising the identification of “who can affect” and “who can be affected” by 
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the organisation (Andreaus & Costa 2014; Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b). 
Therefore, the fundamental query of relational accountability revolves around 
the identification of stakeholders (Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b). Under this 
perspective, NGO practitioners adopt either a rights-based position to consider 
all that may be affected, a power-based position to favour critical stakeholders 
or an ownership-based position to privilege only the owners (Gray, Owen & 
Adams 1996; Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b). Thus, NGOs could take either a 
narrower view position to be only accountable to their “mission to critical 
stakeholders” (Unerman & O'Dwyer 2006b, p. 355) or embrace a broader view 
that acknowledges the rights of all stakeholders who may be directly or 
indirectly impacted by the organisations. Within this dimension, relational 
accountability underlines the role accountability plays as “a vital mechanism of 
control” (Mulgan 2000, p. 563) whereas identity accountability emphasises 
accountability as a “social acknowledgement and an insistence that one’s 
actions make a difference to both self and others” (Roberts 1991, p. 365).  
In addition to being held accountable to external stakeholders for actions and 
inactions, accountability is also motivated by an internal “felt responsibility” 
towards organisational mission and staff (Ebrahim 2003a; Fry 1995, p. 183). 
Felt responsibility manifests itself when practitioners experience an intrinsic 
responsibility to align their value, ethical and cultural dimensions with those of 
the organisation (Agyemang et al. 2017; O'Dwyer & Boomsma 2015). O'Dwyer 
and Boomsma (2015) framed the “felt accountability” regime in which the 
shared vision and collective responsibility for organisational goals are 
prioritised over concerns of “imposed accountability” enforced by external 
stakeholders. The felt accountability emphasises the integration of personal 
conscience with organisational values which facilitates “a more personalised 
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flow of communication” and “a sense of trust” to fully encourage accountability 
among organisational members (O'Dwyer & Boomsma 2015, p. 41). At the 
other end of this dimension, imposed accountability regimes involve more 
formal, reactive, and compliance-based mechanism of control and oversight 
imposed by external stakeholders (Edwards & Hulme 2014; O'Dwyer & 
Boomsma 2015; Roberts 1991; Sinclair 1995). Ebrahim (2009) observes that 
felt accountability is more likely to prosper when NGOs confront less coercive 
external pressure and are given more flexibility to develop internal values. 
However, O'Dwyer and Boomsma (2015) point to the danger that an over-
inward-looking focus could blind NGOs from perceiving impacts on and 
expectations from external stakeholders. The available evidence suggests that 
when an NGO became too dependent on the key government funders, it 
experienced a reduced influence over the accountability co-construction 
process in the context of intensified public and political scepticism (O’Dwyer 
and Boomsma 2015). 
While the three dichotomous frameworks facilitate conceptualisation of NGO 
accountability along discrete dimensions, the key notions of these models do 
not reject each other but overlap in certain aspects. For example, upward 
accountability, downward accountability, relational accountability and imposed 
accountability emphasise accountability duties towards external parties. While 
imposed accountability and the narrower view of relational accountability (focus 
on who can affect the organisation) often lead to upward accountability being 
prioritised, the broader view of relational accountability (focus on who can be 
affected by the organisation) highlights the role downward accountability play 
in greater extent. Similarly, felt accountability and identity accountability call 
attention to the values, mission and culture that are internal to the organisation. 
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Both highlighting the role individual actors play in NGO accountability, felt 
accountability emphasises the development of shared value within the 
organisation whereas identity accountability draws more attention to the 
acceptance of existing organisational “identity” and mission. The implication for 
NGOs practising identity accountability is that it is the established decision-
maker who determines the scope of the NGO’s accountability. While Unerman 
and O'Dwyer (2006b, 2010) conceptualise identity accountability as overly self-
centric and giving limited rights to external stakeholder, Ebrahim (2003a, 2016) 
associate it more positively with a willingness to take action for shaping 
organisational value and performance. Whilst these models and concepts have 
been regularly investigated in Western NGOs, there is little evidence about 
accountability from a GONGO’s perspective. In the case of GONGO actors, 
crossing the conventional boundaries of the public and the third sector, the 
power relations between the account holder and the account provider, the 
potential range of sanctions and rewards, and the operationalisation of the 
account-giving process may pose different and possibly more intense 
challenges and implications to all the parties involved. Exploring GONGOs 
accountability becomes a necessary and timely contribution to the 
understanding of the hybridity embedded in these organisations.  
2.6 The Notion of CSR 
The inherent ambiguity embedded in the nature of CSR makes it a complex 
subject to be distinctly defined. Since Bowen first argued in his book that 
companies have an obligation to produce “social goods” in 1953 (Bowen, 
Bowen & Gond 2013), numerous definitions of CSR have been proposed by 
scholars, and such definitions have evolved over time (Lee, SY & Carroll 2011). 
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Whereas earlier research defined CSR as a corporate strategy to obtain 
economic and legal objectives (Bowen, Bowen & Gond 2013; Carroll 1979; 
Keith & Blomstrom 1975; Mason 1960; McGuire 1963), more recent definitions 
have emphasised stakeholder engagement and taking the broader society into 
account (Carroll 1991, 2012; Lee, SY & Carroll 2011). Davis (1973, p. 313) 
advocates that ‘‘social responsibility begins where law ends’’. In spite of the 
diversity of CSR, it delivers a compelling view that ‘‘corporate responsibility 
reporting has become de facto law for business’’ (KPMG 2011, p. 2). According 
to Jamali and Keshishian (2008, p. 278), contemporary CSR comprises 
corporate “principles, processes, practices, and activities beyond its pursuit of 
economic responsibility for its shareholders and beyond compliance with 
regulations, which contribute to the improvement of the welfare of its 
stakeholders or specific constituency groups and societal segments”. 
The scholarly debate on the notion of CSR has been intensively salient. A key 
question in the debate is whether CSR generates a desirable outcome in the 
long term (Berman et al. 1999; Margolis & Walsh 2003). While normative 
approaches to CSR criticise the economically narrow perception of purely 
instrumental research and attempt to ethically embed questions of societal 
responsibility (Donaldson & Dunfee 2002; Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Solomon 
1992), the political considerations on CSR regarding its implication on 
underlying institutional and political orders of society also become increasingly 
prominent (Scherer & Palazzo 2007). As an evolving notion, the boundaries of 
CSR ranges from an “obligation to respond to the externalities created by 
market action” (Husted & Allen 2006, p. 839), to CSR as “discretionary spending 
in furtherance of an explicit measurable social objective consistent with relevant 
social norms and laws” (Dunfee 2008, p. 349), and CSR entailing “an additional 
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political responsibility to contribute to the development and proper working of 
global governance” (Scherer & Palazzo 2011, p. 906).  
The most cited definition of CSR is Carroll’s (1991) four-tier pyramid model 
incorporating economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities into an 
integrated conceptualisation. In this model: ethical responsibilities embody 
those standards, norms, or expectations that reflect a concern for stakeholders 
like the environmental, civil rights, and many other forms; and philanthropic 
responsibilities encompass those corporate actions that respond to society’s 
expectation including business contributions to the arts, education, or the 
community (Carroll 1991). Economic and legal responsibilities are the basic 
levels of CSR which companies are compelled to fulfil for their existence and 
continuous survival (Carroll 1991). Broader definitions of CSR allow for making 
a practical distinction between the different types of corporate responses and 
motivations. Husted and Salazar (2006) make a useful distinction between 
strategic, altruistic, and coerced CSR in which strategic CSR is implemented 
as a business strategy; altruist CSR is concerned with social benefits in terms 
of returns to the firm; a coerced CSR is influenced by tax or subsidy regulations.  
Despite the different perspectives on the notion of CSR, Crane et al. (2008) 
argue that the lack of definitive boundaries for CSR should not necessarily be 
seen as a weakness for research in the field but rather flexibility to 
accommodate differences in the political, economic and social context. While 
CSR is broadly seen as a global issue with international guidelines outlining the 
best practices, tremendous variations in both the focus and the level of social 
involvements should not be ignored (Marquis, Glynn & Davis 2007). Companies 
are essentially embedded in institutions and contextual relationships that make 
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each operational space of CSR unique (Khanna, Kogan & Palepu 2006). As 
CSR is contingent upon different contexts and institutions in which individual 
corporations operate, there is a growing body of literature arguing that CSR 
conception and practices should be examined within more culture and 
institution-specific bound (Aguilera et al. 2007; Campbell 2007a; Marquis, 
Glynn & Davis 2007). 
2.6.1 The Emergence of CSR in China 
Since China’s reform and open-up policy launched in 1978, the political and 
economic status of China has been dramatically exalted in the international 
arena (Yin, J & Zhang 2012). However, despite its extraordinary economic 
achievements, numerous environmental and social issues, such as 
environmental degradation, labour violations, product safety, and income 
inequality emerged correspondingly (Tan-Mullins & Hofman 2014). Historically, 
CSR in China was initially ignited by exogenous forces in the mid-1990s when 
multinational companies (MNCs) brought with them western CSR norms and 
standards into the Chinese market during the “anti-sweatshop” campaign that 
opposed working conditions in factories (Zhou, W 2006). At that time, Chinese 
companies as suppliers to the global assembly plants were socialised to accept 
CSR requirements as part of the basic requirements to compete in the global 
market (Tan-Mullins & Hofman 2014). Inevitably, the notion of CSR gained its 
incremental attention in China through the revolution of globalisation. However, 
CSR was not widely accepted based on the perception that it was a concept 
coined in the west with standards incompatible with the Chinese social norms 
(Wang, L & Juslin 2009a). Although the central government recognised the 
need to address these CSR issues, the absence of available regulations, 
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ambiguous laws and poor enforcement capacity have led to China’s falling short 
of its reform targets (Day 2005). A growing number of studies provided 
supportive evidence that CSR has become one of the most pressing issues in 
China’s economy (Tan-Mullins & Hofman 2014).  
Since the 1990s, other international drivers for CSR in China, such as global 
market demands and socialisation by international and non-governmental 
organisations, have prompted the passive acceptance of CSR. For example, 
some NGOs and MNCs drafted “codes of conduct” specifically for Chinese 
business, including the “China Business Principles” of the International Labour 
Rights Fund and Global Exchange (Tan-Mullins & Hofman 2014; Wang, L & 
Juslin 2009a). Trade associations, the press, and consumer groups also work 
collaboratively to set self-regulating guidelines to increase the likelihood of 
companies to act responsibly by promoting best practices. Some pioneering 
media agencies, such as the Southern Weekly and WTO Tribune, advocate 
greater corporate accountability by exposing corporate scandals and promoting 
annual CSR rankings (Yin, J & Zhang 2012). CSR initiatives also gradually 
picked up momentum among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and export-
oriented small and medium enterprises (SMEs). For SOEs, positive financial 
performance has become increasingly associated with higher expectations 
from the public on environmental pollutions issues (Shen, Liu & Zhou 2008). As 
to the export-oriented SMEs, many of them started to realise the value of 
achieving higher social and environmental standards to compete in the global 
marketplace (Christmann & Taylor 2006). This led to the growth of CSR 
sensitive managers and entrepreneurs to integrate socially responsible 
practices into their management strategy and daily operation in pursuit of global 
competitive edge (Gugler & Shi 2009).  
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In response to the call for a more circumstantial approach to research on 
Chinese CSR (Moon, J & Shen 2010; Yang, HH, Craig & Farley 2015), a 
systematic clarification of the institutional foundation and regulation structures 
underpinning the Chinese CSR movement is expected. Moon and Shen (2010) 
highlight the very different starting points, journeys, drivers and manifestations 
of CSR in Western countries and China. They also note that previous research 
methodologies on Chinese CSR issues were predominantly from Western 
academic sources and explanations of Chinese CSR were different from 
Western systems. It is evident that reiterating Western-based mindsets to the 
Chinese context demands a higher level of sensitivity in regards to entailing 
theoretical presumptions on CSR research in China. Yang, HH, Craig and 
Farley (2015) in their study also called for an adoption of a more flexible 
theoretical perspective to conduct Chinese CSR research. They argued for 
more cognisance of distinctive Chinese characteristics with the integration of 
macro and micro contextual factors. Given the drastically rising force of NGOs 
in China, exploration of civil society’s function has become a stream of research 
that cannot be overlooked in grasping a comprehensive understanding of CSR 
in China (Moon, J & Shen 2010). 
2.6.2 The Regulation-Driven CSR in China 
Comparing to most western countries, CSR in China features a stronger 
regulatory orientation (Gond, Kang & Moon 2011). Transitioning from a planned 
economy system, Chinese companies rely heavily on state guidance than on 
market-oriented systems (Whitehead 2014). Such a context has given rise to a 
more “implicit” form of CSR which is driven by social standards established by 
the state (Brammer, Jackson & Matten 2012; Kang, N & Moon 2012; Matten & 
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Moon 2008). Highly visible regulatory interventions of the state in China range 
from the enactment of laws to mandating CSR reporting in the largest firms 
(Hofman, Moon & Wu 2017). 
Figure 2-2 The Key Milestones of Regulation-Driven CSR in China 
As illustrated in Figure 2-3, over the past decade the Chinese government has 
implemented a series of regulations and guidelines with the aim of 
strengthening the corporate commitment to CSR (Lin, L 2010; Wang, L & Juslin 
2009b). In 2005, the central government advocated a transition from faster to 
greener GDP growth, placing ‘‘Promote Scientific Development and 
Harmonious Society’’ on top of economic and social policy agenda, and setting 
energy saving, emission reduction, and labour rights protection as national 
strategies (See 2009; Yin, J & Zhang 2012). Provincial, city and local 
government leaders made significant advancements in promoting CSR. The 
Department of Industry and Commerce in Shandong province promoted an 
indexing system and a CSR association whose database include over 4,000 
companies; the Wenzhou city created the first CSR assessment system for 
private companies in China (WTO Tribute 2009). Other CSR regulatory efforts 
also include the new Corporate Law enacted in 2006 urging all companies to 
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assume social responsibility (Moon, J, Muthuri & Idemudia 2010), the 
encouragement of CSR in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by the State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, and release of CSR reporting 
guidelines made by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (Levine 
2008; Whitehead 2014). The Chinese government announced China’s entrance 
into the “New Normal Phase” of economic development in 2015, further urging 
companies to recalibrate their moral compass from aggressive expansions to a 
consolidation between profitability and sustainability (Mayer 2016). The 
issuance of National CSR Standard GB/T 36000 (Standardisation 
Administration of the PRC 2015), a Chinese equivalent of ISO 26000 signal a 
prominent state-led approach to CSR. 
Companies in China actively responded to these regulatory efforts. For 
example, in 2005, the State Grid Corporation was the first and only SOE issuing 
a report on their environmental and social performance (Ip 2008). Promoted by 
the state-led approach, the number of companies issuing CSR reports 
increased to over 1,700 by the end of 2016 (Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences 2016). However, studies indicate that the level of social and 
environmental disclosure in China tends to reflect mainly the demands of 
powerful stakeholders such as government and shareholders (Dong, Burritt & 
Qian 2014). Alon et al. (2010) compare the CSR reporting practices in Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, and found that Chinese firms are the least 
communicative on various CSR issues. In a comprehensive investigation on 
CSR disclosure by Chinese companies, Marquis and Qian (2014) found that 
the factors relating to the firm’s exposure to government regulation provide an 
explanation for the firm’s decision to issue CSR reports, and it increased the 
likelihood of companies to make their CSR reports more substantive. This trend 
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is consistent with the assessment of Chinese firms that the coordination and 
control systems involve limited accountability and transparency, and that higher 
levels of accountability and transparency are strongly driven by the government 
(Hofman, Moon & Wu 2017). In addition to regulatory efforts by the central 
government, CSR policy formulation and implementation at lower provincial 
and municipal levels are also acting as a basis for policy experimentation and 
best practice development (Hofman, Moon & Wu 2017). A range of local 
governments has been leading in developing CSR programs and policies, such 
as the Pudong district in Shanghai and Wenzhou in Zhejiang province (Gao, B., 
Dietmar & Edele 2012). In brief, regulation-driven and government-led CSR 
phenomenon mark the distinctive feature of CSR practices in China. 
2.7 A Review of NGOs’ Role in Corporate Social Responsibility 
Following a review of the notion of NGO and CSR, this section presents a 
review of NGOs’ engagement in CSR both in practice and in theory. 
2.7.1 Empirical Evidence on NGOs’ Role in CSR 
As CSR gains increasing social acceptance around the globe, NGOs appear to 
be exerting substantial influence on firms’ CSR decisions (Guay, Doh & Sinclair 
2004; Teegen, Doh & Vachani 2004). Fostering a plurality of perspectives, CSR 
scholars have directed their attention toward NGOs for its value and 
significance in advancing environmental protections (Hoffman 1999), labour 
rights (Vogel 2008), gender equality (Grosser 2015), and voluntary regulations 
(Hond & De Bakker 2007; Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Doh and Guay (2004) point 
out that NGOs inherently seek to influence corporate strategy and corporate 
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governance by promoting CSR practices they perceived ethical whereas such 
engagement can be either collaboration, independence or opposition in form.  
The roles NGOs play in CSR tend to vary across environmental and social 
issues. Carroll (2015) marked NGOs in the realms of civil rights, women’s rights, 
consumer’s rights and environmental protection as the most important 
precursors of CSR movement as early as in the 1960s. However, more specific 
and frequent engagements of NGOs in CSR were not observed until the 1990s. 
Wheeler and Sillanpää (1997) marked The Body Shop’s outreach to NGO in 
1996 as the first milestone of global initiation on CSR dialogue between 
corporations and NGOs. Doh and Guay (2006) in their study summarised a 
series of subsequent events signifying an escalating empowerment of NGOs in 
CSR activities: the Marine Stewardship Council was established in 1996 
incorporating World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) as the major motivator; the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) recognised NGOs as a significant part of 
business stakeholder in 1997; in 2000, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) involved NGOs in composing their 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; in 2002, European Commission 
started the European Multi-stakeholder Forum with NGOs as one of the major 
participants. NGOs’ engagement in terms of either conversations, consultations 
or debates has manifestly fostered CSR movements on a global scale. Other 
than CSR performance, NGOs also enforce considerable impacts on CSR 
disclosure (Deegan & Blomquist 2006; Tilt 1994). Also, as important drivers of 
civil regulation, NGOs turn to “soft law” such as codes of conduct or guidelines 
to shape socially responsible conduct (Bendell 2005). To summarise, NGOs 
typically employ either a collaborative or a confrontational strategy in engaging 
CSR activities. Increasingly, however, empirical evidence suggests that more 
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NGOs are using a mixed strategy, employing collaboration where appropriate 
but also engaging in confrontation or steering action where necessary (Yaziji & 
Doh 2009).  
While vigorousness has been observed internationally, NGOs’ genuine impact 
on corporations heavily depends on regional context (Doh & Guay 2006). 
Though the role of NGOs in CSR is richly examined in many industrialised 
countries, especially in countries with a liberal democratic form of governance, 
one might expect further insight for such actors from developing countries such 
as China (Davis, SM & Moosmayer 2014; Yang, J & Chan 2011; Yaziji & Doh 
2009). In China, NGOs’ involvement in CSR is at a nascent stage, and 
business-NGO relations are less examined in the literature (Moon, J & Shen 
2010). Different from the origins of CSR in the western wettings, NGOs in China 
are led by a State regulatory approach and play a limited role in the emergence 
of CSR. Hou and Li (2014) state that the lack of authentic NGOs in China leads 
Chinese companies to misconstrue CSR as a compulsory rather than a 
voluntary principle. 
Due to the media censorship system in China, the contents of off-line print, 
audio, and audio-visual media provided limited space for NGOs in their CSR 
campaigning (Stockmann & Gallagher 2011). However, Gao (2007) reports that 
the voice of NGOs in China is growing through the Internet and social media, 
and there is an increasing demand for companies to incorporate NGOs in their 
CSR activities. In a similar vein, Wang et al. (2006) provide that NGOs targeting 
consumer rights mainly resort to the Internet in advocating CSR claims. Lin 
(2010) argues that Chinese NGOs are more inclined to use non-confrontational 
tactics (e.g. public education, information dissemination, salon discussions, 
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field trips, and litigation) in the advancement of their CSR agenda. Confirming 
this idea, Noronha et al. (2013) document that NGOs are specifically focusing 
on CSR research and training, such as the Golden Bee Social Responsibility 
Education Centre and SynTao Sustainability Solutions, are pushing the idea of 
CSR to become more acknowledged by Chinese enterprises.  
Despite the investigation of prior research offering valuable insights on NGOs’ 
involvement in Chinese CSR activities, these examinations are mostly situated 
in one-to-one, business-NGO cases, and therefore failed to capture the 
implications of other involving actors. While most of the extant research denotes 
that NGOs and CSR are heavily influenced by the state-led approach, prior 
research is limited in examining such regulatory implications on their interactive 
elements and the collective actions systematically.  
2.7.2 Theoretical Explanations of the Role of NGOs in CSR 
Broadly speaking, there are a number of theoretical orientations in defining the 
relationship between NGOs and businesses. They include interpreting the 
business-NGO interactions using institutional theory (Doh & Teegen 2002; 
Teegen 2003; Vachani, Doh & Teegen 2009), stakeholder theory (de Bakker & 
den Hond 2007; Hossain et al. 2016; O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer 2009b) and agency 
theory (Doh & Guay 2006; Guay, Doh & Sinclair 2004; Jamali & Keshishian 
2008). More specifically, in the field of social and environmental accounting, 
Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995) suggest that legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
theory are the most commonly adopted theoretical perspectives to explain why 
businesses engage NGOs in their CSR strategies, including both CSR 
disclosure and CSR practices. Both legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory 
stem from the broader Bourgeois political economy theory and “tend to be 
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concerned with interactions between groups in an essentially pluralistic world, 
such as negotiation between a company and an environmental pressure group” 
(Deegan 2014, p. 343). 
Legitimacy theory is frequently embraced in explaining the motivation of 
corporate CSR reactions, including CSR reporting, to NGOs (Owen & Parker 
2008). Legitimacy theory contends that an entity constantly seeks to ensure its 
value system complies with the general value perceptions from the larger 
society; thus any incongruence arisen could endanger the entity’s legitimacy 
and prompt the entity to make changes accordingly (Deegan 2014). When an 
organisation’s operations and accountabilities are consistent with the “social 
contract”, it will be deemed legitimate (Deegan 2014). Legitimate organisations 
are perceived as more worthy, meaningful, predictable and trustworthy and find 
it easier to attract financial, social and political resources and support (Suchman 
1995). However, the organisation’s status is not static and cannot be taken for 
granted. Community perceptions and expectations change, and what was once 
deemed as acceptable may not remain adequate. Organisations, therefore, 
need to predict and acknowledge changes in society’s views and protect their 
past accomplishments by maintaining or repairing the organisation’s legitimacy 
(Suchman 1995). A “legitimacy gap” arises when the actions and activities of 
an organisation differ from society’s expectations and perceptions of how the 
organisation should conduct its business (O’Donovan 2002). NGOs’ 
expectations and activities considerably transform the value and expectations 
of the community, which subsequently impels companies to respond to the 
legitimacy gaps (Deegan & Islam 2014). Scholars have provided evidence that 
NGOs have the ability to shape community expectations while businesses, 
being aware of NGOs ability, react to the claims of NGOs. Embracing legitimacy 
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theory, Deegan and Gordon (1996) find that corporate environmental 
disclosures are positively associated with the levels of environmental group 
membership. Examining the influence lobby groups have on corporate 
environmental reporting policies, Deegan and Blomquist (2006) provide 
evidence that organisations are prepared to listen to NGOs. Jointly investigating 
the role of NGOs and news media, Deegan and Islam (2014) show that social 
and environmental NGOs strategically use the news media to affect CSR 
practices.  
Institutional theory asks questions about how social choices are shaped, 
mediated, and channelled by the institutional environment (Hoffman 1999). It 
has long been one of the most prevalent theoretical models used in 
underpinning NGOs’ role in CSR. This theory has suggested that organisations 
are either instinctively or deliberately endeavour to become isomorphic with 
their counterparts within a given institutional setting (Yaziji & Doh 2009). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out that there are three different isomorphic 
processes: coercive isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and normative 
isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is associated with the managerial branch 
of stakeholder theory and arises when an organisation is coerced to change its 
practice by its powerful stakeholders (Deegan 2014). Mimetic isomorphism 
refers to organisations copying practices of other successful organisations to 
maintain legitimacy and competitive advantages (Deegan 2014). Normative 
isomorphism is regarding pressures “arising from group norms to adopt 
particular institutional practices” (Deegan 2014, p. 387). Prior literature has 
primarily embraced the isomorphism perspective in this theory to examine the 
NGO’s emergence, growth, survival and malfunction associated with CSR 
activities (Hsu, CL & Jiang 2015; Teegen, Doh & Vachani 2004). Campbell 
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(2007b) explains that the engagement and dialogue of a company with its 
stakeholders take place within a long-standing cultural, socioeconomic and 
legal context, and a tradition of interrelations among different social actors, all 
of which form part of ‘‘institutional conditions’’. In this sense, institutional theory 
reveals that organisational strategies are shaped by the institutional legacies 
mirroring the polity, culture, and history of the host country whereas 
organisational practices are constantly challenged by their equivalents through 
collaboration and competition. It also provides theoretical rationales in that 
corporations and NGOs are considerably assimilated by the broader milieu 
whereas mutual influences within and against each camp are significant. Hsu 
and Jiang (2015) argue that entities are overwhelmingly impelled to pursue 
organisational practices of their counterparts in a mature institutional setting. 
However, in an emerging scenario like China, the institutionalised constraints 
are yet to be fully established, placing such isomorphic pressure on actors could 
arguably be compromised (Hsu, CL & Jiang 2015). Examining NGO–business 
partnerships and CSR from an institutional perspective, Whitehead (2014) find 
that the involvement of NGO reflects a changing institutional environment in 
China. 
Another dominant theory conventionally incorporated in the pertinent research 
spectrum is stakeholder theory, within which NGOs’ role on CSR issues are 
mostly rationalised as underrepresented stakeholders (Skouloudis, 
Evangelinos & Malesios 2015). According to Freeman (1983, p. 91), a broad 
sense of “stakeholders” can be defined as any identifiable group or individual 
who can affect the achievement of an organisation’s objectives, or is affected 
by the achievement of an organisation’s objective. Deegan (2014) denotes that 
the stakeholder theory has two major branches – the ethical branch and the 
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managerial branch. Considerable overlap between the managerial branch of 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory can be identified. The managerial 
branch mainly provides theoretical explanations on why organisations report 
social and environmental information to secure support and approval from 
primary stakeholders. Taking this viewpoint, Deegan and Blomquist (2006) 
assert that organisations tend to use the information to gain support and 
approval of powerful stakeholders. They further point out that an organisation 
will only perceive a need to disclose social and environmental information if a 
powerful stakeholder group express those concerns (Deegan & Blomquist 
2006). Deegan (2014) suggests that legitimacy theory, institutional theory, and 
the managerial branch of stakeholder theory are not sharply distinct. They are 
originated from similar philosophical assumptions and often offer overlapping 
perspectives (Deegan 2014). Taking a joint consideration of these three 
theories, Islam and Deegan (2008) find a direct relationship between changes 
in powerful stakeholders’ concerns and the CSR reporting practices of the 
organisation. The ethical branch highlights that all stakeholders, regardless of 
their power, merits equal consideration on their rights to information. This 
branch argues that corporations will only be considered as socially responsible 
if they value the interests of both primary and secondary stakeholder groups. It 
then implies that failing to take into account the interest of secondary 
stakeholders, like NGOs, corporations will face both moral criticism and 
financial loss in the long run (Arenas, Lozano & Albareda 2009). 
Correspondingly, NGOs’ involvement in CSR activities are justified as in it 
substantially leads to a win-win outcome for NGO-business relation whereas 
corporations are considered to be irresponsible when neglecting external 
stakeholders like NGOs (Guay, Doh & Sinclair 2004). Under the stakeholder 
theory, stakeholder power is at the centre of examinations on NGO’s role in 
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CSR. What has not been addressed in this theoretical perspective is that 
stakeholder power is not a fixed term. NGOs who are weak in terms of 
stakeholder power can also be converted into stronger ones by networking with 
others. Therefore, this theoretical perspective does not shed light on the 
network power of NGOs. 
A growing number of scholars are considering NGOs as increasingly powerful 
agents rather than stakeholders in the context of CSR (Guay, Doh & Sinclair 
2004). The agency theory argues that the relationship between business-NGO 
is a principal-agent interaction where both parties are seeking synergistic 
access to finance and expertise. While corporations have more luxury access 
to financial freedom, NGOs possess better knowledge in approaching the 
impoverished (Jamali & Keshishian 2008). From the stance of the agency 
theory, efficiency and specialisation are expected to be leveraged through such 
a donor-recipient model. Nonetheless, Jamali and Keshishian (2008) also 
emphasise careful considerations, such as choices of partners, alignment of 
values as well as the level of competence and resources dependency, must be 
contemplated in order to initiate an effective business-NGO partnership. The 
salience of trust is further reiterated in such collaboration where principals and 
agents of alliance partners must hold confidence in their counterparts to devote 
genuine commitments. Conversely, it is also evident that the failure of a 
successful collaboration can be traced to the asymmetry of information, 
miscommunication and incompatible working cultures (Samii, Van Wassenhove 
& Bhattacharya 2002). This stream of research generally documents that 
considering NGOs as philanthropic agents is risk-bearing in nature, yet the 
benefits of a successful collaboration outweigh the risks involved. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a review of the literature pertinent to critical concepts of 
this research. This literature review demonstrates the inherent paradox of 
GONGOs as a mutant type of NGOs and highlights the role that the context 
plays in prompting GONGO’s practical significance in China. This literature 
review underlies two main streams of theoretical frameworks in understanding 
GONGO’s hybridity: the corporatism framework for GO-ish attributes and the 
civil society framework for NGO-ish attributes. Through the lens of 
accountability, the implication of GONGO’s hybridity on accountability tensions 
are critically reviewed with reference to NGO accountability dimensions. This 
chapter reviewed the CSR literature to explain the unique context for state-led 
CSR in China. Empirical and theoretical evidence in the literature suggests an 
overly business-centred approach in explaining NGOs’ role in CSR. The lack of 
an integrated approach to encapsulate GONGO’s hybridity and the limited 
research on how GONGO actors wield governance influence over CSR is what 
this study aims to address. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter proposes the theoretical underpinning that will be used to guide 
this research. Conventional theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter 2 
provide insightful explanations on NGOs’ role in CSR, and they are well 
supported by rich evidence in the literature. However, these examinations are 
mostly businesses-centred, thus provide limited close-up investigation from the 
NGOs’ perspective. Embracing an alternative theoretical perspective – 
networked governance in responsive regulation theory – this research seeks to 
enrich, rather than challenge conventional CSR literature. The intention is 
twofold: the first is to offer an alternative view to investigate GONGO’s CSR 
influence as a regulator rather than a secondary stakeholder of companies; the 
second is to address the distinctive features of GONGOs and examine their 
CSR governance mechanisms from a contextual and networked perspective.  
The following sections in this chapter provide a systematic review of the 
theoretical perspectives underpinned this study. This will start with a clarification 
on the definition of regulation and governance embraced by this research. 
Section 3.3 will explain the foundational responsive regulation theory and its 
key ideas regarding NGOs’ role as a responsive regulator. Under the umbrella 
responsive regulation theory, section 3.4 further clarifies the networked 
governance perspective of the responsive regulation theory that is used as the 
primary theoretical lens of the research. The networked governance 
perspective enables this study to take a network-level approach to capture both 
features of individual nodal organisations and interactive dynamics among 
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networked actors. A visualised summary of this study’s topic and theoretical 
positioning is presented at the end of this chapter to pin down its empirical and 
theoretical contribution and significance. 
3.2 From Regulation to Governance 
The conventional understanding of regulation is usually based on prescribed 
rules and standards and connotes commands and interference by government 
in intrusive ways. From a traditional legal perspective, the scope of a regulation 
system must at least capture three enforcing components: the capacity for 
standard-setting, the capacity for monitoring, and the capacity for behaviour-
modification (Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin 2004). Therefore, the habitual 
understanding of regulation falls into a form of command and control (CAC) 
mechanism, reflecting the regulator’s capacity to adopt legal rules backed by 
punitive sanctions. The underlying assumption of conventional regulation is 
deemed unilateral in nature, comprising a linear cause-and-effect relationship 
starting from policy formation to policy implementation (Black 2002b). However, 
if the meaning and scope of regulation are confined to standard-setting and law 
enforcement, this rules-based definition could mislead those who seek to 
regulate and be regulated on to how to pursue and improve intervention 
strategically. 
Over time, empirical examinations on regulation have led to an updated 
contemporary understanding that regulation should be conceived as a socially 
interactive activity incorporating both hard and soft approaches wielded by a 
broad range of stakeholders in addition to the legal authorities. Rather than 
seen and practised as an inelastic rule of law, regulation has become a dynamic 
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process that everyone who seeks to influence the flow of events can participate 
(Parker, C & Braithwaite 2003). The broader view has shifted the emphasis from 
regulation with legal forms of law-making to governance with additional non-
legal forms of norm making (Drahos & Krygier 2017). Levi-Faur (2011) expands 
the notion of regulation and argues that the ongoing regulatory explosion 
consists of different mechanisms of control and is characterised by new forms 
of regulatory agencies and regulatory networks. In this sense, regulation is 
conceived as not only minimising violations but also maximising opportunities, 
especially for CSR regulation which is mostly voluntary bounded. A broad 
understanding is needed to realise that CSR regulation is more than rectifying 
faults but encompasses the value and potential of continuous improvements 
beyond compliance. Extant studies find that companies adopt such 
“mechanisms of control” so as to: prevent costly litigation disputes (Whytock 
2010); minimise the cost of regulatory compliance (Cafaggi & Janczuk 2010); 
or acquire commercial opportunities (Auld et al. 2010; Fuchs & Kalfagianni 
2010).  
Black (2002b) suggests that the extending conceptualisation from regulation to 
governance incorporates not only how the government might act, but also how 
different forms of power and control are exercised throughout society. When a 
governance lens is applied to the sphere of CSR, the horizon of governance is 
widened to incorporate command-and-control regulation by the government, 
self-regulation by businesses, and civil regulation by civil society organisations. 
Vogel (2008) concurs this point and further describes NGOs as a form of civil 
regulation, which adopts an array of alternative regulatory measures other than 
enforcement, such as self-regulation, market-based instruments, and soft laws. 
Considering social and environmental scenarios, environment regulation in 
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particular, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (1998, p. 181) contend that 
understanding regulation should integrate “much more flexible, imaginative and 
innovative forms of social control than the law which seeks to harness not just 
governments but also markets, businesses and third parties”. Therefore, 
involving both commercial interests and NGOs, “subtle manipulation of 
incentives and the creation of opportunity structures” should be mobilised in 
addition to direct legal interventions (Gunningham, Neil, Grabosky & Sinclair 
1998, p. 131).  
3.3 Responsive Regulation Theory  
Taking neither a government command-and-control regulation nor a pure 
laissez-faire self-regulation approach alone, responsive regulation integrates 
both styles into one approach. It incorporates state interventions, persuasive 
education, and cooperative self-regulation at different stages of specific 
scenarios in order to form a tailored regulatory continuum. In this way, Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) argue that adversarial relationships between regulators 
and regulatees can be largely minimised, while offenders also cannot get away 
with undesired violations. Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair (1998) further 
argue for the importance of including third parties, especially NGOs, to enhance 
the efficiency of such combined approaches. Much has been discussed about 
public regulators in the extant literature, but transfusing the responsive 
regulation perspective into this research offers a heuristic to support the 
comprehension of the role of NGOs, especially GONGO’s role, as a networked 
regulator in promoting CSR. 
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The theory of responsive regulation was fermented in “an era of regulatory flux” 
in which both fierce desires of deregulation and reassertion of state intervention 
were co-occurring (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, p. 7). Since the initial publication 
of Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate by Ayres and 
Braithwaite in 1992, the theory has endured, answering conundrums about how 
to reconcile different degrees and forms of regulatory responses to achieve 
regulation efficiency and effectiveness. According to Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992), the fundamental concept of responsive regulation is that regulators 
should be responsive to the culture, conduct, and context of those they seek to 
regulate in deciding whether a more or less interventionist response should be 
applied. 
 
Figure 3-1 The Enforcement Pyramid (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, p. 35)  
As shown in Figure 3-1, the image of the “enforcement pyramid” lies at the heart 
of responsive regulation addresses to the questions about when to punish and 
when to persuade in the regulation process (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). The 
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core idea of responsive regulation theory can be easily visualised through the 
pyramidal model. At the base of the pyramid lie the most inclusive, collaborative 
and dialogue-based approaches for securing compliance, at each successive 
level up the interventions are escalated to more demanding and punitive 
measures. The idea is that the regulators should be responsive and have the 
capacity to escalate or de-escalate their regulatory approach, whereas the 
regulatees’ practice will determine the regulatory approach’s level of 
coerciveness. The underlying principle of the pyramid is threefold. First, 
contextual consideration must be given to all available formal and informal 
regulatory approaches for steering the flow of events (Braithwaite, V 2006). 
Second, available regulatory approaches should be organised in a hierarchical 
manner from the most persuasive ones to the most intrusive ones (Braithwaite, 
V 2006). The pyramid underlines the core notion of responsiveness, which 
depicts that soft measures should always be preferred and always precedes 
coercive measures to ensure regulatory efficiency. As regulatory strategy 
moves up the pyramid, repair and ratification from the regulatee are forthcoming 
at a certain point. It is at that point that the regulatory response should be put 
into reverse, and the regulator needs to de-escalate down the pyramid 
(Braithwaite 2017). The third principle is to elicit a commitment to voluntary 
compliance and create opportunities for dialogue by employing rewards and 
benefits (Braithwaite, V 2006). What underpins such argument is a simple 
rationale: punishments are expensive, and persuasions are cheap. Given 
punitive interventions are mostly time-consuming and resource-exhausting, 
regulatory emphasis should be better spent on cost-effective persuasive 
measures. It is suggested that overreliance on enforcement of punitive 
measures could “engenders a game of regulatory cat-and-mouse” whereby 
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regulatees tend to manipulate enforcement loopholes, and regulators lag in 
reaction by rendering remedial patches (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, p. 20).  
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) also denote that the proportion of space at each 
layer of the pyramid is also an indication of the enforcement intensity at each 
level respectively. The idea embedded in the pyramid is a dynamic mechanism, 
in which most regulatory activities should take place at the bottom of the 
pyramid and escalation to more intrusive approach should only occur when 
there is a compelling reason to infer “persuasive approaches” or “soft measures” 
have failed. The ultimate purpose of such mechanisms is to secure compliance 
and encourage continuous improvement in regulatees’ behaviour by embracing 
the most inclusive approaches before demanding interventions (Braithwaite 
2008). When the intrusive regulatory approach and persuasive regulatory 
approach are combined, the options and agility of how to steer the flow of 
events multiplies.  
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3.4 The Networked Governance Perspective 
 
Figure 3-2 A Networked Governance Model Pyramid (Braithwaite 2006, 
p. 890)  
Since its initial publication, the responsive regulation theory has evolved over 
time. The application of the theory has been further extended from a single 
domestic western setting into a diverse range of developed and developing 
countries including both western and non-western contexts (Braithwaite, J 2006; 
Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; Braithwaite & Hong 2015; Braithwaite, Makkai & 
Braithwaite 2007; Dukes, Braithwaite & Moloney 2014; Hong & You 2018; Ivec 
& Braithwaite 2015; Reynaers & Parrado 2017) in the globalised era. Although 
concerns have been raised, supporters of responsive regulation have defended 
its applicability in the age of networked and transnational governance settings 
(Abbott & Snidal 2013; Baldwin & Black 2008; Grabosky 2013; Parker, C 2013).  
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As shown in Figure 3-2, the networked governance perspective of the 
responsive regulation theory is premised on compensating deficits in regulatory 
capacities in developing economies. Networked governance poses an 
approach where weak actors could enrol stronger ones into the governance 
process to accomplish responsive escalation (Braithwaite, J 2006). When 
considering responsive regulation in CSR, it manifests the viability of holding 
NGOs as one of the most collaborative and dialogue-based private regulators 
in facilitating regulatory efficiency. The networked governance perspective 
theoretically supports NGO’s significance as networked regulators who 
escalate the responsive regulation pyramid to build regulatory legitimacy and 
efficiency at a higher level. It also provides theoretical justifications on why 
NGOs may be more potent CSR regulators than governments at elementary 
levels. Meanwhile, this theory brought out the framework of networked 
governance where NGOs in developing countries may be weak in form 
individually, yet they own the capacity of forming networks and enrolling 
stronger government departments to compensate for regulatory deficits 
(Braithwaite, J 2006).  
The applicability of responsive regulation is subject to specific and varied 
regulatory contexts (Nielsen & Parker 2009). In the context of China, companies’ 
resolve to take CSR performance to a higher level is apparent regardless of 
their financial, political or moral motivations (Moon, J & Shen 2010). However, 
the most imminent problem embedded in Chinese CSR at present is a 
combination of lack of regulatory forces and the malfunction of existing 
regulation mechanisms (See 2009). Due to the size of China’s economy, 
geographical area and population, implementing a streamlined CSR regulation 
is challenging. Though seen as a centrally controlled nation, CSR regulation in 
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China is compromised by the complex bureaucratic hierarchy. The 
transformation from a semi-authoritarian state to a country with a high level of 
administration streamlining and government decentralisation warrants non-
state actors to join CSR governance activities. Besides the regulatory 
endeavour from central government and CPC of China, it is expected that other 
forms of social forces can be fully mobilised in order to take Chinese CSR 
movement forward.  
The dynamic feature of responsive regulation in the pyramid framework 
explains why weak actors (NGOs) elicit more powerful ones (other NGOs and 
eventually the government) to accelerate the regulatory escalation to a higher 
level of intervention so as to exert influences (Baldwin & Black 2008). In return, 
it validates the imperative to involve NGOs at a lower level to achieve regulatory 
efficiency and avoid waste in regulatory resources. Moreover, when taking 
responsive regulation from a unitary setting to a multi-dimension realm, this 
theory correspondingly mirrors the CSR regulatory arena in China where there 
exists a multiplicity of actual and potential “regulators” and regulatory efforts are 
often uncoordinated and sometimes operated at cross-purposes. The 
networked governance model of responsive regulation theory provides a 
different perspective to see NGOs role as a vital regulator in Chinese CSR 
context, especially for GONGOs who have higher potentials and stronger 
capabilities to leverage on connections to the government. 
Issues in CSR governance are complex, and even defining the governance 
problem is demanding. Conundrums continue on what is a network with regard 
to governance, and what do they look like? Christopoulos (2008) argues that 
any setting with a plurality of actors and no formal control system that can 
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dictate the relationships between the actors is a governance network. Provan 
and Kenis (2007) further categorise networked governance into participant-
governed networks, lead organisation-governed networks, and network 
administrative organisation. At the most loosely organised level, participant-
governed networks, the networked actors interact with each other on an equal 
basis. Governance is achieved through regular meetings of designated 
organisational representatives, or through the ongoing uncoordinated efforts of 
those who have a stake in network success (Provan & Kenis 2007). Network 
objectives will only be achieved when all networked actors participate and are 
committed to common goals. This form of networked governance is commonly 
found in health and human services, where actors seek to build “community 
capacity” (Provan & Kenis 2007). A lead organisation-governed network, on the 
other hand, occurs horizontally. This form of networked governance is built 
when one particular actor has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play a lead 
role (Provan & Kenis 2007). Thus, whether networked governance can be 
achieved will largely depend on the coordination of lead organisation. Teisman 
and Klijn (2002) delineate a government agency acting as a lead organisation 
in the development of the Rotterdam harbour, whereas Graddy and Chen (2006) 
focus on the key role of lead organisations in governing child welfare networks 
in Los Angeles. The third form of networked governance is called network 
administrative organisation, in which a separate administrative entity will govern 
the centralised network and all its activities (Provan & Kenis 2007). This type of 
network is normally formed on mandatory requirements. They usually take 
forms in formal organisations where distinct executive directors, staffs, and 
board are set to enhance legitimacy in coping with complex social issues 
(Provan, Isett & Milward 2016).  
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Different approaches are applied to enable empirical examinations on 
networked governance phenomenon. One stream of the approaches focuses 
on the location of individual actors in the network as the key analysis dimension. 
The underlying argument behind this approach is that network location as a 
structure characteristic is the critical element of governance capacity. By 
identifying the locations of individual nodal organisations, it enables 
assessment on how close or how far the node is from a strategic location, where 
the occupant has the competitive advantage in possible access to more diverse 
and valued governance resources. Network location measures such as density, 
size, closeness, betweenness, and centrality have been used in literature to 
facilitate such analyses (Schrama 2019). Another stream focuses on embedded 
resources in the network that are afforded by formal and informal relations 
(Christopoulos 2008). The governance capacity is then analysed by the amount 
or variety of resources in others with whom an individual has direct or indirect 
ties.  
In the context of China, formal and informal networks are highly associated with 
personal trust and ties between leaders of different entities. Although China’s 
political environment has been restrictive, it has provided some opportunities 
for NGOs’ resource mobilisation and policy advocacy, especially for those 
whose leaders are social, economic, and political elites (Ru & Ortolano 2009). 
Leveraging personal ties and resources, leaders of NGOs seek to weave and 
expand their networks in order to strengthen their power and voices. In the field 
of environmental protection, it is widely known that China’s environmental 
movement has been spearheaded by prominent individuals committed to 
environmental protection such as Liang Congjie (co-founder of Friends of 
Nature) and Liao Xiaoyi (founder of Global Village Beijing) (Zhan & Tang 2016). 
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More recently, Jack Ma, the founder of the Alibaba Group, established an 
environmental protection foundation connecting 27 individuals from the world’s 
most powerful league including Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg (Lan & 
Galaskiewicz 2015). Meanwhile, many social elites in China, including 
university professors, academic researchers, former government officials, and 
news reporters, have sought to address problems in ecological conservation, 
environmental protection, animal welfare collectively. Many of them have 
established various personal ties with political institutions in China, utilising 
these ties to develop and operate their NGOs (Hsu, CL 2008). These 
interpersonal relations create social capital often seen as an embedded 
network resource which is accessed and mobilised in purposive actions (Lin, N 
2017). The volume of social capital in the network is determined by the size of 
the network and the economic, cultural and symbolic capital possessed by 
networked individuals (Lin, N 2017). Other than the mere size of the network, 
network positions, structural constraints, relationship strength together shapes 
how social capital could be utilised in favour of nodal actors (Lin, N 2002; Tsai 
& Ghoshal 1998). 
The networked governance perspective proposes that when regulation shifts 
from the State to various differently configured nodes, it shifts not merely in 
space but also in kind. The networked approach enables a lateral movement to 
different forms of networked governance at the same level of the pyramid. The 
original responsive regulation pyramid encourages the thought that if the 
regulatory intervention fails, it is natural to escalate rather than scan laterally 
with fluidity and agility looking for horizontal problem-solving partners. 
Networked governance encourages to think and act laterally and in less 
automatically escalatory ways. A set of principles have been proposed as key 
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considerations for strategically employing networked governance with 
responsive regulation. They include: never escalating to hard options without 
considering all available soft and horizontal interventions; using dialogue to 
support norm improvement; demonstrating a preference for “governing by 
providing” over “governing by regulating”; emphasising on capacity building 
rather than control; and scanning creatively for potential network partners with 
fresh resources (Braithwaite 2008, p. 99). Around the world, the potency of 
NGOs’ networked governance mechanism manifests in NGOs addressing 
different social and environmental challenges. These include the care for the 
chronically mental illness (Provan & Milward 1995), development of 
biotechnology (Powell et al. 2005), disaster relief (Simo & Bies 2007), and 
economic development (Ebrahim 2005b). How networked governance has 
been and can be mobilised by Chinese NGOs in tackling CSR issues awaits to 
be explored. 
3.5 Research Positioning 
To illustrate the research positioning of this study, this section presents a 
visualised framework in portraying where this study fits in research theme and 
theory. 
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3.5.1 Research Topic Positioning 
Figure 3-3 Topic Positioning of This Research 
As presented in Figure 3-3, this research follows the research theme path 
indicated by the red arrows. In pursuit of CSR governance mechanisms, 
previous research has extensively examined the government’s command-and-
control governance, NGO’s civil governance, and businesses’ self-governance 
in the global context. This research will specifically look at the governance 
mechanisms taken by the Chinese hybrid NGOs – GONGOs. The selection of 
GONGO is motivated by its practical significance and the lack of insightful 
evidence of it in the literature. This consideration also takes into account the 
legal, political, and social factors concurrently shaping the Chinese context. By 
looking at GONGO’s networked governance on CSR, the position of this 
research carries considerable weight for its novelty in subject choosing, 
potentials in practical application, and significance in theoretical contribution. 
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3.5.2 Theoretical Positioning 
Figure 3-4 Theoretical Positioning of This Research 
As indicated in Figure 3-4, this research is informed and guided by the 
networked governance perspective from the broader responsive regulation 
theory. While responsive regulation theory provides the fundamental concepts, 
assumptions and logics of the theoretical positioning, the extended networked 
governance perspective captures contemporary forms of multi-lateral 
governance participated by a broad range of regulatory actors. Therefore, the 
embraced networked governance perspective is able to reflect the modern 
governance mechanisms and provides a theoretical lens in examining 
GONGOs current governance role in CSR. In simple words, the application of 
networked governance perspective in responsive regulation theory is based on 
four considerations. 
i. It provides a theoretical yet pragmatic explanation on NGOs governance 
potency in CSR by justifying not only when NGOs take governance 
actions but also how they take governance actions. It essentially 
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broadens the narrow attention from the dyadic NGO-business 
relationships in CSR to the network-level interactions. 
ii. Although less resorted, government intervention is at the core of the 
networked governance model. Such an assumption is more compatible 
with the regulatory system and context in China. 
iii. The networked governance perspective highlights the potency of actors’ 
dynamic interdependency and networking power, which is well-suited for 
GONGO’s multifaceted hybrid attributes and organisational structure.  
iv. The responsive regulation theory asserts that compliance is often not an 
endpoint but a waypoint to the ultimate governance objective – attaining 
continuous improvement. This assertion well matches the ever-changing 
CSR issues and the attitudes needed to tackle the complex CSR 
problems. 
Previous NGO-CSR research in western settings largely views NGOs as a 
distinctive and separate actor against the public and private ones. Considering 
the hybrid features of GONGOs in China, this research incorporates both the 
corporatism framework and civil society framework in exploring the governance 
role of GONGOs in CSR. In other words, both the “government-organised” 
attributes and the “non-governmental” attributes of GONGOs are equally 
important and should be addressed when examining their implications on CSR 
governance.  
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the theoretical framework adopted by this research. The 
responsive regulation theory serves as the foundational theory to guide inquiry 
on ‘when’ GONGO actors escalate or deescalate regulation approaches to 
attain intended governance outcome. The networked governance perspective 
under the umbrella responsive regulation theory is further drawn to specifically 
guide examinations on ‘how’ GONGO actors acquire and enhance CSR 
governance capacity by networking interactions. Furthermore, this chapter 
pinpointed the significance and contribution of this study by demonstrating the 
topic positioning and theoretical positioning of the research. Embracing the 
networked governance perspective in responsive regulation theory, this study 
seeks an answer to the research question: How does GONGO’s hybridity shape 
its capacity and application of networked governance to influence CSR 
practices in China? 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
Following explanations of adopted theoretical frameworks in Chapter 3, this 
chapter presents the research design that guides the implementation of data 
collection and analysis in this thesis. This chapter outlines the path to the 
research undertaken in this thesis beginning from the identification of a 
philosophical position to the design of specific data collection strategies and 
analysis. This leads to a specific discussion on why a case study design is 
employed by this research and the protocols taken to ensure the quality of this 
research is presented. This is followed by a detailed description of data 
collection and analysis procedures. Finally, the role of the researcher and 
relevant ethical considerations are briefly outlined. 
4.2 Philosophical Underpinnings and Research Approach 
The phrase “methodology development” is defined as an intersection of 
research philosophies and specific methods where the philosophical 
worldviews a researcher espouses will ultimately lead to a decision on his or 
her preferred research design (Creswell 2013b; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Yin, RK 
2015). This research follows a methodology development path as presented in 
Figure 4-1. This path starts with a clear identification of the researcher’s 
philosophical position. 
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Figure 4-1 The Path of Methodology Development in This Research 
The overarching determinant influencing the selection of research strategy lies 
inherently in the researcher’s viewpoint about the relationship between 
knowledge and how knowledge is developed (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2009). The “assumptions about the nature of reality (ontological assumptions) 
and implicit statements about the kind of knowledge that will be generated by 
the research (epistemological assumptions)” are embedded in a researcher’s 
philosophical positions and provide a springboard to identify the most relevant 
methodology (Quinlan et al. 2011, p. 100). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 15) 
define such a system of philosophical beliefs coupled with the corresponding 
methodology as a “paradigm”. Even so, it is critical to recognise that the 
interconnections between the research paradigm and research methodologies 
“represent tendencies rather than definitive points of correspondence” (Bryman 
& Bell 2011, p. 20). More importantly, the weight of considerations should not 
be given to whether a study is philosophically-informed, but how well the 
philosophical commitment is reflected and defended against other alternatives 
(Johnson, P & Clark 2006).  
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Concerned with what is deemed acceptable knowledge in a field of study, 
epistemology generally takes three positions: positivism, realism, and 
interpretivism (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). Positivism holds that reality 
is an objective existence and tends to produce “law-like generalisations” 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009, p. 113). In a similar vein, realists assert that 
reality is the truth which is independent of the mind (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2009). The interpretivism stance, embraced by this research, emphasises the 
subjective meaning of social phenomenon by respecting that people and their 
institutions are fundamentally distinctive against objective matters of the natural 
sciences (Creswell 2013b). Interpretivists share a view that human behaviour 
is a product of how people interpret the world and therefore seeks to interpret 
human actions from their points of view (Bryman & Bell 2011). The goal of the 
interpretive research, therefore, is to gain rich insights and make sense of the 
complexity (Creswell 2013b). This is consistent with the aim of this research - 
to gain an in-depth, rich in context empirical insight in understanding the role of 
networked governance on CSR in China. 
Following the interpretivist philosophy, this research adopts constructivism as 
its ontological perspective in making a knowledge claim of actual existence 
(Creswell 2013b; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2009). Constructivism holds that 
“individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work” and 
construct subjective meanings based on their personal, cultural and historical 
backgrounds and experiences (Creswell 2013b, p. 8). Challenging the 
assumptions that social actors are external realities, constructivists argue that 
social order is constantly reviewed and revised in and through interactions 
among social actors (Bryman & Bell 2011). The goal of constructivist research, 
therefore, is to delve into social actors’ perspectives as much as possible and 
90 
 
explore multiple meanings embedded in the complexity of views (Creswell 
2013b). In this sense, constructivists search for multifaceted interpretations 
rather than a prescribed definition of the phenomenon being studied. Taking 
constructivism as an ontological perspective, this research acknowledges the 
fluid, evolving, and dynamic nature of GONGO’s networked governance on 
CSR in China and seeks to interpret its implicit meaning embedded in 
interactions among participating actors holding different perspectives. This 
ontological standpoint, combined with the adopted interpretivist assumptions, 
typically render a qualitative approach to this research (Creswell 2013b). 
Consistent with the discussion above, both the philosophical belief the 
researcher holds and the research question this study seeks to answer, lead to 
the adoption of a qualitative approach in this research. Researchers with a 
humanistic bent intrinsically seek discoveries through connections with and 
responses from research participants (Corbin & Strauss 2014; Denzin & Lincoln 
2011). Creswell (2013b, p. 4) defines qualitative research as an approach 
involving “emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the 
participant’s setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to 
general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of 
the data”. Corbin and Strauss (2014, p. 5) concur this definition and further point 
out that a qualitative research approach is characterised by “making order out 
of seeming disorder” and devotes the researcher to the whole investigation 
process as a research instrument. Qualitative research typically embraces an 
emergent design as a tightly defined design could hinder serendipity in 
generating new understandings. Taking a qualitative approach, this research is 
drawn to its emphasis on built-in flexibility and complexity. 
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Research designs, encompassing different purposes and structures, are 
concrete “strategies of empirical inquiry” building upon intended qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed methods formula (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). More 
specifically, Creswell (2013a) identifies that the most commonly employed 
research designs in qualitative inquiries are narrative research, phenomenology, 
grounded theory, ethnography, and case study, among which case study design 
is most relevant to this research. 
4.3 Case Study Research Design 
A research design is a logical blueprint for research, mapping the logic from the 
initial research questions to the final conclusions. The motivation for selecting 
a research design depends largely on the research questions an investigator 
seeks to answer (Creswell 2013a). The case study method is used across a 
variety of social science disciplines because it enables a rigorous investigation 
retaining the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events (Creswell 
2013a; Tellis 1997; Yin, RK 2012).  
4.3.1 The rationale for Choosing the Case Study Method 
Stake (1995, p. 2) describes a case study as a “bounded system” catching both 
particularity and complexity of social issues. More technically, Yin (2009a) 
explains the case study on two levels. The first level of the definition outlines its 
scope as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
in depth and within its real-life context”, the second level distinguishes this 
method from others as it “relies on multiple sources of evidence with data 
needing to converge in a triangulation fashion” (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 18). 
According to Yin (2009a, p. 2), a case study is a preferred method “when (a) 
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“how” and “why” questions are posed, (b) the investigator has little control over 
events, and (c) the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life 
context”. The characteristics of this research precisely meet all three conditions 
pinpointed above.  
First and foremost, case studies are advantageous when operational links 
embedded in a phenomenon of interest need to be traced over time so as to 
address “how” and “why” questions (Yin, RK 2012). In this sense, the “how” 
research question proposed in this study readily encapsulate both the 
substance and the form of “how” questions that case study can help to 
investigate. Equally important is that case study method is particularly useful 
when events of interest cannot be manipulated and require a rich variety of 
sources of evidence to systematically examine the pertinent phenomenon (Yin, 
RK 2012). GONGO’s networked governance on CSR in China is an objective 
phenomenon which the researcher has no control over but relies on a full range 
of primary and secondary data to conduct an investigation. The more the 
research aims to acquire an extensive and in-depth description of social 
circumstances, the more case study method is deemed relevant (Yin, RK 
2009a). This too justifies the rationale for choosing case study as the intended 
research strategy for this study. Further, a case study method is highly relevant 
to events featuring in contemporaries rather than histories (Yin, RK 2012). The 
social events this research seeks to investigate is not a past event but a real-
time phenomenon, in which the chain of evidence is built upon not only through 
archival documents but also relevant insights from witnesses and participants. 
A case study strategy is also a method which has been extensively adopted to 
examine the business-NGO relationships regarding CSR in prior studies (Davis, 
SM & Moosmayer 2014; Doh & Guay 2006; Jamali & Keshishian 2008; 
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O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer 2009b; Whitehead 2014; Yang, J & Chan 2011). For these 
reasons, a case study is an ideal form of inquiry over other research methods 
to address the pertinent research question. 
4.3.2 Defining the Case 
Table 4-1 A Summary of Case Study Design in this Research 
Table 4-1 summarises the essential elements of the case study design in this 
study. While the purpose of the case study method can be exploratory, 
descriptive, or explanatory, the boundaries between them are not always clear 
(Yin, RK 2009a). This research primarily captures the exploratory elements 
arising from the desire to discover the hitherto limited knowledge of GONGO’s 
networked governance on CSR in China. Though often conceived as a prelude 
Characteristics of Case Study Design 
Purpose of the 
Study 
Exploratory 
Type of Design Embedded single-case design 
Boundaries Time 2006 onwards 
Space China 
Unit of Analysis Main Unit of 
Analysis 
The network radiated from the 
central GONGO 
Subunits of 
Analysis 
The nodal organisations networked 
by the central GONGO 
Case Selection The Red Cross Society of China 
Theoretical 
Perspective 
Networked Governance in Responsive Regulation 
Theory 
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of causal inquiries, exploratory case studies go far beyond a preliminary pilot 
stage. They entail strengths in collecting and analysing empirical evidence to 
explore phenomena which lack detailed description, comprehensive 
understanding and sufficient access in the past (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe 2010). 
For case studies bearing an exploratory pursuit, such as the present study, a 
maximum level of flexibility will be allowed, and a pre-set proposition is not 
mandatory (Yin, RK 2009a). 
When planning a case study, the most critical issue is to clearly define the 
boundaries in terms of space and time for a “case” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). In 
this research, while the location boundary is set in mainland China, the time 
boundary is defined from 2006 onwards, given “the role of civil society 
concerning CSR activities was not perceived to be prominent until the late 
2000s” (Tan-Mullins & Hofman 2014, p. 9). This time boundary is also 
consistent with the generally accepted starting point of Chinese CSR regulation, 
the year of 2006, in which the new Corporate Law initially encourage all 
companies to assume social responsibility (Moon, J, Muthuri & Idemudia 2010). 
This concern of case boundary is also pertinent to specify the “unit of analysis” 
in a case study design. Among the basic types of case study designs classified 
by Yin (2009a, p. 50), a “holistic” design treats the case as a whole unit of 
analysis whereas an “embedded” design comprises more than one subunits 
under a main unit of analysis. Such an embedded design draws considerable 
attention to specific subunits (Yin, RK 2009b), which are defined as nodal 
organisations networked by GONGO in this research. In addition to addressing 
“nodes” or “dyads” within a networked governance relationship, this research 
considers the network itself as the main unit of analysis. The reason is that only 
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by investigating the networked governance relationship as a whole, can we 
understand how the network evolves, how it is governed, and how its collective 
influence is generated on CSR practices. Such consideration on the unit of 
analysis is in accordance with studies performed by Provan and Kenis (2007), 
Powell et al. (2005), and Rowley (1997). Throughout the entire research 
process, this research seeks to guard against the pitfalls of targeting at either 
the main unit level or subunit level alone. More specifically, this case study 
employs an “embedded single-case design” to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 46). Compared to multiple-case designs, single-
case designs put a higher level of emphasis on depth, completeness, and 
richness of examinations (Denzin & Lincoln 2011), and they are precisely what 
this research aims for.  
Case selection is not a sampling technique, but it tends to be selective so as to 
maximise knowledge acquisition within a given research period (Tellis 1997). 
Yin (2009a) points out five criteria to guide case selection when a single-case 
study is adopted: the case is representative, revelatory, critical, unique, or 
longitudinal. This research purposively selects the Red Cross Society of China 
(RCSC) as the central case, making this study fit into the first two rationales. 
Primarily, the centric GONGO, Red Cross Society of China, is a well-known 
exemplar of GONGOs in China (Hsu, CL & Jiang 2015; Spires 2011c; Teets 
2009). Among 22 national level GONGOs in China, it has the most profound 
history and social influence both domestically and internationally (Teets 2009). 
In this sense, this case selection captures the feature of typicalness where the 
lessons learned from this case will be informative about the circumstances and 
conditions of other closely similar kinds (Yin, RK 2009a). Also, this case is 
deemed revelatory (Yin, RK 2009a), as it opens a window to uncover the 
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prevalent GONGO phenomenon in China, which previous researchers have 
limited opportunities to get access to (Kirby 2013; Zhan & Tang 2016). 
Although the case study research method is flexible and often follows intuitive 
paths, explicitly defining the case at the start will render a more logical and 
systematic guideline to the whole study (Yin, RK 2012). Nonetheless, this 
research does not restrain to redefine the case after data analysis. 
4.3.3 A Brief Background of the Red Cross Society of China 
The Red Cross Society of China (RSCS) is a nationwide GONGO specialising 
in humanitarian services and disaster relief in China. It was originally founded 
by a group of Chinese business and political leaders during the Russo-
Japanese wartime in Shanghai, 1904. After the founding of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949, the Communist Party of China regrouped RSCS in 
Beijing. With the support of the Chinese central government, RSCS reclaimed 
its legal membership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies in August 1950. Despite being recognised as a member 
organisation, RSCS is not affiliated with the international Red Cross 
organisations in terms of organisational structure and decision-making systems.  
In 1955, the government of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) declared the 
Red Cross Society of the Republic of China the sole national humanitarian 
organisation in the country. From this time, the RCSC actively assists the 
government in implementing the Geneva Conventions, disaster relief and 
healthcare services improvement. Since 1982, in collaboration with the 
government, the RCSC has made efforts to advocate and promote non-
remunerated blood donations in China. In 1993, the Standing Committee of 
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National People's Congress officially promulgated the Red Cross Law of the 
People's Republic of China, which provides legal protection to the Chinese Red 
Cross and its operational activities. This law also acknowledges the legal 
relationship between RSCS and the PRC government. At the end of 1997, the 
Standing Committee of China's National People's Conference entitled RSCS to 
be the sole organisation to lead blood donation programs in China. Currently, 
RSCS is the only Red Cross society endorsed by the government in the PRC.  
4.3.4 The Role of Theory  
Every case exploration starts with “some rationale and direction”, even if they 
might later be proved wrong (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 29). An initial theoretical 
perspective could help researchers to develop research questions, select 
relevant cases, refine research design, identify data sources, and organise data 
analysis strategies at the beginning (Yin, RK 2012). Unlike strictly defined 
theories awaiting tests or verifications in quantitative research, a theoretical 
perspective in case study serves as a simple logic threading understanding and 
interpretation of the case in a broad way (Creswell 2013a). This theoretical 
starting-point could also be further built, extended, or challenged after data 
collection and analysis procedures (Yin, RK 2012).  
This research takes the networked governance perspective in responsive 
regulation theory as an initial theoretical lens to shape questions regarding what 
issues are important and who needs to be studied. As explained in Chapter 3, 
this theoretical perspective is more helpful in explaining how weak, individual 
actors enrol and interact with other stronger actors to enhance governance 
capacity. Yin (2009a) explicitly emphasises the importance of theory 
development prior to data collection and analysis. Holding a theoretical 
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perspective can also be employed as a tactic to demonstrate the academic 
worthiness of the research and compensate inadequate field experience of 
researchers (Yin, RK 2012). Also, theory plays a critical role in building 
“analytical generalisation” of a case study, in which “a previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
case study” (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 38). At the same time, any “rival explanations” 
emerged from data analysis will not be excluded.  
4.4 Research Quality 
As in all research, considerations must be given to construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity, and reliability to guarantee a rigorous methodological 
path (Yin, RK 2009a). These quality criteria are typically termed credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability, and broadly referred to as 
“trustworthiness” in qualitative studies (Lincoln & Guba 1985). To operationalise 
these terms, controlling research quality is to ensure research findings are 
mutually understandable, acceptable, and transferable among the researcher, 
readers, and research participants. While research quality is subject to the 
design of instruments in quantitative research, “the researcher is the instrument” 
in qualitative research (Patton 2002, p. 14). Therefore, the quality of a case 
study research also largely depends on the belief, ability, and efforts of the 
researcher. To address the challenges of research quality, multiple tactics are 
applied throughout different phases of this research as summarised in Table 
4-2. 
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Table 4-2 A Summary of Tactics to Ensure Research Quality - Adapted 
from Yin (2009a) 
 
4.4.1 Research Validity 
Validity is a key criterion to evaluate the “accuracy” (Creswell 2013b) and 
“authenticity” (Denzin & Lincoln 2011) of research. Considering case studies in 
particular, Yin (2009a) explains research validity in construct validity, internal 
validity, and external validity. Since internal validity is only relevant to 
explanatory studies where a causal relationship is aimed to be achieved (Yin, 
RK 2009a), this exploratory study will focus on addressing construct validity and 
external validity. 
Research 
Quality 
Tactics to be Employed 
Relevant Phase of 
Research 
Construct 
Validity 
Use multiple sources of evidence Data collection 
Establish Chain of Evidence Data collection 
Have key informants review draft 
case study report 
Report composition 
External 
Validity 
Use theory in the single-case 
study 
Research Design 
Select case strategically Research Design 
Reliability 
Use case study protocol Data collection 
Develop case study database Data collection 
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Construct validity is associated with the extent to which research examines 
what it claims to examine (Denzin & Lincoln 2011), and it needs to be well 
considered at the data collection and report composition phases (Yin, RK 
2009a). In attaining construct validity, Yin (2009a) makes three operational 
suggestions which are followed accordingly by this research. First, this research 
leverages on the “data triangulation” strategy in the data collection phase to 
draw upon a wider array of evidence sources (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 116). This 
involves seeking different perspectives from different sources to interpret the 
same events and phenomenon. This research employs three types of evidence 
(i.e. documentation, archival records, and interviews) from diverse sources (i.e. 
various networked organisations) to achieve this pursuit. Second, this research 
builds a clear “chain of evidence” in the data collection phase so that an 
independent reader will be able to trace and track how evidence is derived from 
the initial research question to the final conclusions (Yin, RK 2009a, p. 122). A 
detailed effort involves making extensive and specific citations on collected data, 
recording both the content and context (i.e. time and place) of the data and 
logically linking the data to the research question and case study protocol. Third, 
this research invites key informants to review the draft report at the composition 
phase in order to reconfirm the views of informants are not misunderstood. 
External validity typically refers to the generalisability of research (Yin, RK 
2009a). It considers whether an inferring conclusion from a certain setting can 
be applied to other different settings (Creswell 2013a). Single-case studies are 
often prone to concerns about external validity. Critics argue that 
generalisability cannot be built beyond a single immediate case. Nonetheless, 
many case study researchers point out that the focus of case study is to capture 
the uniqueness of the cases rather than building wider generalisation based on 
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it (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000; Stake 1995; Yin, RK 2009a). Still, this 
does not infer that case studies are devoid of external validity. Yin (2009a, p. 
43) defends the generalisability of case studies by distinguishing “analytical 
generalisation” from “statistical generalisation” and contends that external 
validity can be attained from theoretical relationships. In this sense, case 
studies achieve generalisation from the research results to a broader theory 
rather than from a sample to the population. Stake (1995, p. 42) also upholds 
the external validity of case study as "naturalistic generalisation”. He argues 
that generalisability is built on the relationship between the reader's 
experiences and the case study itself. The results generated by case studies 
can resonate with a broad variety of audiences, thereby facilitating a wider 
understanding of the phenomenon. In this research, external validity is attained 
through two tactics. First, this research employs a theoretical perspective to link 
a theoretical logic that might be applicable to other settings (Yin, RK 2009a). 
Second, a clear rationale for case selection is provided with detailed research 
procedures to enable an echo of “experiential understanding” from the broad 
audience (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). 
4.4.2 Research Reliability 
Research reliability addresses the issue on minimising errors and biases in a 
study to allow subsequent investigators to arrive at the same conclusion if they 
follow the same procedures all over again (Denzin & Lincoln 2011; Yin, RK 
2009a). Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 300) use the term “dependability” as an 
equivalent of “reliability” in quantitative research. They describe the process of 
seeking dependability as an “inquiry audit” and metaphorically compared it with 
a fiscal audit to show that reliability cannot be achieved without a sufficient 
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documentation on both the process (i.e. research procedures) and the product 
(i.e. data) of a study (Lincoln & Guba 1985, p. 317). The key criteria of reliability, 
therefore, root in transparency and replicability of the research. In response to 
these challenges, the present study adopts two measures to tackle pertinent 
problems. First, to increase transparency, this research develops a “case study 
protocol” to specify and clarify how the research is conducted  (Yin, RK 2009a, 
p. 79). Second, to enable replication and retrieval of data, this research 
establishes a “case study database” to organise all collected reports, 
documents, notes, and transcriptions in a systematic manner (Yin, RK 2009a, 
p. 119). Both of these tactics were accomplished throughout the data collection 
phase. 
4.5 Research Procedures 
4.5.1 The Two-Stage Approach 
 
Figure 4-2 An Illustration of Two-Stage Sequential Approach 
As indicated in Figure 4-2, this research employs a two-stage approach to 
address the two research aims respectively. This approach is consistent with 
the considerations on the unit of analysis discussed above in Section 4.3.2. It 
ensures equal attention is given to both the main unit (i.e. the network as a 
whole) and the subunits (i.e. the nodal organisations). A brief flow of the 
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research process is presented here, whereas more detailed considerations 
regarding data collection and analysis at each stage will be discussed later. 
The first stage takes the perspective of the GONGO – the Red Cross Society 
of China (RCSC) – to investigate its hybrid identity, organisational network 
infrastructure, and operationalised hybrid features. This is achieved by 
exploring RCSC’s organisational commitments, structures, and specific 
activities highly relevant to its GO-ish and NGO-ish features that shape its CSR 
governance capacity. Tracing from its operational events, other regulatory 
actors embedded within the same networked governance relationship are 
identified. These networked actors range from related government agencies, 
other GONGOs, and other NGOs. The objective here is to capture not only the 
GONGO’s internal operations but also its external connectivity to systematically 
understand the mixed ingredients encapsulated in GONGOs hybridity and its 
implication on GONGO’s perceived identity and capacity as a legitimate, non-
state CSR regulator. Explorations at this stage also provide leading clues to 
map the network of involved parties and locate associated companies that the 
GONGO seeks to influence and govern. This evidence helps to identify relevant 
research targets and construct protocols for the second stage.  
The second stage is focused on understanding the application of networked 
governance by examining the perspective of associated companies to capture 
how GONGOs influence business actors and how business actors perceive and 
react to the GONGO’s direct and indirect CSR governance. This involves 
examining the relevant actor’s CSR perceptions, experiences, and practices, 
inclusive of CSR disclosure with reference to the GONGO’s networked 
governance efforts. Subsequently, both independent, dyadic and networked 
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efforts concerning CSR practices are examined. This perspective also provides 
evidence on how substantially and effectively the GONGO’s networked 
governance is received by its intended targets.  
A comprehensive interpretation incorporating the findings from both stages will 
follow data analysis, where discussion, conclusion, and implications are 
developed for the entire research. Benefiting from the strengths of the case 
study design adopting multiple perspectives, this study considers not only the 
voices and perspectives of the individual actors but also the relevant 
interactions between them. It is expected that by linking stage one and stage 
two, this research cycle can render a coherent and holistic exploration of both 
the actor-level and the network-level phenomenon. 
4.5.2 Data Collection 
Case studies are designed to bring out the details from different perspectives 
of the participants by relying on various data sources (Denzin & Lincoln 2011; 
Yin, RK 2009a). A wide array of data sources can be employed in case studies, 
including documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, 
participant observation, and physical artefacts (Yin, RK 2009a). A list of three 
sources chosen to be adopted by this research is presented below in Figure 
4-3. 
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Figure 4-3 A Summary of Source of Evidence in this Research  
This research employs three types of data: documentation, archival records, 
and open-ended interviews. All three types of data were collected and used in 
stage one and two, but they were collected from different sources to answer 
different questions at two different stages. While reading through 
documentation can provide a basic understanding of the events of interest, 
archival records offer certain quantitative and comparative evidence in 
examining the research question. Open-ended interviews provide insights from 
relevant participants’ perception and experience, which are critical to answer 
the research question. Three sources of data are triangulated, and a clear chain 
of evidence is maintained to ensure the robustness of the research findings. 
4.5.3 Documentation and Archival Records 
In this research, documentation mainly consists of documents outlining the 
external environment of the research issue, such as legal and administrative 
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documents issued by the State Council and the Central Committee of CPC, 
articles in major newspapers and journals, and research and industry reports. 
Archival records are mostly reports featuring organisations’ internal attributes, 
such as annual organisational reports and CSR reports, and organisational 
records archived in the host organisation, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the 
National Bureau of Statistics, and the stock exchanges, and information 
disclosed in the organisation’s website. While documentation provides the 
external up-to-date background information about the investigating 
phenomenon, archival records offer internal insights about the specific 
organisations. All relevant documents and archival records are retrieved in two 
ways: publicly available data are accessed from online databases or the 
participant organisations’ websites, and internal data of participant 
organisations are collected during field trips given access are permitted. In the 
process of collecting documents, the researcher constantly remained alerted to 
the possibility that organisational documents could be inaccurate and biased. 
Specific lists of documentation and archival records collected and analysed in 
stage one and stage two will be presented with corresponding findings in 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.  
Documents and archival records are highly relevant and useful in this case 
study for five reasons. First, they offer detailed information to contradict or 
corroborate evidence from other sources. Second, they can generate an overall 
clue of events and inspire new questions to guide further investigations. Third, 
they provide verifications on the spellings of titles and names that may emerge 
from interviews. Further, archival records provide additional merit as they can 
offer some quantitative and historical insights on relevant events. Last but not 
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least, they allow the researcher to extensively view and review data with fewer 
restrictions on time and space.  
4.5.4 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Conducting interviews is critical to gathering rich, empirical insights on 
intermittent events (Yin, RK 2012). However, a common concern with data 
collected from interviews is that participants may engage in impression 
management and retrospective sense-making (Baxter & Jack 2008). 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 28) argue that one efficient way to mitigate 
such biases is to incorporate “numerous and highly knowledgeable informants 
who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives”. In this light, 
interview participants were elicited at different hierarchical levels and functional 
departments of the research participant organisations to ensure multiple 
perspectives are included in the data collection. This strategy is consistent with 
the approach adopted by O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer (2009b). The participants in 
this research are informants: 
• who have observed, participated, or supervised CSR related activities; 
and/or 
• who are observing, participating or supervising CSR related activities; 
and/or 
• whose positions and job responsibilities are closely related to CSR 
activities. 
Interviewees were selected based on their historical experiences and first-hand 
knowledge of the research topic. In stage one, the participants were firstly 
recruited from the RCSC, who had given institutional approval to participate in 
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this research. Interviewees were invited from different functional departments 
in the organisation based on their current and historical job positions and 
involvement in CSR related activities. The selection criteria identifying potential 
participants were sent to the General Office of RCSC through email, which 
maintained relevant records of all employees. The General Office then issued 
an invitation to potential participants on behalf of the researcher. Organisational 
members willing to participate in the research were invited to contact the 
researcher, indicating their expression of interest and providing their contact 
details. The researcher then contacted the participants to seek informed 
consent and arrange interviews. Based on interview data from the RCSC, 
participants in RCSC’s networked organisations were identified and 
approached by the researcher on an individual basis. In stage two, business 
executives and CSR officers were recruited from companies connected to the 
RCSC. Participants' names were identified using a combination of public 
records disclosure (e.g. annual reports or CSR reports) and snowball sampling 
from interviews in stage one. Participant's contact details were obtained from 
the website of their hosting organisations and/or the RCSC referees. Willing 
business participants then attended the interviews based on invitations sent to 
them by email. 
The number of interviews to be conducted depends typically on three 
considerations: how many interviews are normally conducted by experienced 
scholars in research with a similar topic, how many informants will agree to 
participate in interviews, and whether new information and insights will emerge 
from additional interviews (Creswell 2013b). 
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Table 4-3 Number of Interviews in Prior Research 
Table 4-3 summarises highly cited studies which closely examine the NGO-
business relationship with a significant interview component. Based on the 
number of interviews from previous studies, this research extensively employed 
snowball sampling techniques to approach relevant participants. Subject to 
accessibility and availability, a total of 52 face-to-face interviews were 
conducted in this research. The participants include informants from: all 
organisational levels of RCSC; the networked government departments, 
including the local Department of Civil Affairs and local government offices; the 
networked GONGOs and NGOs, including the two international red cross 
organisations – ICRC and IFRC; and associated companies including both 
large state-owned enterprises and small private companies. A summary of the 
number of interviews conducted is provided below in Table 4-4. 
 
Prior Research on Related Topics Number of Interviews 
Tully (2004) 9 
O'Dwyer, Unerman and Bradley (2005) 8 
Deegan and Blomquist (2006) 11 
O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer (2009b) 9 
Arenas, Lozano and Albareda (2009) 18 
Deegan and Islam (2014) 17 
Davis, SM and Moosmayer (2014) 17 
Grosser (2015) 11 
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Table 4-4 A Summary of Number of Interviews 
To protect the participants’ confidentiality, interviewees are coded by removing 
personal information in the de-identification process. The participants are 
informed that their personal identities will be kept anonymous and will not be 
used in disseminating the results of this research. A coded list of interviewees 
is attached in Appendix I with information regarding their relevancy, host 
organisations, and current or former positions. 
The following considerations are applied to ensure the quality of interview data: 
Organisation Type Number of Interviews 
Internal Actors  
RCSC 
Headquarters-Level 
Province-Level 
Prefecture-Level (City-Level) 
County-Level 
30 
External Actors  
Networked Government Departments 5 
Networked GONGOs 2 
Networked NGOs 4 
Targeted Companies 11 
Total 52 
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1. The interview questions are developed in an open-ended and general 
manner (Creswell 2013b). To fully provoke rich and expansive insights 
from interviewees, the questions act as a reminder to keep the 
researcher on track as data collection proceeded rather than act as 
definitive questions.  
2. A clear interview protocol is developed (Creswell 2013b), specifying the 
time and places, names of interviewees, positions of interviewees, 
description of the relevance, and pertinent interview questions for each 
interview. 
3. Interviews start with friendly and non-threatening questions to create a 
comfortable and relaxed environment so that trust and rapport can be 
built (Yin, RK 2009a). 
4. Adequate recording procedures are applied during the interviews. All 
interviews are audio recorded with a high-quality recording device with 
written notes taken simultaneously (Creswell 2013b). The audio records 
are transcribed verbatim into Chinese by the researcher (who is a native 
Chinese speaker) with the assistance of a professional transcribing 
service provider. Transcribing techniques and modifications are applied 
when necessary to retain contextual clarity.  
5. Follow-up emails or telephone calls are made to interviewees after a 
reasonable period of time to validate the data and ensure they are not 
misunderstood. 
Guided by the research question and the two-stage case study design, two 
separate lists of interview questions are designed for interviews in stage one 
and two. As the participants of this research are Chinese, interview questions 
are translated into Chinese with the help of an independent, professional 
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translation service provider. To ensure the accuracy and efficiency of formal 
interviews, three pilot interviews were conducted before the formal interviews 
to test the design and wording of interview questions. The following diagrams 
present a reference of how interview questions are designed to capture the 
critical concepts in the research question: How does GONGO’s hybridity 
shape its capacity and application of networked governance to influence 
CSR practices in China? 
 
Figure 4-4 Stage I Interview Questions  
113 
 
Figure 4-4 presents a visual illustration of how interview questions of stage one 
are linked to the theoretical lens and the research question. The design of the 
research question is informed by the networked governance perspective in 
responsive regulation theory (Braithwaite, J 2006; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000; 
Drahos 2004). Interview questions are designed in a way to capture key 
concepts in the research question. The stage one interview questions are 
intended for informants from the RCSC and its networked regulators. Questions 
1 and 5 are designed to capture the uniqueness of the GONGO’s hybrid 
organisational structure. While questions 2 to 6 inform the implication of 
GONGO’s hybridity on its networked governance capacity, question 6 to 10 
provide information about how GONGOs conduct external networking activities 
to steer CSR activities. Answers to these questions provide relevant evidence 
in terms of how GONGOs actively network with internal and external actors to 
escalate their CSR governance intervention. Further, questions 3, 4, 5 offer 
additional insights about GONGO’s extensive involvement in CSR activities 
applicable to other GONGOs in answering what general role GONGOs are 
playing in Chinese CSR. 
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Figure 4-5 Stage II Interview Questions  
 
Figure 4-5 shows how interview questions in stage II are designed to capture 
essential elements in the research question. Similar to the design of questions 
in stage one, interview questions are guided by the research question, which is 
derived from the adopted theoretical framework. To put the questions into 
context, stage two interview questions are designed for informants in 
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associated companies. Question 1 aims to obtain basic information about the 
company and sets as a friendly opening question to the remainder of the 
interview. Questions 2 to 4 are intended to seek business actors’ understanding 
of CSR and their relevant experience in CSR activities. Question 5 aims to 
examine how the hybrid identity and governance potency of GONGOs are 
understood by business actors. The answer to this question provides useful 
insights in comparing and contrasting hybrid features perceived by business 
actors with those of GONGO actors. While question 6 captures the company’s 
perceived influence from GONGO’s networked governance, questions 7 to 10 
seek companies’ reaction to such governance and an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of GONGO’s governance mechanisms. Evidence from questions 
4, 6, 7, 10 incorporates how companies respond to GONGO’s governance 
approaches in practice and disclosure. 
To ensure consistency and reliability of interview procedures, an interview 
protocol is developed to guide semi-structured interviews in both stage one and 
stage two. The details of the interview protocol are provided in Appendix II. 
4.5.5 Data Analysis 
Prior to analysis, the raw data was processed into an organised format. All 
notes taken from interviews and field visits were transformed into formal write-
ups, whereas private abbreviations, sketches, and symbols were translated 
accordingly (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2013). Prior to formal analysis on 
documentation, archival records and interview data, the researcher 
endeavoured to “immerse into” and “play with” the data in ways such as 
visualising data in flowcharts, tabulating the frequency of events, and arranging 
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information in chronological order (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2013; Yin, RK 
2009a).  
In qualitative research, data analysis is mostly associated with a process of 
“coding” in which labels with symbolic meanings are assigned to information 
collected in a study (Creswell 2013a). Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2013) 
define coding as a “data condensation” task in which codes prompt and trigger 
a “deep reflection” of what the data means. Saldaña (2015) suggest a two-cycle 
approach for coding. In the first cycle, codes are initially assigned to the data 
chunks to identify reoccurring similarities (Saldaña 2015). This is followed by 
pattern coding in the second cycle to group similar codes into a smaller number 
of categories and themes (Saldaña 2015). This two-cycle approach was 
adopted and performed with qualitative data analysis software – QSR NVivo 
version 11. In this research, a provisional theme list was generated based on 
the literature review and the adopted theoretical perspective prior to the coding 
process. As shown in Figure 4-6 below, the provisional codes were used as a 
starting point to guide data analysis and were later refined in the coding process. 
Figure 4-6 Provisional Codes 
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As the data analysis progressed, the provisional codes were revised, modified 
and expanded to a list of data-generated codes which better reflects the linkage 
between the theoretical framework, literature review, and the data collected and 
analysed in this research. The list of data-generated themes is presented below 
in Figure 4-7. 
Figure 4-7 Data-Generated Codes 
In the first cycle coding process, Saldaña (2015) identifies 25 different coding 
methods, among which descriptive coding, attribute coding, and process coding 
are most relevant to this research. First, descriptive coding is a preferred 
method when a wide variety of data forms are involved, and a basic topic needs 
to be assigned to passages (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2013). Since a 
considerable number of documents and archival records are employed in this 
research, descriptive coding is deemed a useful approach to extract topics and 
compose an inventory of the case for this study. Second, attribute coding is also 
relevant as they help to categorise different settings, features, characteristics, 
and other variables of interest across multiple participants (Miles, Huberman & 
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Saldana 2013). This strength is especially advantageous as multiple types of 
organisations and participants with different demographics and positions will be 
involved in this research. Third, process coding was adopted for its strength in 
extracting intertwined actions and dynamic sequences (Miles, Huberman & 
Saldana 2013). This method is particularly helpful in summarising the 
interactions among the GONGOs, the networked regulatory actors, and the 
associated companies. In the second cycle, pattern coding was employed to 
cluster similar codes derived from the first cycle into more condensed 
categories and themes (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2013). An analytic memo 
was written up throughout the process to capture the emergence of any 
unexpected category or theme. Then, data displays in forms of matrices, graphs, 
charts, and networks were applied accordingly to visualise the data in a more 
accessible way (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2013).  
Four principles are applied to ensure the quality of data analysis: all the 
evidence was attended with no loose ends, all major interpretations were 
addressed including rival explanations, the most significant aspect was 
highlighted, and the researcher's prior experience and knowledge were fully 
exploited (Yin 2009b). Finally, assertions and interpretations were drawn and 
verified with theoretical significance. An illustration of the key procedures in data 
analysis is demonstrated below in Figure 4-8.  
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Figure 4-8 An illustration of Data Analysis Process – Adapted from 
Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2013) 
Interpretation and understanding of meaning in a text in their non-original 
language generate challenges that might hinder the transfer of meaning and 
result in misinterpretation and a loss of research validity. To minimise the risk of 
misinterpretation and possible drifts of a participant’s intended meaning during 
data analysis, this research employs Chinese as its primary analytical language. 
This practice is based on two broad considerations. First, the major sources of 
data collection for this research are in Chinese. These include documents and 
records written in Chinese and interviews conducted with Chinese speakers. 
Second, to capture the richness of data in language, people commonly use 
narratives and metaphors (Polkinghorne 2005), but narratives and metaphors 
vary in different cultures and are language-specific (Temple 2008). Therefore, 
the validity of the research is better maintained when the distance between the 
meanings expressed by the participants and the meanings interpreted by the 
researcher is as close as possible (Polkinghorne 2016). Translation occurred 
after the data is analysed, where findings and selected quotes are presented in 
Assigning codes or themes to data
Sorting coded materials to identify patterns, themes, 
categories, differences and sequences
Isolating and reviewing these commonalities and 
differences
Noting reflections in jottings, journals and analytic 
memos
Elaborating consistent assertions discerned in the 
database
Interpreting and assetions with theories
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English. Professional translation service is employed to ensure the accuracy of 
the translation. 
4.6 Role of the Researcher 
The prerequisite of being a qualified case study researcher is the ability to live 
with ambiguity and acceptance of the self as a research instrument. Yin, RK 
(2009a) further suggests that a good case study researcher must possess a 
number of specific skills: the ability to ask good questions and to interpret the 
responses, be a good listener, be adaptive and flexible so as to react to various 
situations, have a firm grasp of issues being studied, and be unbiased by 
preconceived notions. Also, a full variety of data collection techniques, such as 
analysing documentary evidence, retrieving archival records, and conducting 
interviews are required (Yin, RK 2009a). As a case study investigator, the 
researcher acknowledges her own value and background will shape the 
investigation and interpretation of the pertinent phenomenon. To conduct a 
robust case study, the researcher continuously strived to immerse into the data 
and established an intimate relationship with the research process. Additionally, 
the researcher persistently attended relevant research training courses, 
workshops, and seminars to replenish various skills and techniques desired by 
a rigorous case study process. 
4.7 Ethical Consideration 
This thesis closely follows the Risk Assessment and Application procedure 
guided by the RMIT Human Research Ethics Committee. Ethics approval was 
obtained prior to research procedures involving relevant organisational and 
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human participants. The research design and procedures were carried out in 
an ethical and professional manner where all participants were given freedom 
to opt in and out and assured with full confidentiality. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter described the methodological and analytical frameworks adopted 
in this research. The research question and the complex nature of the network-
level investigation guided the choice of a case study design. To address the 
research question, primary data was collected from 52 interviews with 
participants involved in CSR networked governance relationships. Secondary 
data, including legal and administrative documents, organisational reports, and 
media reports, were used to support analysis. Multiple data types and data 
sources were triangulated in a two-cycle coding process for data analysis to 
capture the complexity of network-level interactions. Reflections on the ethical 
considerations and the role the researcher plays in the research process were 
provided. 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS OF STAGE I 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the case study research design in Chapter 4, this chapter presents 
findings on the data collected and analysed in stage one of the research. The 
purpose of this chapter is to pinpoint the typical hybrid features of GONGOs in 
regard to its GO-ish features and NGO-ish features to examine how these 
elements mix and shape GONGOs’ motivation, legitimacy and capability in 
exerting networked governance influence on CSR activities. Using the Red 
Cross Society of China (RCSC) as a typical GONGO case, this chapter seeks 
to highlight these elements that are generally common to all GONGOs in China 
as well as those exclusive to the RCSC. 
This chapter starts with a list of documents and interview data employed in 
Stage one. This is followed by systematic mapping of the RCSC’s 
organisational network under the umbrella Red Cross system to grasp how its 
organisational network shapes its identity as an NGO on an international-level 
and as a GONGO on the domestic level. Focusing on the RCSC, this chapter 
outlines RCSC’s ethical principles that set the overall scope and orientation of 
the organisation’s CSR engagement. Then, by examining the themes emerged 
from the organisation’s GO-ish and NGO-ish attributes, this chapter seeks to 
explore factors that prompt the GONGO to network with external actors and 
how the GONGO interacts with those actors. 
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5.2 A Summary of Data Analysed in Stage I 
The document data analysed in this stage range from state and regional legal 
documents to organisational regulations and reports. They were collected from 
the publicly available digital databases or directly from the participating 
organisations with consent. A summary of key documents collected and 
analysed in this stage are presented in Table 5-1 and Table 5-2. Other than the 
listed documents, information from the participant organisations’ websites, 
social media, and related news articles are also used as supporting data for 
analysis. 
Table 5-1 Key External Documents of Stage I 
Key External Documents of Stage I 
Data Type Name 
State Law/Regulation The Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Red 
Cross Society 
State Law/Regulation 
Social Organisation Registration Management 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
Administrative Measures for the Assessment of Social 
Organisations in the People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
Measures for the Management of the Credit Information 
of Social Organisations in the People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
The Management Measures on the Use of the Red Cross 
Sign in the People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
Measures for the Accreditation of Charity Organisations 
in the People's Republic of China 
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State Law/Regulation 
Regulation on the Management of Foundations in the 
People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
Provisional Regulations on Registration Management of 
Private Non-Enterprise Units in the People's Republic of 
China 
State Law/Regulation 
Information Disclosure Guidelines for Foundations in the 
People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation The Civil Servant Law of the People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
The People’s Republic of China’s Law on the 
Management of the Activities of Overseas NGOs 
within Mainland China 
State Law/Regulation 
The Notice of the State Council about Suggestions on 
Further Strengthening the Work of Red Cross Societies 
State Law/Regulation State Council's Regulation on Voluntary Services 
Regional 
Law/Regulation 
11 Local Government Work Plans for Further 
Strengthening the Work of Red Cross Societies (Regions 
are based on participant organisations’ location, 
including Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Guizhou, 
and Hainan) 
 
Table 5-2 Key Organisational Documents of Stage I 
Key Organisational Documents of Stage I 
Data Type Report Name 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Constitution of the Red Cross Society of China 
RCSC Report 
The 2015-2019 Development Plans of the Red Cross 
Society of China 
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RCSC Report 
2012-2017 Annual Reports of the Red Cross Society of 
China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Membership Management Regulation of the Red 
Cross Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Regulation of Volunteer Service Management of the 
Red Cross Society of China   
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Management Regulation of Membership Fee of the 
Red Cross Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Disaster Response and Relief Rules of the Red Cross 
Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Management Regulation of Integrated Community 
Resilience Project 
ICRC Policy/Report 
The International Committee of the Red Cross Mission and 
Work Report 
ICRC Policy/Report Policy on ICRC Cooperation with National Societies 
ICRC Policy/Report 
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief 
ICRC Policy/Report 
The Code of Ethics for Procurements of Red Cross 
Organisations 
ICRC Policy/Report 
Guidelines and Information on How to Do Business with 
the ICRC 
ICRC Policy/Report 
Study on the Use of the Emblems: Operational and 
Commercial and Other non-operational Issue 
ICRC Policy/Report ICRC Strategy for 2015-2018 
IFRC Policy/Report 
Guide to the Auxiliary Role of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent National Societies – Asia-Pacific 
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IFRC Policy/Report Strengthening Movement Coordination and Cooperation 
Report 
IFRC Policy/Report The Corporate Partnerships Guide 
IFRC Policy/Report The Federation-Wide Resource Mobilisation Strategy 
The interviews in this stage were conducted with 41 informants from the RCSC 
and other regulatory actors being enrolled by RCSC in the process of 
networked governance. The interview participants from the Red Cross system 
covers informants from all levels of RCSC organisations (the national 
headquarters-level, the province-level, the prefecture-level, and the county-
level) and RCSC’s international networked actor - the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The participants interviewed in RCSC’s 
networked organisations include informants from the local governments, other 
GONGOs, NGOs, and academic research centres. Table 5-3 below provides a 
list of the interview details. 
Table 5-3 Semi-Structured Interviews in Stage I 
 Semi-structured Interviews of Stage I 
Participant 
Code 
Organisation Type Participant’s Position 
Interview 
Length 
RC01 RCSC Headquarters Vice President 
1 hour 20 
minutes 
RC02 RCSC Headquarters Vice President 2 hours 
RC03 RCSC Headquarters Head of Department 50 minutes 
RC04 RCSC Headquarters Head of Department 
1 hour 10 
minutes 
RC05 RCSC Headquarters Former Head of Department 54 minutes 
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RC06 RCSC Headquarters Deputy Head of Department 50 minutes 
RC07 RCSC Headquarters 
Director of Health Services, 
Head of a Service Delivery 
Centre 
43 minutes 
RC08 RCSC Headquarters 
Executive Deputy Head of a 
Service Delivery Centre, 
Former Executive Vice President 
of an RCSC Provincial Branch 
1 hour 5 
minutes 
RC09 
Institution directly 
under the RCSC 
Headquarters 
Secretary-General 45 minutes 
RC10 
Institution directly 
under the RCSC 
Headquarters 
Secretary-General 1 hour 
RC11 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
1 hour 45 
minutes 
RC12 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
1 hour 33 
minutes 
RC13 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
1 hour 18 
minutes 
RC14 Province-Level RCSC Chief of Office 48 minutes 
RC15 Province-Level RCSC Vice President 
1 hour 5 
minutes 
RC16 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
1 hour 8 
minutes 
RC17 Province-Level RCSC Secretary 
1 hour 8 
minutes 
RC18 Province-Level RCSC Vice President 41 minutes 
RC19 Province-Level RCSC Head of Department 45 minutes 
RC20 Province-Level RCSC 
Head of Emergency and Relief 
Department 
2 hours 21 
minutes 
RC21 Province-Level RCSC 
Head of Public Relations 
Department 
1 hour 7 
minutes 
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RC22 
Institution directly 
under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Deputy Head 
1 hour 39 
minutes 
RC23 
Institution directly 
under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Head 40 minutes 
RC24 
Institution directly 
under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Deputy Head 52 minutes 
RC25 
Prefecture-Level 
RCSC 
Executive Vice President, Field 
Worker 
50 minutes 
RC26 
Prefecture-Level 
RCSC 
Executive Vice President, Field 
Worker 
2 hours 25 
minutes 
RC27 County-Level RCSC 
Executive Vice President, Field 
Worker 
49 minutes 
RC28 County-Level RCSC 
Secretary of CPC Group, Field 
Worker 
39 minutes 
RC29 County-Level RCSC Secretary-General, Field Worker 1 hour 
RC30 RCSC Grassroots Unit Field Worker 
1 hour 20 
minutes 
NR01 
Government 
Department 
Deputy Head 50 minutes 
NR02 
Government 
Department 
Division Chief, 
Former Chief of Office of a 
GONGO 
1 hour 3 
minutes 
NR03 
Government 
Department 
Head of Department, 
Current Vice President of a 
GONGO 
47 minutes 
NR04 
Government 
Department 
County Mayor, 
Former Executive Vice President 
of a GONGO 
35 minutes 
NR05 
Government 
Department 
Vice Secretary, 
Deputy Director of General Office 
of Provincial Administration of 
48 minutes 
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Civil Service, 
Former Deputy Chief of Office in 
a GONGO 
NR06 GONGO Vice President 57 minutes 
NR07 GONGO 
Chief of Office, Secretary-
General 
53 minutes 
NR08 NGO 
Cooperation Coordinator of 
Regional Delegation for East 
Asia 
1 hour 23 
minutes 
NR09 NGO 
Manager of Partnership and 
Resource Development in 
Country Cluster Support Team 
59 minutes 
NR10 NGO 
Chairman, 
Council Member of RCSC 
51 minutes 
NR11 
Academic Research 
Centre 
Professor of Sociology, 
Director of GONGO Research 
Centre 
1 hour 21 
minutes 
 
5.3 The Hybrid Identity and Network Infrastructure of RCSC 
The Red Cross Society of China (RCSC) is a national-level society of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (hereafter referred to as 
"the Movement"), which is currently the largest humanitarian network in the 
world devoted to protect life and health and to ensure respect for the human 
being (The International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 1986). 
The worldwide Movement consists of three bodies: the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), The International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC), and 191 individual National Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (ICRC 2018). With the advent of ever-growing social and 
environmental challenges, Red Cross organisations have intensified 
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interactions with the rising private sector to secure support from and influence 
over business actors.  
On an international scale, the Red Cross organisations are widely recognised 
as NGOs. However, in the Chinese context, the RCSC’s identity is considered 
a typical GONGO straddling the boundary between the government and NGO. 
This section lays out the overall structure of RCSC’s domestic and international 
network under the Red Cross umbrella to explore how this organisational 
network shapes its governance capacity. Although the RCSC appears to be a 
one-piece entity under the umbrella Red Cross system, it is in fact comprised 
of many branches and units working at various levels as individual 
organisations. Interactions among these stand-alone organisations constitute 
significant components of the RCSC’s networked governance relationships. 
These interactive relationships are established and maintained at two levels: 
the international level and the national level. 
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5.3.1 The RCSC’s International-Level Network 
5.3.1.1 Components of the International-Level Network 
 
Figure 5-1 The RCSC’s International-Level Network 
As Figure 5-1 shows, the RCSC acts as a component of the broader 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement on the international level. 
The RCSC, along with the ICRC, the IFRC and other 190 National Societies, 
forms the largest humanitarian network in the world. United by seven 
overarching Fundamental Principles (i.e. humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
independence, voluntary service, unity and universality), each component of 
the Movement has its own legal identity and exercises no authority over the 
others.  
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Table 5-4 Components of the Movement 
A summary of the components of the Movement with reference to their primary 
roles and responsibilities is presented in Table 5-4. Both headquartered in 
Geneva, Switzerland, the ICRC and the IFRC render their priorities to different 
areas of human needs. The former gives its priority to help victims affected by 
conflict and armed violence while the latter focuses on disaster relief and 
emergency responses in peacetime regions. As the founding organ of the 
Movement, the ICRC plays the chief role in designing and implementing policies 
for the Movement. The 191 individual National Societies present in nearly every 
independent country in the world and chartered by their respective 
governments. They focus on helping people within their borders and take on 
tasks and projects based on local needs. In times of cooperation, the ICRC and 
the IFRC act as the lead agency to coordinate activities of National Societies, 
thereby maximising complementarity of mandates and skills of all components. 
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Financially, the RCSC, along with other National Societies, makes yearly 
membership contribution to fund operations of the ICRC and the IFRC. The 
latest available annual report of ICRC suggests that the contributions from 
National Societies together constitute 1.8% of its total contributions received 
while the largest proportion of support amounting to 84% was received from 
governments honouring the Geneva Conventions (ICRC 2017). On the other 
hand, National Societies’ contribution to IFRC constitutes 59.8% of its funding 
source while government contributions come second at 29.1% (IFRC 2016).  
5.3.1.2 Interactions on the International-Level Network 
The RCSC works closely with the ICRC and the IFRC, but it is not affiliated. 
This allows the RCSC to operate separately from other components of the 
Movement while still enjoying access to establish cooperative relationships via 
the ICRC and the IFRC. In this case, ICRC and IFRC act as the linking points 
enabling the RCSC to extend outreach to its international counterparts. On an 
operational scale, the RCSC connects to its international network: 
• by proposing projects to other components of the Movement via the 
ICRC and IFRC; 
• by managing and deliver projects the ICRC and IFRC delegates to them; 
• by making and receiving financial contributions and donations in kind; 
• or by borrowing and/or lending staff. 
In 2000, the IFRC established its Country Cluster Support Team in Beijing. Five 
years later, the ICRC also moved its Regional Delegation for East Asia to 
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Beijing. The establishment of these two offices in China offers the RCSC a 
geographic convenience to further deepen contacts and cooperation with its 
international network. On the one hand, the ICRC and the IFRC rely on the 
RCSC’s local resources and workforce to deliver their projects in China; on the 
other hand, the RCSC needs to capitalise on international funding and expertise 
from the ICRC and the IFRC to enhance its professional competency. In 
commenting on the relationship with the RCSC, a representative from the IFRC 
said: 
“All our activities (in China) are coordinated and implemented through 
the RCSC, be it the cooperation with government departments or with 
other large organisations. We have to maintain close communication 
and cooperation with the RCSC (to carry out those activities). [….] Our 
relationship with the RCSC is cooperative in nature, and we respect 
the dominant rights the RCSC have. [….] We rarely carry out projects 
on our own. If we have projects to deliver, basically we will go to the 
RCSC. [….] It is fair to say that we have a weak foundation in China 
[….] the RCSC has much higher credibility and influence than us, so 
we stick to the principle of relying on the national societies to carry out 
our work.” (NR09) 
In turn, the RCSC has been strategically taking advantage of international 
outreach to secure access to cutting-edge technologies and aid projects. A 
participant from the RCSC headquarters explained how the RCSC has been 
benefiting from cooperating with its international partners: 
“They (the oversea partners) can bring us many new technologies and 
ideas. Especially when we look back at the entire development of our 
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Integrated Community Resilience Project, we found our lessons are 
actually learnt from the cooperation with the IFRC, Hong Kong Red 
Cross, and other oversea Red Cross organisations. We would not be 
able to finally develop the functioning project model we have now if it 
were not for an organic integration of those international experiences 
with our local conditions.” (RC06) 
The Integrated Community Resilience Project is now the RCSC’s signature 
project which covers 22 provinces and 877 community units across China. The 
predecessor of the Integrated Community Resilience Project was a project 
called Community Based Disaster Preparedness (CBDP) delegated by the 
IFRC to the RCSC after a series of massive flood hit Hunan, Guangxi, and 
Chongqing in 2003. This project is designed to make sure infrastructures, and 
living necessities are well prepared for future disaster relief work. As a strategic 
partner, the Hong Kong Red Cross joined the motion and provided financial and 
technical support to promote this project to other provinces prone to natural 
disasters. With more experience gained on a global scale in later years, the 
IFRC then led the RCSC to shift its mindset from the CBDP model to a 
Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) model. The core shift of 
this new model is to enable people living in disaster-prone areas to be equipped 
with the knowledge and skills to identify and respond to natural disasters prior 
to disaster outbreaks. This includes organising regular disaster escape drills, 
building early warning systems, as well as setting up community-level 
organisations for disaster prevention. In 2008, one of the largest earthquakes 
in human history, the Wenchuan earthquake, occurred in Sichuan, China. 
Taking lessons learnt from the unprecedented socio-economic losses that 
disasters bring to people, the focus of disaster relief work was further shifted 
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towards an Integrated Community Resilience (ICR) model. The expertise and 
guidance the RCSC borrowed from its international partners, including both the 
ICRC and the IFRC, led to thorough design and implementation of the new 
model. This ICR model aims to enable disaster sufferers to quickly recover from 
damages in terms of both financial losses and mental losses. Initially, the ICR 
model was launched to entitle sufferers in the Wenchuan Earthquake to apply 
for a Livelihood Development Fund at extremely low costs. After a two-year trial 
at over 200 pilots in Sichuan, this model proved its efficacy and is now promoted 
to benefit underprivileged people in non-disaster areas all over China.  
In addition to direct operational cooperation, the RCSC relies on the ICRC and 
the IFRC’s expertise to facilitate its capacity-building within its operational 
border. This includes soliciting support for: 
i. measures to strengthen the legal bases and statutes of RCSC in China; 
ii. promotions of international humanitarian law and the Movement’s 
Fundamental Principles in China; 
iii. training and educations of emergency aid and health care in China; 
iv. facilitating communications and exchanges with oversea Red Cross 
Organisations. 
The international outreach ability continues to be a prominent advantage the 
RSCS has over other GONGOs and NGOs in China. When engaging in CSR 
activities, the RSCS tactically uses its international network to turn distant 
business actors into partners. In commenting this, a provincial-level RCSC 
official remarked: 
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“MT (an SOE in China) used to direct most of its projects to the 
Communist Youth League (a GONGO in China). This year (2017) they 
cooperate with us for the first time, giving us a donation of 9.3 million 
yuan for medical assistance programs. [….] The trigger of this 
cooperation with us was attributed to MT’s executive leader joined our 
communication visit to Macau Red Cross. During this trip, the 
executive leader had a personal experience of the international 
exchanges that Red Cross societies can deliver and the international 
influence that Red Cross Societies have. So, he changed his mind and 
decided to give this project to us.” (RC20) 
The international-level network is also a resource typically capitalised by the 
RSCS to gain and secure legitimacy in China. While many GONGOs and NGOs 
in China remain cautious and sceptical in making direct contacts with oversea 
NGOs, the RSCS is confronted with much fewer obstacles and scepticism in 
foreign diplomatic interactions. The Geneva Convention upheld by all Red 
Cross organisations and their host countries continues to serve as a legal 
mandate for the RCSC’s international networking activities. 
5.3.2 The RCSC’s National-Level Network 
5.3.2.1 Structure of the National-Level Network 
Unlike its international-level network, the national-level network of RCSC is 
highly hierarchical. Under the national headquarters, the individual branches 
and units of RCSC are established in accordance with the government’s 
administrative level. This setup arrangement is not exclusive to the RCSC but 
likewise applies to all 22 national GONGOs in China. The network consists of 
138 
 
two sets of bodies: the governance and supervision bodies and the entity 
bodies. Figure 5-2 below illustrates how these nodal organisations are 
structured in the RCSC’s national-level network. 
Figure 5-2 RCSC’s National-Level Network 
The headquarters of the RCSC is located in Beijing, China. It provides 
operational guidance and professional support to 34 province-level branches 
scattered over 34 administrative regions across China. The provincial branches 
oversee operations of lower-level branches – prefecture-level and county-level 
branches – within their respective province borders. As of the end of 2017, there 
were 334 prefecture-level branches and 2781 county-level branches operating 
in China (RCSC 2018). The provincial branches are entitled to seek direct 
collaboration with other branches at the same or lower level without going 
through the headquarters. Only in cases where a branch seeks connection with 
an international Red Cross organisation, consent from headquarters must be 
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obtained prior to the establishment of any direct contact. The headquarters’ 
primary duty is to define general objectives, formulate strategies, and draft 
policies for the entire RCSC system. It acts as the representative of the RCSC 
in all foreign affairs. All branches under the headquarters carry out daily 
operations on an individual basis. The RCSC’s specific projects delivery and 
implementation typically take places at province-level and below. 
According to Article 8 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Red 
Cross Society (National People's Congress of the PRC 2017b), the congress 
of members is the supreme governing bodies of the RCSC headquarters and 
branches at each corresponding level. The councils and the boards of 
supervisors are elected by and responsible to the congresses of members. The 
councils elect their Presidents and Vice-Presidents and follow the decisions 
made by the congresses of members. The executive committees are the 
executive bodies of the council, responsible for implementing and overseeing 
the institutional strategy and general objectives defined by the congresses of 
members and the council. The work of the councils and executive committees 
are subject to independent oversight by the board of supervisors. In practice, 
the members of the executive committee are the leading officials who run the 
RSCS branches at each corresponding level. Typically positioned as the 
Executive Vice Presidents, the leading officials manage the daily operation of 
RCSC branches, assign particular jobs to RCSC departments and staff, and 
ensure the smooth running of the organisation as a whole. 
5.3.2.2 Interactions on the National-Level Network 
In general, the primary duties of RCSC branches are often summarised by their 
staff as “Three Relief and Three Donations”: the “Three Relief” involves disaster 
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relief, emergency relief, and humanitarian relief; the “Three Donations” refers 
to voluntary blood donation, voluntary hematopoietic stem cell donation, and 
voluntary human organ donation. Based on these general guidelines, province-
level RCSC branches normally tailor their focus in response to specific 
characteristics of their own operating region. For example, as one of the most 
populous cities in the world, Shanghai has a large number of non-permanent 
residents who are not entitled to medical insurance provided by the government. 
In response to this issue, the focus area of the RCSC Shanghai branch has 
been on building a health insurance system accessible to non-permanent 
residents living in Shanghai. In a similar vein, given the southernmost island of 
China, Hainan province, has become the most popular tourist destination in 
China, the working priority of RCSC Hainan branch is directed to maritime 
rescue and first aid at scenic areas. 
The different foci of work areas also shape how resources are gathered and 
distributed across the RCSC’s national network. In economically developed 
regions like Shanghai and Jiangsu, fund-raising projects are more commonly 
seen than in other regions. In contrast, service delivery and implementation 
projects are usually the priority in economically underdeveloped regions, such 
as Guizhou and Sichuan, where humanitarian needs are more intense. Through 
RCSC’s national network, donations received from economically developed 
regions are often channelled to economically underdeveloped regions for 
humanitarian projects with higher degrees of urgency. 
The different working foci also mean that RCSC branches must rely on 
interactions with their peer branches to make up for their own weaknesses. 
However, data from this study suggests that such complementary support does 
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not necessarily transfer from branches in wealthier regions to branches in more 
impoverished regions. In practice, the RCSC branches in more developed 
regions face fierce competition compared with those in underdeveloped regions. 
In commenting this, an RCSC informant from Beijing remarked: 
“Basically, all large-scale NGOs set their headquarters in Beijing, such 
as the China Charity Federation, the Beijing Charity Association, and 
The China Soong Ching Ling Foundation. Our funding sources are 
much more limited than those of branches in South China, simply 
because we have much more competitors.” (RC11) 
The opportunity for these RCSC branches to successfully secure and launch 
projects are also relatively lower than their counterparts in impoverished areas. 
Especially for service delivery projects, RCSC branches in most deprived areas 
typically get to grow faster by gaining more hands-on experiences. An RCSC 
participant remarked: 
“The growth and influence of an RCSC organisation are neither 
determined by whether we operate in a well-developed region nor how 
many funds we can raise. It is mainly determined by how much we can 
deliver. [….] For example, although Guizhou is an economically 
underdeveloped region, its performance in the Integrated Community 
Resilience project is at the top tier in our country. [….] Its first aid 
training is also one of the best among all province-level branches. 
Therefore, even though our branch operates in a much wealthier 
region, we have to rely on the Guizhou branch to pass on their 
knowledge and experience to us.” (RC08) 
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The regional variance across the RCSC’s national-level network suggests an 
unevenness of organisational capacity in terms of both resource mobilisation 
and professional expertise. Such unevenness constitutes a substantial 
incentive for individual RCSC organisations to network with other actors at 
nation-wide levels who have the power they do not have. 
5.4 Hybrid Features of GONGOs 
Examining how a GONGO is perceived by actors involved in networked 
governance relationships is essential because such perceptions have an 
impact on how flows of control and influence are directed in the networked 
governance process. Understanding the GO-ish and NGO-ish attributes of 
GONGOs are integral to understanding how the hybrid identity may strengthen 
or weaken GONGO’s CSR governance capacity. It is also a prerequisite to 
grasping why GONGOs enrol other actors into the networked governance 
relationship and how they manage to do that.  
Using RCSC as an example, this section outlines perceived GO-ish and NGO-
ish attributes common to all GONGOs in China. The RCSC’s intimate 
interactions with the CPC committee and government departments are often 
perceived as both causes and consequences of their GO-ish identity. On the 
other hand, the perception of their NGO-ish identity often lends emphasis to 
what they do as opposed to what they are. These perceptions are typically 
derived from observable collaborative and competitive interactions GONGOs 
have with other GONGOs and NGOs at operational levels. Many participants 
who participated in this research suggest that they do not conceive GONGOs 
as passive puppets controlled by order-like government forces. Instead, they 
perceive GONGOs as active puppeteers who are capable of pulling strings to 
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activate limbs of public and private actors who remain passive in places where 
their interests lie. 
5.4.1 Perceived GO-ish Features 
5.4.1.1 Intimacy with the Communist Party of China 
Given that the Party-State institution of China rarely provides a clear-cut 
distinction between the Party and the Government, the RCSC’s interaction with 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) constitutes a significant element that 
paints the organisation with GO-ish features. A close examination of the 
organisational structure of the RCSC found that the RCSC maintains a 
profoundly intimate relationship with the Communist Party of China (CPC). This 
unique feature distinguishes it from all Red Cross organisations in other 
countries and most NGOs in China. This intimacy can be observed from the 
establishment of the CPC branches at various levels of RCSC’s management 
system. According to the Red Cross Law of PRC:  
“To straighten the management system of the Red Cross societies, we 
must follow Article 46 in Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the Communist 
Party of China and apply it to establish CPC Branches within the Red 
Cross societies. At the same time, every RCSC, at the provincial level 
and city level, should set up a Party committee, general branch 
committee and sub-branch committee. RCSC organisation at the 
county level should also establish the branch committee of CPC and 
party group. The objective is to improve and strengthen the leadership 
of the Party on the RCSC.” (National People's Congress of the PRC 
2017b) 
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The provisions in the Red Cross Law highlights the significance of CPC’s 
participation in the RCSC and legally defines the involvement of CPC at 
different levels of RSCS’s organisational structure. Such involvement is 
strengthened by appointing Party leaders to the role of the RSCS leaders. Many 
leaders who are in charge of the Red Cross organisations in China also hold a 
concurrent post as the Secretary of the Party Committee or Secretary of CPC 
Branch. At both the RCSC headquarters and all RCSC branches below, there 
exists departments dedicated to the CPC members: the CPC branch. The 
Executive Vice President of the RCSC organisation is normally the General 
Secretary of the CPC branch. A province-level participant mentioned: 
“The important decision-making for our branch usually takes place at 
our CPC branch. [….] We have CPC branches at all levels of our 
organisations, and all our work is guided and led by the General 
Secretary of the CPC branch. [….] At present, our staff and CPC 
membership ratio is one hundred per cent at the province-level, 
meaning all our staff are CPC members.” (RC19) 
From an operational perspective, it can be observed that such an intimate 
relationship fosters a stronger interdependency and trust between the CPC and 
the RCSC. This mainly manifests in the decision-making process and the 
appointment of organisational leaders. In activities involving operational 
directions and major decisions, RCSC tends not to violate the strategic plan set 
by the Party and normally performs its duties under the leadership of the Party.  
“Our role is positioned to be the auxiliaries to the Party and the 
government. [….] Our working focuses are typically given to the areas 
that concern the Party and the government most. For example, our 
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provincial Party committee’s priority at present is on the subjects of big 
data, poverty relief, and environmental protection. These topics will 
give us a clear direction of what we should do next. [….] We are not 
supposed to go off track or away from those subjects. One of the most 
important indicators for assessing our performance is whether our job 
is consistent with what was set by the Party and the government.” 
(RC20) 
The de facto leaders of Red Cross organisations, the Executive Vice Presidents, 
have to undergo a recommendation and selection process led by the CPC 
before being officially appointed. For example, the Executive Vice President of 
a provincial branch is initially recommended by the CPC Branch of the 
corresponding province, then assessed by the representative meeting, and 
finally appointed by the CPC Committee. Similarly, at the headquarters level, 
the Executive Vice President of RCSC is directly appointed by the Central 
Organisation Department of CPC. In addition to these appointments, the 
Executive Vice Presidents are subject to personal assessment on their 
performance by the CPC Committee. 
This observation from RSCS is consistent with Spire’s (2007) observation that 
establishing CPC branches is a common practice and requirement for most 
registered NGOs and GONGOs. The strong “Party” overtone in RCSC 
organisations suggest that the RSCS are more responsive to CPC’s initiative 
than other NGOs who do not maintain such intimacy and trust with the CPC. 
The implication which can be drawn from this is that the RCSC is able to 
mobilise more support, both financially and politically, from the Party Committee 
when their CSR projects are consistent with the CPC’s objectives. 
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5.4.1.2 Structural Embeddedness 
 
Figure 5-3 The Decoupling Phases of RCSC  
The governmental embeddedness is also observable in that the RCSC 
originally functioned as a government department. As shown in Figure 5-3, 
before the enactment of the Red Cross Law, the RCSC had been attached to 
the administrative department of the Ministry of Health, with regional Red Cross 
branches working as an office of the local health departments. In 1999, with the 
approval of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council (1999), RCSC 
was transformed from being governed by the Ministry of Health into being 
connected by the leaders of the State Council.  
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Figure 5-4 The RCSC’s Decoupling Rate from The Department of Health 
by 2017 
As illustrated in Figure 5-4, by the end of 2017, 97% of RCSC units and offices 
had officially decoupled from the local Department of Health. Despite the legal 
separation, RCSC maintained a close relationship with the Health departments, 
especially in their overlapping areas of disease prevention, blood donation, and 
organ donation. 
The governmental feature of RCSC is also reflected in the appointment of 
RCSC leaders. According to Article Ten of The Red Cross Law (National 
People's Congress of the PRC 1993), the RCSC can invite the State Presidents 
to be its Honorary President, a privilege not possessed by any other GONGOs 
or NGOs. In 2004, the General Office of the State Council (2004) issued a 
statute titled “Suggestions on Further Strengthening the Work of RCSC”. 
According to this statute, “the Presidents of the Provincial, Prefecture and 
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County Red Cross branches should be elected from the leaders in the 
corresponding administrative ranks” and “the post of the Honorary Presidents 
of the Provincial, Prefecture and County Red Cross branches should be 
assumed by the leaders in the corresponding administrative ranks” (General 
Office of the State Council 2004). It is the first and only time in China to put it in 
the written Statute that the offices of the Presidents and Honorary President of 
a GONGO should be concurrently held by the leaders in the corresponding 
administrative ranks. On an operational level, the management and staff of 
RSCS are given the same treatment as those in the government department.  
“Our human resource management is in reference to the Civil Servant 
Law. All our staff are provided with the same level of treatment that 
public servants are entitled to, including the salary and welfare benefits. 
But this also means our staff is required to comply with the code of 
conduct that enforced on the public servants.” (RC01) 
The examination of data collected provides insight that has not been observed 
from the extant literature. The literature suggests most GONGOs are deemed 
GO-ish because their registration process, funding source, and staff 
composition imply a connection to or support from the government. However, 
in the case of RCSC, the governmental attributes are further explicitly observed 
from the legal endorsement from the government. With such legitimacy both in 
form and in practice, the RCSC is easily perceived by external actors as a 
government department. While this may compromise their representativeness 
of authentic NGOs, their government-like enforcement power is strengthened 
in governance activities. 
149 
 
5.4.1.3 Financial Dependency 
The funding source is often what makes the RCSC vulnerable to criticism about 
its autonomy. Given its operating capital and office space are provided by the 
Government, the public usually perceives the RCSC as a de facto government 
department. The provision of financial support enables the RCSC to sustain its 
daily operations, but the RCSC must rely on individual fund-raising for specific 
projects. Many argue that the financial support provided by the government 
compromises the identity of the RCSC as an independent NGO. However, 
many insiders in the Red Cross system defended such financial support from 
an internationally accepted legal perspective. 
“I think calling the RCSC a GONGO because we receive financial 
support from the government is not a rigorous argument. [….] Paying 
us salary is a mandatory duty that the government has to uphold by 
signing on the Geneva Convention. It is not an investment made by the 
government. Moreover, the government does stipulate (in the Red 
Cross Law) that we are entitled to carry out work independently.” 
(RC12) 
The ongoing operating capital enables the RCSC to sustain its operations 
without seeking external financial support. This enhances the bargaining power 
of the RCSC when cooperating with the business actors. In most cases where 
NGO-business cooperation is based on a beneficiary-donor relationship, NGOs 
tend to be extremely weak in exercising bargaining power. This is because 
NGOs heavily dependent on the financial donations provided by companies. 
Since the RCSC’s operating capital is fully provided by the government, the 
funds they raise from the private sector is used to support mandated projects. 
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Furthermore, the RCSC is not permitted by law to withhold overhead costs from 
the donations, ensuring all donations are used for the purpose in which they 
are given.  
Prior to the enactment of the Charity Law of PRC enacted in 2016, NGOs 
normally drew management fees (i.e. overhead costs) of 15%-20% from the 
total donations. Since the enactment of the Charity Law of PRC, the maximum 
overhead ratio NGOs in China is allowed to take from the fund they raised is 
stipulated at 10% (National People's Congress of the PRC 2016a). From a 
psychological lens, donors wish to see their money go to the intended 
beneficiaries without syphoning funds through intermediaries. The financial 
arrangement of the RCSC caters to the preference of a large number of private 
donors and provides GONGOs with a competitive advantage over NGOs. 
Although the government funding compromises the RCSC’s autonomy from the 
government, it enhances the RCSC’s autonomy from the private sector to a 
certain degree. 
Many RCSC participants in this research claimed the financial support from the 
government is “both a gift and a curse” as funds from the government has 
become the only legitimate financial resource the RCSC is entitled to receive 
for maintaining operations. Since the GONGOs are not allowed to charge 
management fees, only limited funds are available from the government for 
further strengthening and building the RCSC’s organisational capacity. 
Especially for administrative staff and field workers, although they are entitled 
to welfare benefits at the same level as public servants, their pay grades are 
usually set at a much lower and fixed level compared to average practitioners 
in ordinary NGOs. 
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“Frankly speaking, our staff are only paid at a fixed rate from the 
government. Employees can easily lose their motivation because of 
the ineffective rewarding scheme. Many of them are motivated either 
by a felt responsibility to the organisation or potential promotion 
opportunities in political careers.” (RC20)  
The funding constraint has become a challenge for the RCSC to retain 
professional social workers who otherwise can be attracted by higher paygrade 
in market-oriented NGOs. The constraint has also been enforced on fixed 
assets provided to the RCSC. In 2012, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee adopted an Eight-Point Frugality Code, aiming to rectify undesirable 
and unethical work practices of officials in formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism 
and extravagance. The 8th point of the code requires that “officials must practise 
thrift and strictly to follow relevant regulations on accommodation and car use”. 
To follow regulations in this code, the RCSC organisations at all levels are 
required to cut down unnecessary operational costs, including costs associated 
with vehicles provided. Based on data in this research, a prefecture-level 
branch was allowed to retain only one SUV donated by an oversea Red Cross 
organisation. This SUV has been used for multiple purposes ranging from field 
investigations, documents delivery, to the transportation of supplies and goods 
across two districts and four counties. In summary, while the RCSC 
organisations can enjoy stable funding support from the governments, the 
amount and specific employment of the fund are subject to strict government 
regulations.   
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5.4.1.4 Human Resource Management System 
The reference frame of the RCSC’s human resource management system is 
the Civil Servant Law of the PRC. This means that all staff of the RCSC are 
managed with the same approach as public servants of the governments. This 
also means that there is specific staff quota enforced on every RCSC branch. 
The quota is neither decided by the relevant RCSC branch nor a higher level of 
RCSC authority. Instead, it is determined by the CPC Commission Office for 
Public Sector Reform at a corresponding level. Under this system, the size of 
the workforce that an RCSC branch is entitled to have is beyond the discretion 
and demand of the organisation itself. Because of this constraint, the sizes of 
individual RCSC branches are normally kept at a lean level.  
Moreover, the RCSC’s staff mainly come from three sources: the civil servants 
who are transferred from government departments, military veterans who are 
assigned to the RCSC, and the successful candidates from the Civil Servants 
Examinations. The limited staff quota is quickly filled by staff coming from these 
sources, which makes it even more difficult for the RCSC organisations to 
recruit professional social workers from the market. Also, given the high-ranking 
officials are directly appointed by the CPC Commission Office for Public Sector 
Reform, other staff find that the RCSC fails to offer them a career prospect with 
foreseeable promotion opportunities. Commenting on this, a province-level 
RCSC informant remarked: 
“Currently, we have no staff who was graduated from a social work 
background. Most of our staff are transferred from the health 
departments of the government. They are mostly graduates from 
medical schools. If these staffs approach the age of retirement, new 
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staff assigned to us are expected to be military veterans who used to 
serve in administrative positions. We do not have the authority to let 
them go. [….]. This leaves us a huge challenge that we have to 
manage highly professional social work projects with unprofessional 
workforces.” (RC16) 
It can be observed that although the government-like human resource 
management system enables the RCSC to access a stable workforce source, 
GONGOs appear to be weak in making recruitment and layoff decisions based 
on their own needs.  
5.4.1.5 Operational Compatibility 
Given the RCSC’s history with the government, RCSC organisations at all 
levels share a working mode well-matched with other government departments 
at their corresponding levels. This compatible operation mode is reflected in 
having similar organisational structures, like-minded strategic planning, and 
identical decision-making mechanism and workflow. 
In operational activities, such compatibility also favours the RCSC in leveraging 
support from the government. In all Chinese government agencies, formal 
communications are conducted by sending and receiving official documents 
dedicated to the government, called the “red heading documents”. Upon 
receiving a red heading document, the receiver is obligated to look into the 
issues and offer a formal response by replying a red heading document to the 
sender. In practice, the RCSC organisations often use red heading documents 
to request support and assistance from a government department. This formal 
communication channel privileges all GONGOs in China, including the RCSC. 
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It secures a stable and easy conversation channel to the government and 
compels the government departments to take the requests from GONGOs 
seriously.  
The red heading documents do not only facilitate communications between the 
RCSC and government departments, but they also serve as administrative 
orders to integrate and enforce persuasive powers. For example, the RCSC 
Guizhou Branch issued a red heading document jointly with the Provincial 
Transportation Department and the Provincial Public Security Department in 
2009, urging all transportation companies to provide adequate first aid training 
to their drivers. Unlike responding to an appeal initiated by an NGO, companies 
typically make more serious efforts in following up issues instructed by the 
government departments. However, such joint issuance of red heading 
documents also warrants extensive efforts made by the RCSC to convince 
relevant government departments. 
5.4.2 Perceived NGO-ish Features 
5.4.2.1 Work Orientation and Style 
Although GONGOs are closely tied to the government in terms of their financial 
and human resources, their work orientation and style appears to be more non-
governmental in nature. Like NGOs, GONGOs’ focus areas are usually situated 
in areas where the government could not reach and/or is not willing to reach. 
For example, the RCSC often plays a vital role in diplomatic activities at 
international arenas on behalf of the government. For example, before Taiwan 
and Mainland China fully established the “Three Links Agreement” in 2008 (i.e. 
transportation, commerce, and communication), the Red Cross organisations 
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in both jurisdictions were the only channels available for formal communications 
across the strait. The Jinmen Agreement signed in 1990 by the Red Cross 
organisations at the two sides is the very first agreement acknowledged and 
accepted by both authorities across the strait. In recent years, the RCSC plays 
a more significant role in countries which do not formally establish diplomatic 
relations with the China authority and countries who participate in China’s “One 
Belt One Road Initiative”. In oversea places where the Chinese government 
departments could not identify a correspondingly same-level agency, the RCSC 
often acts as an agent in searching and connecting proper entities for the 
government. 
In addition to playing an essential part in assisting non-governmental diplomacy, 
the RCSC is also a vital actor in assisting and maintaining public security and 
stability. Especially in cases where limited aid and supplies are distributed to a 
large number of underprivileged populations. RCSC personnel also works as a 
“soft instrument” to understand and seek acceptance from the beneficiaries. 
While the government officials may be seen as condescending and distant, the 
staff of the RCSC are considered more welcomed by people at the community 
level. 
“The government delegated us to distribute 400 million yuan to the 
disaster victims. The original plan was to cover all of our 21 townships. 
[….] It was then found that we could only cover 4 of them with the given 
fund. Each family will be only entitled to 20,000 yuan. But still, it is a 
huge amount for any victim after a horrible disaster. [….] It was at that 
point, people of other townships got together and started a riot. They 
assumed that as long as the aiding fund was from the government, it 
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should be equally distributed to all. They could not be convinced by the 
government officials that people in other townships were in more 
urgent needs. [….] We had to take a two-way approach. On the one 
hand, we recommended to the government to expand the coverage of 
aiding fund to all people even though it might slightly reduce the 
amount distributed to each family. On the other hand, we sent out all 
our staff to appease the rioting people and give thorough explanations 
to them.” (RC27)   
In cases like this, the RCSC was tactically employed by the government as an 
agent to mediate the conflicting situations where the presence of government 
officials might otherwise ignite misunderstanding or revolt. 
5.4.2.2 Collaborations with other GONGOs  
The RCSC regularly collaborates with other GONGOs and NGOs who carry out 
activities in overlapping work areas. Such collaborative interactions are mostly 
seen in coordinated activities during disaster relief and poverty relief. In work 
focusing on these areas, the aiding demand usually exceeds the average 
workload of a single GONGO thus warrants joint efforts from multiple capable 
parties. 
In projects involving the delivery of aid and assistance to the underprivileged 
groups, the China Charity Federation (CCF) often engages in collaborative 
work with the RCSC. The China Charity Federation is a GONGO founded in 
1994 and is dedicated to assisting people in poverty and facing adversity. In 
practice, this working focus often coincides with the RCSC’s work in 
humanitarian relief. Although these two GONGOs tend to work independently, 
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the government has the capacity to prompt coordinated actions by these 
GONGOs during severe crises.  
Facilitating cooperation between these two GONGOs during disaster relief, the 
RCSC Deyang Branch and the CCF Deyang Branch were appointed to share 
office space in the same building after the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake. Given 
Deyang is located in an earthquake-prone area, the Disaster Relief Centre 
directly under the Deyang government proposed the office-sharing plan to 
ensure immediate and coordinated responses to future disasters. A standing 
workgroup involving leaders of the two GONGOs and officials from other 
relevant government departments was also formed to allow regular information 
sharing and coordinated decision-making. In later years, the two GONGOs built 
their aid supply warehouses within 50 metres distance from each other 
respectively. The warehouses are managed and maintained by the two 
GONGOs on their own, but it became a common practice for them to share 
storage spaces. 
In addition to coordinating and sharing tangible resources, the RCSC also 
leverages the strengths of networked GONGOs to elevate its service delivery 
capacity. In assisting the impoverished in Guizhou, the RCSC Guizhou Branch 
has worked on a project called “Sending Love to All Families” for more than ten 
years. Its province-level GONGO partner, the Federation of Literature and Art 
(FLA) Guizhou Branch, has actively participated in this project since its 
commencement. The FLA is a membership-based GONGO composed of 
associations of writers and artists. To help the RCSC deliver the project, the 
FLA regularly organises its artist members to give free-entry art performances 
at the service delivery locations. The renowned FLA artists also participate in 
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campaigns and activities relevant to the project on a regular basis to promote 
this project to a broader audience. In helping the RCSC mobilise participation 
from the business actors, renowned calligraphers and painters from the FLA 
organise an annual charity sale to pool financial resources and human 
resources from companies and wealthy philanthropists. This ongoing 
collaboration presents a direct networking effort made by the two GONGOs to 
maximise complementarity of each other’s expertise. 
5.4.2.3 Competitions with other GONGOs 
Although GONGOs in China are referred to as the “bridge and bond” linking the 
authority to the people, most GONGOs have a specific target group of 
beneficiaries: the Communist Youth League of China focuses on uniting elite 
teenagers and children; the All-China Federation of Trade Union focuses on 
connecting the working class and protecting labour rights; the All-China 
Women’s Federation is focused on leading women’s movement in China. 
However, the mandate of the RCSC claims their target groups are “the most 
vulnerable people” in China, which is a vaguely defined notion. In some cases, 
the most vulnerable people can be perceived as drop-out teenagers; in other 
cases, the most vulnerable people can be identified as women with deadly 
illnesses. Since it is an expression open to flexible and dynamic interpretations, 
the RCSC’s work scope can be highly overlapping with the work scope of other 
GONGOs.  
To fight for funds and resources, the RCSC face fierce competition from other 
GONGOs on multiple fronts. The biggest competitor to the RCSC in fund-
raising activities is the China Charity Federation (CCF). The CCF is a GONGO 
established and supervised by the Civil Affair Departments of the Chinese 
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government. In regions like Shanghai and Jiangsu, where the RCSC carries out 
most fund-raising activities, the RCSC find it challenging to gain the upper hand. 
The RCSC participants claim they have been confronting aggressive 
competitive tactics from the CCF.  
“The RCSC and the CCF are both GONGOs, but CCF is operating 
under a much higher degree of administrative intervention. [….] 
Actually, the ranking of its president and the honorary president are not 
as high as those of the RCSC. But they are dominant and demanding 
because they are managed by the Civil Affair Department. In my 20 
years of work at the RCSC, the Civil Affair Department has been overly 
supportive to the CCF. For example, we received in a total of RMB 1.48 
billion donations from the public in fund-raising campaigns for 
Wenchuan Earthquake disaster relief. But a considerable portion of it 
was later redirected to the CCF under compulsory order. During that 
time, we fought with them on this issue many times.” (RC13) 
The competition between the RCSC and the CCF has intensified after the 
enactment of the Charity Law of PRC in 2016. According to Article 22 of the 
newly enacted law, all NGOs and foundations must register with the Civil Affairs 
Department and obtain the department’s approval prior to public fund-raising 
activities. Many insiders of the RCSC argue that this article is in conflict with the 
mandate of the Red Cross Law and violates the RCSC’s right to raise funds 
independently. In October 2017, the Civil Affairs Ministry and the RCSC 
Headquarters jointly issued “The Notice Regarding Public Fundraising by the 
Red Cross Society of China”, requiring RCSC organisations at all levels to 
follow the stipulations in the Charity Law. Many informants from the RCSC 
160 
 
believe that it was a compromising movement made to secure legitimacy and 
operational license in future fund-raising activities. Commenting on this, an 
academic researcher focusing on studying GONGOs remarked: 
“Enforcing the Charity Law on the RCSC is obviously in conflict with 
the Red Cross Law. Adopting the Notice is a compromising agreement 
after enduring, vicious competitions. [….] This Notice scared off many 
large-scale business partners of the RCSC, especially those online 
fund-raising platforms, because the cooperation could not be 
proceeded without obtaining approval from the Civil Affairs 
Department.” (NR11) 
Competitions between GONGOs does not only occur in competition for 
resources but also for securing political positions and significance. Given 
positive support from the government departments is vital to successfully 
perform their duties, local units of RCSC invest heavily in maintaining 
communication and relationships with government departments to seek their 
endorsement on the RCSC’s work. The connection to the international Red 
Cross Movement is also a resort that the RSCS typically applies to gain and 
secure political significance in China. Compared to other GONGOs in China, 
the RCSC is the only GONGO who has a significant international community. 
This advantage favours the RCSC over other GONGOs to draw attention from 
the political leaders in international affairs. 
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5.5 The Implication of Hybridity on GONGO’s CSR Governance 
5.5.1 An Overview of RCSC’s CSR Principle and Engagement 
As a national component of the Movement, RCSC’s engagement in CSR 
activities closely follows the Movement’s Ethical Principles (ICRC 2002) 
building partnerships with the private sector as well as domestic laws and 
regulations of its host country, China. According to the Movement’s Ethical 
Principle (ICRC 2002), Red Cross organisations carry out CSR engagements 
in two areas: (1) supportive collaboration from the private sector and (2) 
dialogue with companies operating in conflict-prone areas. In cases of 
supportive collaboration with the private sector, Red Cross organisations seek 
material and/or financial support from companies, corporate and private 
foundations, and wealthy entrepreneurs to enhance its capacity in delivering 
humanitarian work. The primary avenues of such collaborations can be 
summarised as: 
i. Seeking philanthropic donation; 
ii. Purchasing from ethical business suppliers; 
iii. Leveraging corporate technology and skill assistance; 
iv. Authorising use of the name and logo of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent to providers of goods and services; 
v. Establishing a joint, operational partnership with businesses. 
In cases of collaboration with businesses, Red Cross organisations accept 
support only from companies whose policies and activities are consistent with 
the mandate and principles of the Movement. This includes the seven 
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Fundamental Principles of the Movement: “humanity, impartiality, neutrality, 
independence, voluntary service, unity and universality”; and the Movement’s 
Statute “to protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being” (The 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 1986). Based on 
these guiding principles, the Movement has identified five ethical criteria (ICRC 
2002) preventing Red Cross organisations from entering into CSR 
engagements with companies who:  
(1) involves in manufacturing or sale of arms; 
(2) violates the international humanitarian law; 
(3) violates internationally recognised human rights and fundamental labour 
standards; 
(4) manufacture products that are widely recognised as deleterious to health; 
(5) is closely tied to major public controversies. 
In cases involving humanitarian dialogue, Red Cross organisations approach 
companies operating in conflict-prone areas irrespective of whether their 
policies and activities are consistent with the Movement’s principle. Experience 
shows that in areas under violence or armed conflict, governments often lose 
their prerogative while some large-scale corporations have more influence and 
coverage to protect and assist victims. In this case, Red Cross organisations 
advocate humanitarian corporate conducts in war-prone areas and pay close 
attention to the businesses’ relations with the host government and local 
communities to alleviate human sufferings. 
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Responses from interviews suggest that in the absence of armed conflict in 
China, RCSC’s current CSR engagements focus on seeking supportive 
collaboration with the business actors operating in China. The RCSC’s CSR 
engagements develop along two lines. The first is operational, which includes 
designing, delivering, and reporting specific CSR projects with particular 
business actors. The second involves promoting humanitarian conduct and 
Principles of the Movement to the general private sector. Along both lines of 
RCSC’s work, persuasion, education, negotiation and cooperation are the 
primary tactics RCSC utilises to influence CSR practices while confrontational 
actions are seldom taken into effect in practice.  
5.5.2 Network Scope and Density 
The fluidity of knowledge and resource transfer and the vast and complete 
national network enables the RCSC to gain a palpable competitive advantage 
over other NGOs operating in China. Due to the registration requirement, most 
NGOs in China work on a regional basis. Even for large-scale NGOs who have 
the resources to sustain operations nationwide, it is almost impossible for them 
to have permanent grassroots units functioning in all administrative regions 
inclusive of all towns and villages. Since established RCSC branches 
correspond to the Chinese administrative division, it ensures that RCSC 
organisations and units are present in every administrative region, regardless 
of the size. A province-level RCSC participant commented:  
“The advantages of our organisational network are remarkable. Not 
only [our branches] are present in every city and county, but also our 
basic grassroots units are established in most public institutions, 
schools, and hospitals. [….] In our province, we had more than 12,000 
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grassroots units at peak before we merged and restructured them into 
6,000 to 7,000 units. These grassroots units are also one of our 
resources. If a company wishes to outspread its CSR project to full 
coverage of the whole province, these units are exactly what will help 
them to achieve their goal.” (RC13) 
The widespread coverage of RCSC organisations ensures that there is an 
active workforce ready for deployment in any administrative region at any given 
time. At present, this extensive coverage is something other NGOs in China 
find difficult to achieve. This is frequently used as a selling point to attract 
potential business partners to the RCSC. A national-level RCSC described his 
strategy to outbid other NGOs when approaching business partners: 
“We have resident branches in every province, city, and county. This 
enables a hardware foundation for our cooperation. There are some 
other NGOs in China, for example, the One Foundation, which does 
not have “feet on the ground”. Unlike us, they cannot provide “docking 
points” for their partners at all levels. Wherever you go, you can readily 
find a resident RCSC organisation right on the spot.” (RC03) 
GONGO’s business partners also concur that organisational coverage is a 
crucial factor that they value when choosing CSR partners. In addition to the 
consideration that companies prefer having a local docking point, companies’ 
decisions are also based on cost analysis and long-term follow-up demands of 
CSR projects. A business respondent explained his motivation to choose 
GONGO as a CSR partner:  
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“[The reason of us preferring GONGO] is because it can implement 
this (project) instantly without delay. [....] What I often observed from 
other NGOs is that they will have to specifically send someone to 
investigate the local place where a particular project is initiated. We 
can only get the feedback when the investigator spends considerable 
time on understanding the specific situation of that place after his trip. 
Moreover, in order to send over the supplies for the project, another 
round of the trip will have to occur. For example, the [ABC] (an NGO 
partner) have to deploy their staff from Guangzhou province to 
Guizhou province back and forth throughout a project. This kind of 
arrangement is costly and inevitably lead to some omissions. They will 
not have the time and experience to establish a comprehensive local 
understanding of who the needed really are and who are not, like 
GONGOs do.” (CO09) 
The readily established GONGO units at the community level are perceived by 
business partners as a cost-effective setup, which saves on cost and time, 
including the cost of transportation, investigation, implementation and follow-up 
procedures of the CSR projects. Particularly useful for monitoring and follow-
up assessment of the projects, the resident GONGO units possess the luxury 
to observe and adjust project delivery instantaneously. Even after the 
implementation stage of the projects, resident GONGO units can make on-
going monitoring and evaluation in the long run. 
The network also enables RCSC field workers to identify emerging social pain 
points that often imperceptible to distant managers and donors. These social 
pain points can be easily overlooked or misinterpreted by people who only pay 
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short-term visits to the concerned places. A fieldworker of RCSC described how 
grassroots units helped RCSC in its CSR project design: 
“Our advantage is that we have grassroots units. Within the region of 
my work, I know very well which townships have relatively poorer 
economic development and in which townships roads are not in good 
condition. For example, some companies want to donate rain boots to 
students living in mountain areas. Based on my knowledge of road 
conditions, I can immediately tell them which the places have the 
highest demands. The information I provide is accurate and real-time. 
[….] To give you a recent example, a company based in Guangdong 
city comes to our town for project investigation. They saw our 
government building was even fancier than theirs, so they assumed 
our people did not need any financial support at all. But they could not 
see the deeper humanitarian needs that our local people see and 
experience behind those superficial appearances.” (RC30) 
In summary, the scope and density of GONGO’s organisational network allow 
them to operate on a larger scale and deliver CSR project across regional 
borders at a relatively low cost. The numerous resident units at the community-
level appear to be critical in identifying and investigating social problems which 
could inform relevant CSR practices. 
5.5.3 Political Resources 
The RCSC’s political resources rely on an informal social network functioning 
across the RCSC and the government systems. The incumbent RCSC leaders 
are usually those who held prior positions in government departments. Their 
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prior working experience equips them with the necessary knowledge and social 
network to build trust and work smoothly with different government departments.  
“I used to be the General Secretary of the Health Department. When I 
worked there, I became acquainted with many General Secretaries of 
other government departments because we have regular meetings 
together every season and even every month. After I joined the RCSC, 
I took advantages of these personal relationships to seek their support 
[….] because of my former position, they all took my request seriously.” 
(RC13) 
The prior working experience and informal social network of the RCSC leaders 
enable them to know the operations of government and the departments to 
establish communication with when various needs for support arise. What is 
noteworthy is that human resource recruitment does not necessarily flow from 
the government to the GONGOs. It appears to be a common practice to transfer 
and assign GONGO staff to various government departments. This 
phenomenon is validated with the information provided by both informants from 
GONGOs and the government departments regarding their former positions. 
Put simply, GONGOs and the government departments in China typically share 
the identical pool of talent in which the personnel mobility is maintained at a 
high level. 
The informal social network that favours the RCSC also extends to subordinate 
relationships. The leading positions of GONGO often become retiring positions 
for government officials. People who at present hold vital positions in 
government departments are usually people who were once subordinates or 
colleagues of the GONGO leaders. Out of respect and reciprocal manners, the 
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incumbent government officials typically respond to their former superior’s 
request positively. However, this is not a tactic only employed by GONGOs in 
China. Most NGOs, both in China and in other countries, usually offer leading 
positions to influential politicians, celebrities, and the Royal Members in return 
for higher visibility to the public and wider accessibility to resources. 
“On the global scale, it is a common practice for retired government 
officials to assume leading positions in Red Cross organisations. [….] 
If you take a look at the resumes of Red Cross leaders around the 
world, you will find that most of them used to serve in the government. 
[….] Their backgrounds precisely ascertain that they are dedicated to 
serving the public. [….] Their prior experiences and social networks 
proved to be advantages that favour our work. [….] Typically, it is the 
highly respected person who could assume the leading positions of 
Red Cross organisations. Whereas in China, the Honorary President 
is the Vice President of the country, in Japan, the Honorary President 
is the Queen.” (NR09)    
In this regard, the objective of RCSC strengthening the relationship with 
government is beyond building capacity for specific projects, but to secure 
political resources and strategic political status in the long term. 
5.5.4 Shared Credibility Stigma 
The intimate relationship with the government also forces the RCSC to share 
praise and blame with the government. In June 2011, Guo Meimei, a young 
woman, claimed in her microblog to be the “General Manager” of the “Business 
Association of RCSC” while showing off luxury cars and handbags. Her 
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flaunting of lavish lifestyle soon made the national headline and created public 
scepticism that her wealth was a result of misused donations to the RCSC. The 
thereafter called “Guo Meimei Scandal” is deemed to have tarnished the 
credibility and reputation of the charity sector in China as a whole. Even though 
in December 2011, a formal police investigation found no evidence of an entity 
called “Business Association of RCSC” and there was no connection between 
Guo and the RCSC, the scandal continues to haunt the RCSC with donations 
to the RCSC falling by 80% in the following year. The respondents from the 
RCSC claimed that the Guo Meimei scandal was a turning point since when the 
RCSC has become extremely cautious about screening and cooperating with 
the business actors. 
After the Guo Meimei Scandal, a so-called "Tacitus Trap" suddenly became a 
buzzword on the Chinese internet. It basically means, when a government loses 
credibility, whatever it says or does, regardless of good or bad, is deemed fake 
or evil by the people. A number of RCSC participants described the public 
outrage over the RCSC as a “bullet taken for the government”. Given that the 
public perceives the RCSC as a government agent, public hatred against 
exposed corruption scandals in the government departments at that time was 
amplified and transferred to the RCSC. The GONGO identity, therefore, is a 
compelling factor forcing the RCSC to share credibility stigma with the 
government when they are perceived as a holistic entity. 
5.5.5 Bureaucratic Constraints 
Like the bureaucratic burdens suffered by most large organisations, the 
oversized network of RCSC places the GONGO’s operating efficiency at risk. 
Although every administrative region has at least one RCSC unit, the resources 
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and staff allocated to them do not always provide enough support. The staff and 
funding are usually budgeted by local governments based on non-emergent 
situations. This means the available resources provided are minimal, sufficient 
to ensure routine operations. For small counties and towns, this sometimes 
means only one or two full-time staff are assigned.  
“We have only 24 full-time staff at our province-level branch and 63 
full-time staff at institutions directly under the branch. It is quite 
common that a county-level branch has only one or two full-time staffs. 
Province-wide, we have 574 staff in total. But if you make a comparison, 
the Hong Kong Red Cross has 2,864 full-time staff and more than 
4,000 million HK dollar government funding per year.” (RC21) 
The issue of bureaucratic constraint becomes even critical when projects 
regarding emergencies and crisis occur. During the Wenchuan Earthquake in 
2008, the RCSC was appointed the leading organisation guiding and 
coordinating all rescue actions. To relieve and restore the damages done, 
RCSC organisations in Sichuan faced enormous workload at all levels. A 
prefecture-level RCSC staff described the difficulties he experienced at that 
time: 
“We had only five staff in total, but we had to manage RMB 1.23 billion 
donations distributed from our headquarters, which involves more than 
300 projects. [….] To be honest, I was under a huge amount of 
pressure. I was extremely hard-working. But there were more than 300 
on-going projects spread across six different counties at the same time 
and most of them were located in remote villages. I felt I was powerless 
even though I devoted my days and nights.” (RC26) 
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What is inferred from this discussion is that while the financial resources can 
be mobilised with high liquidity across RCSC’s network nationwide, human 
resources are not mobilised across different levels. This inference can be 
corroborated when it is understood with reference to how the staff of RCSC are 
recruited and managed in practice. The detailed discussion regarding the 
RCSC’s human resource management system is presented in section 5.4.1.4. 
The network’s highly extensive and hierarchical structure also means that the 
decisions made at top levels of RCSC might be perceived and implemented 
differently at lower levels. For example, in identifying and screening business 
partners in CSR projects, decision-makers at different levels of the RCSC 
system interpret the threshold and criteria very differently. An RCSC 
headquarters official conveyed the principles that guide his decision-making: 
“There are certain companies who by nature violates our Red Cross 
principles. [….] For example, the tobacco companies are normally 
large corporations in China, and they are also big tax-payers. But we 
have a guiding principle in the Movement, which is to protect the life 
and health of human beings. What the tobacco companies 
manufacture is obviously deleterious to health and therefore against 
our principles. Thus, we set ourselves against any donations from 
tobacco companies.” (RC02) 
In stark contrast, a provincial-level official interpreted such principles in a 
different way: 
“Frankly speaking, tobacco is not prohibited by the Law. [….] I 
understand why RCSC organisations tend to be cautious about 
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cooperating with those businesses who have negative public 
reputations. But if these businesses intend to do something good for 
society, why shall we stop them? If their intention is voluntary in nature 
and with sincerity, we can seek an anonymity agreement to ensure our 
cooperation will not serve as their publicity tools. As long as they 
participate for good causes, why shall we decline them?” (RC12) 
The variations on the interpretation of the Movement’s principle directly lead 
RCSC organisations to target different business actors in CSR projects. These 
divergent interpretations also lead to different attitudes and approaches 
employed by individual RCSC organisations in operational activities with their 
business partners. 
5.5.6 Accountability Tensions 
Most interviewees acknowledged that the RCSC organisations are facing a 
multiplicity of stakeholders who demand accountability in various forms. 
Instrumentally, the RCSC organisations perceive demands to provide formal 
and regular reports to sponsors demonstrating their financial accountability 
(money has been spent for designated purposes) and functional accountability 
(specific objectives of programmes have been achieved). Normatively, the 
perceived expectation to actively engage both intended and potential 
downward beneficiaries soliciting participation and feedbacks is equally strong.  
When upwardly discharging financial accountability to the Government, the 
RCSC reports annual budget statements and financial statements similarly 
applied to all government agencies. In discharging financial accountability to 
large institutional donors, RCSC organisations provide customised project-
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based financial statements in addition to legally prescribed performance 
evaluation reports and third-party audit reports. Responding to the information 
needs of individual donors, the RCSC disclose specific donation on their 
website with many RCSC branches updating such information in real-time. The 
interviewees associated this form of disclosure with strengthening 
accountability and restoring public trust following the Guo Meimei Scandal in 
2011, in which donor funds were seemingly used for personal lavish spending. 
The RCSC encountered a negative public reaction resulting in enhanced and 
timely accountability disclosures becoming the essential mechanism for the 
RCSC to discharge accountability to individual donors. Instrumentally, the 
RCSC provides formal and regular reports to sponsors demonstrating their 
financial accountability (money has been spent for designated purposes) and 
functional accountability (specific objectives of programmes have been 
achieved). Justification of how operating funds and project funds are spent is 
presented in different forms even though in practice it could be difficult to clearly 
distinguish the daily operational activities and the project-specific activities. In 
terms of downward accountability, beneficiaries, employees, volunteers, and 
members were generally acknowledged as stakeholders of RCSC 
organisations. However, GONGOs face additional challenges in the 
identification of downward beneficiaries compared with typical NGOs. 
GONGOs in China are generally accountable to a specific group of 
beneficiaries. However, the mandate of the RCSC is particularly sensitive and 
challenging when their target beneficiaries are “the most vulnerable people” in 
China (The Red Cross Society of China 2016). 
GONGO’s accountability tensions in the relational-identity dimension are 
related to individual GONGO practitioners’ self-identification in terms of how 
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they see themselves in their role performance as representatives of a GONGO 
and the extent to which their personal values align with organisational mission 
and values. Working along this dimension, the individual’s interpretation plays 
a significant role in determining the scope, mechanisms and outcome of their 
own accountability. The data suggest that relational identity differs based on the 
level in which the participant operates within the RCSC. High-level participants 
associate their organisation more strongly with the international Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement. For example, one participant states: 
“Our organisation [the RCSC] originated from the international Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement and we are an important part of 
the Movement. Its [the movement’s] purpose is to protect human health 
and maintain human dignity. Therefore, all the work we are doing now 
is working towards this mission. Our work is guided by the seven 
fundamental principles of the Movement (humanity, impartiality, 
neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality).” 
(RC04) 
On the other hand, a number of participants working in lower-level 
organisations claim their affiliation and closeness with the leading party and the 
Government: 
“Our role is positioned to be the auxiliaries to the Party and the 
government. [….] Our work focuses are typically given to the areas that 
concern the Party and the government most.” (RC25) 
Such divergent self-identification could be triggered by different legitimacy 
demands that practitioners experienced at different levels. Practitioners at 
higher levels of the RCSC may perceive a stronger demand to link their identity 
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with the international Red Cross community to safeguard their legitimacy and 
their political status at decision-making levels. In contrast, lower-level 
practitioners normally face more specific project delivery tasks requiring 
significant support and cooperation from the government in terms of workforce, 
resources, and policies. Moreover, lower-level practitioners have more chance 
to face beneficiaries who could hardly distinguish the identity of RCSC 
employees from government officers. The dual effect of internal and external 
role positioning could influence lower-level practitioners to resonate more 
strongly with accountability towards the governmental identity. 
Along the imposed-felt accountability dimension, the combined impact of 
regulatory requirements and donor’s demands shape how the RCSC 
practitioners experience the imposed accountability. In addition to accounting 
reporting standards such as the Non-governmental and Non-profit Organisation 
Accounting Standards (2005), other non-accounting legislation, such as the 
Charity Law (2016b), the Information Disclosure Guidelines for Charity 
Organisations (2018a), the Law of the Red Cross Society of China (2017a), the 
Constitution of the Red Cross Society of China (2015), also have a significant 
impact on the imposed accountability requirements. In addition to formal 
disclosure requirements applied to all registered Chinese NGOs, there are 
additional compliance checks and audits particularly targeted at GONGOs. On 
the other hand, felt accountability of GONGO practitioners is strengthened with 
the duration of employment in the RCSC organisations where long-service 
interviewees portray themselves as a part of the noble humanitarian Movement 
and with the role performance of the job. 
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5.6 Chapter Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter explores the structure of the RCSC’s 
international and national network. A systematic tracing of its organisational 
network reveals that while the Red Cross organisations are widely recognised 
as NGOs at the international-level network, the RCSC’s identity in Chins is 
perceived as a highly hierarchical-structured GONGO. It is also observed that 
the hybridity of GONGOs plays a crucial role in shaping its governance and 
networking capacity. The perceived GO-ish features revolve around the 
organisation’s intimate relationship with the CPC, institutional structure 
embeddedness, financial dependency on government funding, government-like 
human resource management system, and the government-compatible 
operation modes. At the same time, the perceptions on its NGO-ish features 
are mainly derived from its voluntary membership base, specialised work 
orientation and foci, dialogue-based work approach, and recurrent collaborative 
and competitive interactions with other NGOs at operational levels. This study 
argues that the attributes of GONGO actors are too complex and dynamic to 
be captured by the dichotomy between corporatism and civil society framework. 
Instead, they should be viewed as accommodating entities whose 
organisational boundaries are porous and who strategically trade on a mixed 
identity. It is more helpful to translate GONGO’s hybridity to mean that their 
capacity permeates across sectors for resource mobilisation and power 
leverage than to deny GONGOs as either authentic government agencies or 
authentic NGOs. 
In sum, the findings from stage one suggest that GONGO’s hybrid features 
have significant implications for its CSR governance legitimacy and governance 
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capacity. For CSR governance legitimacy, GONGO’s physical and institutional 
embeddedness into governments portrays its perceived identity as a quasi-
regulator from the points of view of external parties, especially business actors. 
In the meantime, GONGO’s expertise, skills and experience in specialised 
areas, such as disaster response, first-aid delivery, blood donation, and 
humanitarian relief, backed up its competence in governing issues in those 
domains. In regard to GONGOs’ CSR governance capacity, while the hybrid 
features allow GONGOs to enjoy preferential access to political resources, they 
also make GONGOs subject to an overload of bureaucratic constraints and 
excessive credibility stigma. These implications prompt GONGOs to 
deliberately use their networks as both a strategy and an infrastructure to: firstly, 
make the governance procedure more equitable, accessible and open; second, 
to increase the bargaining power to counter the targeted company’s regulatory 
capture and resistance; third to enable escalation to higher levels of 
governance interventions with higher levels of intensity; fourth, to assist 
information gathering, validating and sharing; lastly, to facilitate necessary 
material and human resources flow from resourceful networked actors to other 
networked actors in need. Accordingly, these give rise to the formulation of 
corresponding rewarding incentives, threatening punishments, and capacity 
building assistance in GONGO’s networked governance approaches. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS OF STAGE II 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings based on analysis of data collected in stage two 
of the research. The primary data sources of analysis at this stage are laws, 
regulations, and policies regarding joint engagement in CSR activities by 
GONGOs and associated businesses, interviews conducted with the business 
participants in this research, and corporate statements and reports of the 
participant organisations. Findings for this chapter are discussed with reference 
to findings in stage one to allow an integrative overview of the networked 
governance process with evidence found from different actors’ perspectives 
involved in the process. The business informants in stage two were principally 
identified and approached based on interviews with the GONGOs in stage one. 
The interviewees are comprised of corporate managers and executives who 
have knowledge and experience of joint CSR engagement with GONGOs. Their 
host corporate organisations range from large-scale listed companies, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), to local private companies.  
This chapter begins with a summary of the data collected and analysed in stage 
two. With reference to data collected in stage one, this chapter then discusses 
how CSR is perceived and motivated by different actors involved in networked 
governance relationships. This comparative analysis highlights the existing and 
potential conflicts of principles and value between networked actors. Following 
that, a synthesis of findings from stage one and stage two is provided with 
representative case scenarios where networked governance approaches 
involving rewards, punishments, and capacity building in CSR activities. The 
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roles played by GONGOs, networked actors, and companies in the networked 
governance process are demonstrated.  
6.2 A Summary of Data Analysis in Stage II 
Data collected and analysed in this stage has a dedicated focus on documents 
reflecting joint CSR engagement of GONGOs and business actors. External 
documents include laws and regulations in regard to GONGOs’ roles and 
responsibilities in CSR activities, national and regional CSR policies, and third-
party assessment and review reports of joint CSR engagement. Organisational 
archival documents are comprised of corporate annual reports, CSR reports, 
publication and news regarding the participant organisations’ CSR projects, and 
RCSC’s standards and policies regarding CSR-related activities. Table 6-1 and 
Table 6-2 below list key documents and reports utilised in this stage. Information 
sourced from the companies’ websites, social media, and related news articles 
has also been employed as supporting documents for analysis. 
Table 6-1 Key External Documents of Stage I 
Key External Documents of Stage II 
Data Type Name 
State Law/Regulation 
The Law of the People's Republic of China on Donations 
for Public Welfare 
State Law/Regulation The Company Law of the People's Republic of China 
State Law/Regulation 
Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of 
China 
State Law/Regulation 
The Announcement of the Ministry of Finance and the 
State Taxation Administration on Issues of Corporate and 
Social Donation to Red Cross Societies 
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State Law/Regulation 
Provisions on Issues of Standardising Social 
Organisations' Participation in Cooperative Activities 
State Law/Regulation 
The Regulation of the Ministry of Health on Medical 
Institutions with Red Cross Title 
State Law/Regulation 
Interim Measures for the Administration of the Investment 
Activities for Value Preservation and Appreciation of 
Charitable Organizations 
State Law/Regulation 
The Guiding Opinions of the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of State 
Council on State-Owned Enterprises Better Filling Social 
Responsibilities 
State Law/Regulation 
The Guiding Opinions of CPC Central Committee and 
State Council on the Three-Year Action Plan for Poverty 
Alleviation 
State Law/Regulation 
The Guiding Opinions of the General Office of China 
Banking Regulatory Commission on Strengthening the 
Social Responsibility of Financial Institutions 
State Law/Regulation 
The Guidance of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the 
National Office of the Elderly Working Committee on the 
Involvement of the Red Cross Societies in the Provision 
of Aged Care Services 
State Law/Regulation 
The Blood Donation Law of the People’s Republic of 
China 
State Law/Regulation 
The Planning Outline of General Office of the National 
Development and Reform Commission for the 
Construction of a Social Credit System (2014-2020) 
State Law/Regulation 
The Guiding Opinions of the State Council on 
Establishing and Improving the System of Providing Joint 
Incentives to Credible Entities and Enforcing Joint 
Punishment on Discreditable Entities 
State Law/Regulation The Memorandum of Understanding for Joint Promotion 
and Joint Punishment on Entities Making Charitable 
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Donations by the General Office of the National 
Development and Reform Commission and 40 
Government Departments and Public Institutions 
Industry Report 
2011-2018 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Annual 
Reports on China’s Philanthropy Development 
Industry Report 
2012-2018 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ 
Research Reports on Corporate Social Responsibility of 
China 
Table 6-2 Key Organisational Documents of Stage II 
Key Organisational Documents of Stage II 
Data Type Name 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Management Regulation of Fundraising and 
Donation Acceptance of the Red Cross Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Regulations on Medical Institutions Using the Name 
and Emblems of the Red Cross Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Measures of Commendation and Awards to Model 
Institutions 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Regulations on Authorised Use of the Name and 
Emblems of the Red Cross Society of China 
RCSC 
Regulation/Guideline 
The Procurement Management Regulation of the Red 
Cross Society of China 
Corporate Reports 31 Corporate Annual Reports of participant companies  
Corporate Reports 24 Standalone CSR Reports of participant companies 
Corporate Reports 
45 CSR Publications/Statements of participant 
companies 
RCSC Report 
2012-2018 Annual Reports of the Chinese Red Cross 
Foundation 
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RCSC Report 
2012-2018 Annual Inspection Review Reports of the 
Chinese Red Cross Foundation 
Interviews performed in this stage include 11 semi-structured interviews with 
informants recruited from 8 companies involved in RCSC’s networked 
governance efforts. Among them, five participant companies are publicly listed 
companies operating across multiple provincial territories, and the remaining 
three companies are private companies operating in local regions. All interviews 
are analysed with on-site observation notes and memos. Some CSR 
governance case scenarios that emerged from stage one interviews are further 
clarified and verified at this stage from the perspective of the business actors. 
The perceptions and experience of business participants are analysed with 
reference to the perceptions and experience of corresponding GONGO actors 
and networked actors in stage one. Table 6-3 below provides a list of the 
interview details. 
Table 6-3 Semi-Structured Interviews of Stage II 
 Semi-structured Interviews of Stage II 
Participant 
Code 
Organisation Type Participant’s Position 
Interview 
Length 
CO01 
Listed Pharmaceutical 
Group - SOE 
Head of Operation Department 42 minutes 
CO02 
Listed Pharmaceutical 
Group - SOE 
Chief of Office 59 minutes 
CO03 
Listed Pharmaceutical 
Group - SOE 
CEO, Vice Secretary of CPC 
Group 
Council Member of GONGOs 
58 minutes 
CO04 For-Profit Hospital President 
2 hour 21 
minutes 
183 
 
CO05 
Private Real Estate 
Development Company 
Vice President, Secretary of 
CPC Group 
55 minutes 
CO06 
Listed Medical 
Technology and 
Equipment Company 
General Manager 
1 hour 11 
minutes 
CO07 
Development Fund 
Institution 
Vice President, Secretary-
General of CPC Group 
50 minutes 
CO08 
Listed Pharmaceutical 
Company 
General Manager of a 
Provincial Branch 
1 hour 8 
minutes 
CO09 
Listed Risk and 
Disaster Response 
Technology Company 
General Manager of a 
Provincial Branch 
56 minutes 
CO10 
Listed Financial 
Institution - SOE 
Head of Public Relations and 
Corporate Culture Department 
1 hour 7 
minutes 
CO11 
Listed Financial 
Institution - SOE 
Head of Institutional 
Cooperation Department 
44 minutes 
 
6.3 Perception of CSR  
6.3.1 Perceived Meanings of CSR 
The premise of exploring how the networked governance of GONGOs’ 
influence CSR practice is to find out how different actors involved in this process 
understand CSR. The conception of CSR is essential because various actors 
involved in the processes of networked governance are guided by prescriptions 
entailed in their respective perceived CSR meanings. How the actors interpret 
CSR principles can directly influence how they formulate specific governance 
efforts and responsive mechanisms to inform their practice. The disparities in 
conceptualising and interpreting CSR have significant impacts on how actors 
identify and evaluate governance outcomes. For example, for GONGO actors 
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who associate CSR with the meaning of corporate philanthropy (RC02, RC09, 
RC10, RC13, RC18, RC26) the governance objective is correspondingly set at 
orientations such as encouraging companies to sustain ongoing commitments 
in philanthropic activities in the long-term and directing corporate philanthropic 
resources to more fitting places. On the other hand, for companies who define 
CSR as a means to foster corporate culture (CO06, CO08, CO10), their focus 
is directed on enhancing employees’ understanding of the organisations’ CSR 
philosophy and promote a socially responsible brand image by taking part in 
CSR activities.  
Based on interviews with participants across GONGOs, government 
departments, and companies, it was found that different actors involved in the 
networked governance relationship align themselves with different definitions 
and principles of CSR. Many participants in this research expressed frustration 
in describing CSR (RC02, RC05, RC07, RC10, RC13, RC14, RC23, NR04, 
NR10, CO01, CO03, CO05), defining it loosely with reference to philanthropy 
and charity. To articulate their respective understanding of CSR, most GONGO 
participants linked CSR with notions such as corporate philanthropy (RC02, 
RC05, RC07, RC10, RC13, RC14, RC26, RC27, RC28, RC29, NR02, NR03, 
NR05), volunteerism (RC01, RC04, RC08, RC11, RC12, RC20, RC22, RC25) 
and ethical business practices (RC17, RC23, NR02, NR03) while business 
participants mostly described CSR as an important component of corporate 
culture (CO04, CO06, CO08, CO10), public relations management (CO01, 
CO02, CO11), and part of corporate political responsibility (CO03, CO04, CO05, 
CO07, CO09). All business participants identified economic responsibility as a 
critical component of CSR, whereas some participant highlighted the role a 
responsible leadership played in promoting CSR value and practices (CO04 
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and CO08). Actors generally accept the topic of CSR as value-driven or 
purpose-driven activities that contribute to various tangible and intangible 
benefits to businesses. However, the instrumental value of embracing CSR as 
a strategy to mitigate risks was attached to conforming established institutional 
expectation more than to avoid business uncertainties. In aggregation, these 
recurrent notions incorporate the conventional academic understanding of CSR 
proposed by Carroll (1991), who suggest CSR comprises economic, legal, 
ethical, and philanthropic responsibilities. What is noticeable from the dissimilar 
foci among different actors is that they tend to interpret CSR with notions that 
help secure self-assessed important objectives. The GONGO participants 
conceptualise CSR as a principle that is consistent with their organisational 
values and goals to serve the public interest. On the other hand, the notions 
conveyed by business participants are more instrumental in business discourse.  
However, it was found that the diversity of CSR perceptions does not 
necessarily hinder the alignment of objectives in specific CSR activities when 
joint engagement from both GONGO actors and business actors is expected. 
The central and local governments in China periodically prescribe guidance for 
CSR-focus areas and regional development plans based on contextualised 
local demands. Such directional guidance often acts as catalysts to compel 
cohesion and pragmatic cooperation between GONGOs and business actors 
to tackle social and environmental challenges in their overlapping areas. For 
example, in immigrant cities such as Shanghai, one of the major social 
challenges identified by the local government is the provision of medical 
services to transients. Accordingly, to address this issue, the Shanghai Red 
Cross Society works closely with local financial institutions and private schools 
to establish health insurance systems for children of non-permanent residents. 
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Likewise, in earthquake-prone areas, such as Sichuan province, the local red 
cross organisations focus their attention to disaster warning systems and 
services and donation for disaster relief. In one of the most economically 
developed regions, Jiangsu province, local red cross organisations actively 
engage in corporate fund-raising activities. In economically underdeveloped 
areas, like Guizhou, the red cross organisations attend to poverty and 
humanitarian relief such as providing adequate food, education and healthcare 
to underprivileged population. Therefore, while the RCSC remain a holistic 
entity and a single identity, different RCSC organisations at local levels focus 
on contextualised CSR engagements across different regions. The diversified 
local challenges also prompt RCSC organisations to target businesses of 
varying natures and formulate customised working plans to solicit solutions to 
common CSR issues. To a certain degree, such a responsive approach to CSR 
engagement consolidates the divergent CSR interpretation comprehended by 
GONGO and business actors. Although the disparities in CSR conceptions do 
not necessarily elicit conflicts in the implementation of CSR collaborations, they 
do reveal that various actors address their emphasis on different aspects of 
CSR.  
6.3.2 Motivations of CSR 
The motives of GONGOs to engage in CSR activities stemmed invariably from 
the intention to pursue its organisational mission (RC01, RC02, RC04, RC05, 
RC07, RC08, RC09, RC11, RC13, RC14, RC15, RC18, NR02, NR05, NR07), 
assist the government in tasks and places where the government cannot reach 
(RC01, RC03, RC06, RC12, RC16, RC17, RC21, RC26, RC27, RC30, NR03, 
NR06), and seek additional service delivery resources (RC03, RC05, RC10, 
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RC11, RC12, RC13, RC16, RC20, RC21, RC29, NR02, NR07). The motives of 
business participants vary from economic incentives such as marketing 
strategy (CO08), tax exemption (CO03, CO05, CO06), and cost minimisation 
(CO05, CO09, CO10), to strategic considerations such as seeking best practice 
and professional expertise (CO02, CO06, CO10, CO11), risk mitigation (CO03, 
CO05, CO06, CO07), positive publicity (CO01, CO04, CO06, CO08), and 
establishing political connections (CO04, CO05, CO08). In this regard, many 
business participants associate their interpretation of CSR with corporate 
political responsibilities. Given that Chinese companies face substantial 
political expectation and interference arising from local institutional contexts, 
obtaining political legitimacy is perceived vital for the survival and success of 
Chinese companies. Many business participants claim that involving GONGOs 
in CSR activities plays a strategic role in cultivating a good relationship with the 
local government and thus achieving political legitimacy. However, the 
demands for political legitimacy vary across companies with different sizes and 
characteristics, which in turn shape their CSR practices.  
The emergence of business participant’s dedicated attention to CSR and 
subsequent CSR practice were not entirely voluntary. Most small-scale 
business participants started to make CSR commitments after they were tacitly 
or explicitly encouraged to tackle specific social issues by government agencies. 
Business participants from small, regional-based companies claim that their 
CSR agenda was led by regional development plans prescribed by local 
governments. To better design and implement CSR towards contribution to the 
regional development goals, small companies rely on GONGOs’ interpretation 
of and update on social and environmental demands in local contexts. In 
contrast, acquiring political legitimacy is of secondary concern for state-owned 
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enterprise participants. As state-owned enterprises interpret political legitimacy 
as a default resource due to their state ownership, what they primarily sought 
from GONGOs was a more sustainable and reliable partnership in delivering 
CSR outcomes with minimum political risks. 
Business participants in this study generally believe that political connections 
can help them secure favourable policy conditions, gain privileged access to 
resources such as bank loans, and ultimately improve their financial 
performance and market value. By mobilising political resources to acquire 
support and favourable treatment, the political connection was deemed a useful 
tool to manage political uncertainties. However, direct connection with the 
government is difficult to obtain, especially for SMEs. For them, the motives for 
launching joint CSR activities with GONGOs are twofold. First, GONGOs are 
regarded as waypoints leading potential direct connections to the government. 
Multiple participants in this research cited examples in which business donors 
insisted on inviting government officials to attend events in their CSR projects 
so that the business owners can have opportunities to build personal 
relationships with the officials. Second, the companies regard having records 
of joint CSR collaboration with GONGOs as proof of good conduct. This proof 
can be of operational use in tendering for both business contracts and 
government contracts. Since most GONGOs undertake a thorough screening 
process for selecting business partners, having records of partnership with 
GONGOs typically becomes evidence of corporate integrity. On the other hand, 
collaborating with GONGOs in CSR activities is also perceived by business 
actors as a strategy to mitigate political risks. Since the government politically 
endorses GONGOs, cooperation with GONGOs is deemed less risky than 
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working with other NGOs who could be politically adversarial to the government. 
In commenting this, a business participant remarked： 
“The political environment in China is something we have to consider 
to ensure the survival and development of the company. […] Since 
GONGOs have already been approved and endorsed by the 
government, why should we take risks by choosing other NGOs?” 
(CO05) 
Seeking political alliances and avoiding political risks constitute significant 
motives of business actors to prefer working with GONGOs over other NGOs 
in CSR activities. However, all business participants in this research failed to 
articulate how they tangibly benefited from such political support, and there was 
minimum evidence suggesting any direct connection to the government was 
successfully established via GONGOs. 
6.4 Networked Governance Approach 
GONGO’s CSR governance objective is twofold: to encourage continuous 
improvements in CSR practices; and to deter and rectify irresponsible business 
practices. The influence of GONGOs stems from rewarding incentives, threats 
of punishment, and capacity building assistance in networked governance 
approaches.  
6.4.1 Networked Governance by Rewards 
Control mechanisms emphasise forms of governance by relying on the power 
of sticks (punitive sanctions) rather than carrots (rewarding incentives). 
However, the role of NGOs in facilitating CSR practices are habitually perceived 
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as more prominent as “soft speakers” carrying rewarding incentives to motivate 
positive and beneficial CSR engagements. The use of tangible and symbolic 
incentives to encourage desirable and ethical business practices are typical 
options provided by most NGOs. While GONGOs do give occasional one-off 
rewards to companies, the networked governance approach emphasises a 
continuous and more responsive escalation to increasingly appealing and 
inducive rewards. This escalation is not achieved by GONGO’s independent 
efforts. Instead, it is realised as the empowerment of networked governance by 
rewards through enrolling and networking with different state and non-state 
actors. In Figure 6-1, a case example illustrating GONGO’s design of networked 
governance by rewards is presented. The following Table 6-4 summarises the 
networked actors involved in the specific case scenario. 
Figure 6-1 A Case Example of Networked Governance by Rewards 
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Table 6-4 A Summary of Networked Actors in the Case Example of 
Networked Governance by Rewards 
Organisation 
Code 
Organisation 
Type 
Organisation Description 
RCSC-D GONGO 
A prefecture-level RCSC which operates in 
disaster-prone areas 
Tech C 
Business 
Actor 
A listed technology company specialised in 
risk and disaster response technology 
development 
RCSC 
Headquarters 
GONGO The national-level RCSC headquarters  
CCF-D GONGO 
A prefecture-level GONGO, focusing on 
providing relief and assistance to the 
underprivileged population. It carries out 
projects on disaster relief, poverty 
alleviation, elderly care, care of orphans, 
education assistance, disability assistance, 
and medical relief. 
B-Rescue NGO 
An NGO operates in the same city as 
RCSC-D does. It consists of local volunteers 
who work to mobilise local resources for risk 
preparedness and rescue services in time of 
natural disasters. 
Y-Response NGO 
An NGO dedicated to collecting, analysing 
and publishing disaster preparedness and 
resilience information to the public. It works 
closely with the local government to provide 
and share information regarding disaster 
forecasts and analyses.  
Department of 
Civil Affairs 
Government 
Agency 
A prefecture-level government department 
responsible for social and administrative 
affairs. Its main duties include formulating 
social welfare development plans, providing 
social assistances, mapping out disaster 
response policies, and coordinating relief 
efforts. It acts as the office managing the 
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registration and supervising social 
organisations within the provincial territory 
boundary.  
Local 
Government 
Office 
Government 
Agency 
The administration office of a prefecture-
level government, operating in the same 
provincial territory with RCSC-D and CCF-D. 
Disaster preparedness and relief are important components on the International 
Red Cross Movement’s humanitarian relief agenda. At the domestic level, 
RCSC’s disaster preparedness and relief plans range from establishing early 
warning systems, providing rescue services, fundraising and supporting victims, 
to rebuilding resilience to disaster-affected areas. An early warning system is 
an essential element of disaster risk prevention system. The provision of 
information about an emerging disaster risk enables early action to prevent 
turning a natural disaster into a human disaster costing human and economic 
loss. 
In this case example, the targeted company, Tech C, is a technology company 
specialised in designing disaster warning systems. In addition to developing 
universal models of the monitoring system to observe and record natural 
phenomena, the company also builds customised disaster warning systems, 
data transfer stations, and control centres for public institutions to administer, 
transmit, and broadcast natural disaster information. Upon identifying how this 
technological strength has benefited the inhabitants and the RCSC’s work in 
local disaster-prone areas, the RCSC-D, a local RCSC branch, firstly enrolled 
the national RCSC Headquarters to give commendation and awards to the 
company’s contribution to the provision of early warning information. To further 
encourage the company’s research and development commitments in disaster 
preparedness projects, the RCSC recommended the company to other disaster 
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relief NGOs (B-Rescue and Y-Response) by endorsing the quality and 
effectiveness of its systems. For networked NGOs like B-Rescue and Y-
Response, their demands on Tech C’s service and product were specialised 
compared with general monitoring systems. Their requests involve wearable 
devices for the rescue team, communication channels that remain functional in 
areas with minimum levels of signals, and secured database with high 
computing efficiency and real-time traceability. When the company’s 
customised modification in systems and product design was validated by the 
networked NGOs, the company was economically rewarded by an increased 
number of contracts and broader application of its systems on more disaster 
warning platforms. To secure a long-term collaboration in disaster warning 
projects from Tech C, RCSC-D enlisted the local Government Office, the local 
Department of Civil Affairs, and CCF-D and established a local Red Cross 
Disaster Preparedness and Response Centre. Working as a supra-
organisational platform, the centre created an opportunity to eliciting ongoing 
and sustained participation from the case company, the networked GONGO 
and NGOs, and the local authorities. 
Many considerations are given in designing and implementing RCSC’s reward 
instruments in this case. Among the positive incentivise that can be adopted as 
a governance mechanism, praise is considered of moderate tangible value to 
the target company. Praise instrument is prioritised by the RCSC as the first 
move toward rewards escalation because the complexity and costs associated 
with the instrument is minimum to the GONGO. Praise instrument also signals 
the alignment of shard value in public interest affairs between the GONGO and 
the target company. The subsequent escalation of rewards incorporates a 
higher level of consideration on material and economic incentives and involves 
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enlisting potential clients of the target company. Such an escalation was 
perceived as an effective one because the target company could notably 
differentiate the increased material value of the escalated rewards from the 
mere symbolic value attached to the previous rewarding gesture. For rewards 
offered at an intensified level, enrolling multiple legitimate actors into the 
process was perceived preferable as the rewarding mechanisms could be 
formulated with less arbitrary bias and implemented in a more accountable and 
rightful manner with joint participation from multiple independent networked 
actors. 
6.4.2 Networked Governance by Punishments 
Considerations on business actors’ motivation to rectify irresponsible and 
potentially harmful business practices are critical to understanding the viability 
of the escalation process of networked governance by punishments. Generally, 
the motivations are twofold. The primary motivation is associated with facing 
possible punitive consequences if the business fails to address potential social 
and environmental harm. The second is concerned with a duty to adhere to the 
rules enforced by regulatory mechanisms. In areas where formal regulations 
are absent, the role of the GONGO actor to formulate responsive deterrence 
instruments becomes prominent. The following illustration in Figure 6-2 
presents a case example in which the RCSC uses progressive punishments 
design to detect and deter irresponsible business behaviours. A summary of 
networked actors involved in the case is listed in Table 6-5.  
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Figure 6-2 A Case Example of Networked Governance by Punishments 
 
Table 6-5 A Summary of Networked Actors in the Case Example of 
Networked Governance by Punishments 
Organisation 
Code 
Organisation 
Type 
Organisation Description 
RCSC-G GONGO 
A provincial-level GONGO which identifies 
first-aid for road safety as one of its 
localised priorities. 
Linehaul 
Truck X 
Business 
Actor 
A private transport company, offering 
linehaul and road freight services with a 
fleet of over 400 vehicles.  
G Daily Media 
A local daily newspaper which has been 
published since 1980. The newspaper 
primarily serves the province of issuance, 
but copies also sell in neighbour provinces. 
Its average daily circulation is 120,000.  
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NGO-R NGO 
A grassroots NGO that implements 
programs and advocates for road safety 
initiatives  
NGO-Z NGO 
An NGO alliance that focuses on 
developing shared information platforms for 
first-aid education and training. 
Department of 
Transportation 
Government 
Agency 
A provincial-level government department 
responsible for the operation, coordination 
and regulation of transport infrastructure 
and transport services within the provincial 
territory boundary.   
Department of 
Public 
Security 
Government 
Agency 
A provincial-level police and security 
authority that exercises oversight over and 
is responsible for day-to-day law 
enforcement within the provincial territory 
boundary.  
Industry and 
Commerce 
Bureau 
Government 
Agency 
A provincial-level regulatory agency in 
charge of regulating business practices, 
promoting competitiveness and acting as 
the patent and business license registration 
office. 
In the 1998 World Disaster Report, the IFRC was one of the first organisations 
to identify road safety as a major global safety crisis. The RCSC, among other 
national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was recognised as one of the 
key partners in the Resolution on Improving Global Road Safety (UN Resolution 
64/255), adopted by the United Nations in March 2010. Following the IFRC’s 
report and the UN Resolution, road safety has become a major targeted area 
of the RCSC’s domestic work. Reducing injuries and fatalities associated with 
traffic accidents by first-aid training and education is identified as one of RCSC’s 
priority to build a risk prevention approach to tackle road safety challenges. 
Prior to 2010, completing adequate hours of first-aid training was a compulsory 
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pre-requisite for learners to obtain a driving licence in some provinces in China. 
The provincial RCSC organisations assumed most of the course delivery tasks. 
Gradually, this mandatory requirement transformed into a voluntary option. 
Albeit this change, RCSC organisations expanded their role as pure education 
providers to risk detectors and monitors. 
In this case example, the local GONGO, RCSC-G, identified a number of truck 
drivers serving at the Linehaul Truck X company failed to renew their first-aid 
certificates when expiration is due. Following up this lead, RCSC-G further 
discovered that many truck drivers newly joined Linehaul Truck X within the 
recent past three years had never attended any road safety education course 
or received any first-aid training. Using arbitrary terms in the employment 
contracts, Linehaul Truck X deliberately shuffled the responsibility and 
associated costs to individual truck drivers. Upon confirming it as a significant 
CSR risk, RCSC-G initiates a strategic networked shaming strategy to publicly 
criticise the company by enrolling the local media (G Daily) and road safety 
NGOs (NGO-R and NGO-Z). The story of Linehaul Truck X’s employment 
contract scandal was reported by G Daily while NGO-R and NGO-Z both post 
critical comments on their platforms. However, other than giving a claim to make 
improvements in an interview report, Linehaul Truck X did not take any 
meaningful actions after this event. With such an unsatisfactory response from 
Linehaul Truck X, RCSC-G formally enrolled the Department of Transportation 
and the Department of Public Security to issue a warning notice to the company 
jointly. The warning notice was made in the format of a “red heading document”. 
Such documents though not formally enforceable, usually carry perceived 
power similar to administrative orders. In this specific case, an enforced self-
regulation response by signing up for regular first-aid training and education to 
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all current employees at Linehaul Truck X was achieved upon receiving the 
warning notice. However, according to the informants from RCSC-G, if the 
company had not responded, higher levels of punishments were planned to be 
forthcoming. Such networked punishments are designed to trigger legal 
prosecution by enrolling the Department of Transportation and the Department 
of Public Security. At the most intensified governance intervention level, the 
company can be blacklisted, and its operation license can be revoked if the 
Industry and Commerce Bureau is formally enrolled in the governance process. 
6.4.3 Networked Governance by Joint Rewards and Punishments 
Figure 6-3 Networked Governance by Joint Rewards and Punishments 
As illustrated in Figure 6-3, the escalation and de-escalation of rewards and 
punishments do not necessarily work in a linear progression manner along the 
independent rewarding pyramid and the punitive pyramid. The rewards and 
punishments can travel across the pyramids to enable a dynamic shift and 
coordination across different networked governance approaches. In addition to 
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offering substantiated material benefits and threats along the escalation route, 
GONGOs also project potential sanctions and incentives as perceived potential 
benefits and threats to secure the targeted companies’ cooperation. For 
example, while a GONGO provides networked praise to commending a 
generous business donor, it is also made explicit that in case a donation fraud 
is identified, punitive networked punishments will be immediately activated.  
In addition, while discretional rewards and punishments are operationalised at 
discrete networks formed by individual GONGOs, they are further reinforced by 
broader regulation systems in which rewards and punishments are expanded 
to a national level and collectively monitored and enforced by government 
departments and national GONGOs. One of the formal and systematic ways to 
institutionally enable joint reward and punishments is the rolling out of the Social 
Credit System in China. In the system, social credit scores have a significant 
influence on companies’ accessibility to subsidies and public procurement, 
government-distributed land, rights of issuing bonds and investment 
opportunities. 
Since the release of the “Plan for Establishing a Social Credit System” by the 
State Council (2014b), a comprehensive nationwide governance toolkit, 
designed to monitor, rate, and regulate business actors and business 
behaviours, has been gradually established. The National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) are 
assigned to lead the implementation process in close cooperation with 
government departments, national GONGOs, and trade associations. The plan 
promotes integrity in government affairs, commercial sincerity, social integrity 
and public trust, and enables punitive and rewarding measures to be targeted 
at both business actors, government authorities and individuals (State Council 
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2014b). For example, under the system, a lower credit could be given if a 
company: does not pay its loans in time; fails to comply with emissions targets, 
work safety standards, or government investment requirements; or fails to 
deliver charity donation and CSR commitments as promised (National 
Development and Reform Commission & People’s Bank of China 2014; State 
Council 2014a, 2014b). Possible punishment measures, ranging from higher 
taxes, limited permission to issue share and bonds, fewer opportunities to 
obtain a loan and participate in government-funded projects will be taken to 
companies with a low rating (State Council 2016). On the other hand, 
companies with a favourable credit rating will benefit from lower interest rates 
on debt, lower tax burdens, support and incentives from government 
departments and GONGOs, and preferential consideration in government 
contracts (State Council 2016). The ultimate goal of the system on regulating 
companies is not only to strengthen financial credit worthiness of the companies 
but also their sincerity, honesty, and integrity in business activities.  
GONGO actors play two primary roles in CSR governance under the system. 
First, GONGO actors are critical data collection points to the credit rating 
system. According to the Social Credit System Plan (State Council 2014b, 
2016), sincerity or discredited information should be collected at all data points 
nationwide linking central government departments, local governments, legal 
entities, GONGOs and banks. Second, GONGO actors are incorporated in the 
joint punishing and rewarding networks as an executor of the governance 
measures. Through the joint punishing and rewarding networks, GONGO 
actors are able to elicit rewarding and punishing powers from central and local 
government agencies at different regulatory domains (National Development 
and Reform Commission 2016). A summary of rewarding and punishing 
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measures enabled by networked regulators under the social credit system is 
provided below in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-6 Rewarding and Punishing Measures by Networked Actors 
Networked Governance Measures 
Implementing 
Actor 
Rewarding Incentives to the 
Targeted Company 
Punishing Actions to the 
Targeted Company 
Department of 
Civil Affairs 
• Provide streamlined service 
for information registration 
and/or change of registered 
information 
• Offer priority in the 
department’s purchase of 
services and provide 
corresponding guidance on 
the purchased services 
• Provide recommendation 
and endorsement to the 
application for awards, 
such as the China Charity 
Award and Model Charity 
Organisation of China 
• Provide employees with 
convenient access to the 
public aged care facility, 
marriage registration, 
funeral services, social 
security services, 
temporary special care and 
residential placement 
• Mark as high-risk 
entities in the 
assessment of 
accessing subsistence 
allowances, medical 
assistance, temporary 
residential placement. 
• Restrict, cancel, or 
revoke the registration 
for charitable 
organisation/foundation 
Department of 
Finance and 
• Corporate charity donation 
within 12% of total annual 
profits could be fully 
deducted from the taxable 
• Cancel or limit the pre-
tax deduction for a 
charity donation 
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State 
Administration of 
Taxation 
income; charitable donation 
above 12% could be 
carried forward to the next 
three years for taxable 
income deduction  
• Log positive records on the 
company’s tax credit 
evaluation 
• Offer priority in applying for 
government funding 
projects 
• Revoke preferential 
consideration or 
qualification in 
government purchases 
and subsidies 
• Restrict participation in 
government 
procurement activities  
People’s Bank of 
China and China 
Banking 
Regulatory 
Commission 
• Log positive records for the 
company in the Financial 
Credit Information 
Database which is a crucial 
assessment indicator for 
loan application 
• Restrict issuance of 
bonds, shares, and 
other financial products 
• Mark as high-risk 
companies in the 
application of loan 
General 
Administration of 
Customs 
• Apply lower import and 
export cargo inspection 
rates 
• Streamline the review of 
import and export cargo 
documents 
• Priority for customs 
clearance of import and 
export goods 
• Appoint a coordinator to 
assist the customs 
clearance 
• Apply higher import and 
export cargo inspection 
rates 
• Revoke priority in 
customs clearance of 
import and export goods  
Administration of 
Quality 
Supervision, 
Inspection and 
Quarantine 
• Apply lower inspection and 
quarantine rates on goods 
used for donation or 
charitable activities 
• Apply higher inspection 
and quarantine rates on 
goods used for donation 
or charitable activities 
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Department of 
Public Security 
• Provide employees with a 
streamlined process for 
household registration and 
resident permits 
 
Intellectual 
Property Office, 
Administration of 
Press, Publication, 
Radio, Film and 
Television, and 
China Council for 
the Promotion of 
International Trade 
• Provide assistance and 
streamlined services in a 
patent application, 
copyright registration, 
intellectual property right 
litigation 
• Provide assistance and 
guidance on organising or 
participating economic and 
trade exhibitions, forums, 
and fairs 
• Restrict access and 
application for research 
projects and grant 
Human Resources 
and Social 
Security Bureau 
• Provide streamlined 
processing for social 
security-related services 
 
Department of 
Land and 
Resources 
• Provide preferential 
consideration in 
government’s call for bids 
on land and resources 
• Restrict access to land 
acquisition from the 
government 
Department of 
Environmental 
Protection 
• Provide streamlined 
processing for 
environmental impact 
assessment and 
registration for 
environmental protection 
permit 
 
National GONGOs 
• Present awards, prizes, 
recognition, accreditation 
and commendation 
nationwide 
• Revoke the award, 
prize, recognition, 
accreditation and 
commendation 
presented 
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• Public endorsement and 
recommendation 
 
• Revoke endorsement 
and recommendation 
Department of 
Justice 
• Provide support and 
consultation services in 
legal consultation, 
commercial mediation, and 
trade arbitration. 
 
Department of 
Culture, 
Department of 
Tourism, 
Administration of 
Sport, and 
Administration of 
Cultural Heritage 
• Provide free access or 
discounted tickets to 
museums, public libraries, 
culture centres, theatres, 
art galleries, sports venues, 
parks, and tourism sites. 
 
Department of 
Transport 
• Provide discounted tickets 
to public transportation 
• Restricted access to 
ticket purchase 
Civil Aviation 
Authority and the 
Ministry of 
Railways 
• Provide preferential access 
to tickets purchase and 
allow purchase with social 
credit 
• Restricted access to 
ticket purchase 
Under the social credit system, GONGOs and government departments obtain, 
share and update credit information of targeted companies through a 
nationwide platform in a decentralised manner. The credit information of 
companies and those blacklisted are publicly disclosed on the State Enterprise 
Credit Information Disclosure System and the Credit China website. The 
enables GONGO actors to empower themselves with rewards and 
punishments instruments from other networked actors. Although the 
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establishment of the system shows a strong commitment from the government 
to explore innovative governance options through cross-sector collaboration 
and application of information technology, it is observed that the existing Social 
Credit System is still a relatively crude tool. The punishments and rewards are 
offered in a broad sense with minimum references to specific indicators for 
measuring tangible consequences of penalties and benefits. Also, the intensity 
of instruments enabled by the rewarding and punishing system is asymmetric. 
While the harsh punitive measures are explicit and enforceable on both 
companies and individuals affiliated to the companies, the rewarding incentives 
are specified in a more subtle and vague fashion. The implication is that the 
power of signalling rewarding incentives for continuous improvements in CSR 
practices can be compromised by the latent ambiguity. The business actors 
may perceive substantial gaps to consolidate perceived benefits and perceived 
sanctions when formulating responses in CSR practices.  
6.4.4 Networked Governance by Capacity Building  
In some cases, the failure to secure CSR improvements or ratifications by is 
not due to a company’s lack of interest or intention to respond. Instead, the 
company’ inaction is because the company is incapable of responding due to 
lack of knowledge or resources. In these cases, a networked governance by 
capacity building approach is adopted by GONGOs to facilitate business actors’ 
CSR commitments. Based on data analysis, three broad scenarios concerning 
cases where GONGOs initiate a networked governance approach to promote 
capacity building in CSR activities are identified. The three scenarios are 
summarised based on responses from multiple perspectives, including the 
GONGO, networked actors, and the business actors. The following sections 
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present these scenarios with reference to specific cases in which companies 
act as the GONGO’s donor, beneficiary, and strategic partner. In all three 
scenarios, GONGO’s networking activities aims to achieve two objectives: the 
first is to deal with the technical complexities that the GONGO actors are not 
able to resolve individually, and the second is to prevent an arbitrary exercise 
of discretion when a concentration of power can render biased decision-making. 
6.4.4.1 Company Acting as a Donor 
Participants from both GONGOs and companies concur that corporate 
philanthropy is the most accessible way of engaging in CSR activities. Most 
business participants in this study claim that they are acting or have acted as 
charitable donors by contributing funds, human resources, and technology to 
CSR projects jointly engaged with GONGOs. The role GONGO plays in these 
cases can be described as an agent probing, negotiating, and linking networked 
actors to fulfil the requirement of philanthropic donation projects. 
In the majority of cases, business donors designate pre-determined purposes 
for donations, but they heavily rely on the GONGO agents to direct donations 
to the intended places. It is found that while the orientation and objectives of 
the donations are explicitly stated, the business donors often do not formulate 
specific strategies for implementation of CSR projects. The business donors 
tend to take a passive approach in awaiting proposals formulated by GONGOs 
and evaluations of the proposals are performed based on traditional business 
criteria such as budgets and project duration. At this stage, the role GONGOs 
plays is a facilitative agent who outlines designs of the CSR projects tailored to 
particular companies. A number of GONGO participants mentioned that many 
donation plans proposed by the companies tended to be broad and vaguely 
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defined. For example, the objective of a CSR project could be as simple as 
“helping drop-out students”. Although this might give GONGOs a higher degree 
of discretion in deciding how to use the donated resources, GONGO 
participants found it unhelpful in encouraging a continuous and genuine CSR 
engagement by business actors. In cases where the objective was too 
ambiguous, the business actors could fail to evaluate whether the intended 
goals of making the donation were achieved. The donation, therefore, normally 
ended up becoming a one-off charity event. Business donors with clearly 
defined CSR objectives are more likely to make continuous commitments and 
improvements in the long term. Therefore, a major focus of GONGOs’ 
governance role at the initiation phase is to use its internal network and 
professional expertise to help business donors define their CSR objectives and 
formulate their donation plans. 
At the execution phase, GONGOs typically resort to external networked actors 
to drive donation resources to the intended beneficiaries. The purpose of 
enrolling other actors into a joint collaboration lies in securing legitimate access 
to the beneficiaries. For example, in 2010, the RCSC Guizhou Branch and the 
China Construction Bank Guizhou Branch collaboratively carried out the “Talent 
Development” donation project aiming at assisting ethnically minority college 
students with financial difficulties. The donation was formulated within a 
timeframe of 5 years at a total amount of 7.85 million Chinese Yuan 
(approximately AUD 1.57 million).  
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Figure 6-4 A Case Example of Company Acting as A Donor 
As illustrated in Figure 6-4, to set up clear qualification criteria for applicant 
selection and scholarship standards for the project, the RCSC Guizhou Branch 
approached the Provincial Education Department, the Guizhou Communist 
Youth League (a GONGO), and the Provincial Health and Family Planning 
Department. From the Education Department, the RCSC Guizhou Branch 
enrolled 18 universities within the provincial border to assist in identifying and 
screening for qualified beneficiaries. From the Communist Youth League, 
multiple university student groups were enrolled as independent referral units. 
The Health and Family Planning Department and the Education Department 
jointly provided a timely estimation on the scholarship amount with reference to 
average living expenses of college students. The involvement of all parties was 
later transformed into an executive council assessing and monitoring the 5-year 
plan on a yearly basis, but the RCSC Guizhou Branch remained to be the 
leading actor responsible for operational matters and linking various partners 
together. The “Talent Development” plan eventually helped 2,617 
underprivileged college students of whom 95% were originally from 
impoverished rural areas. It was observed that throughout the project, the 
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interactions between the leading GONGO and the business donor remained 
intensive, but direct interactions among other enrolled parties were infrequent. 
Most collaborative efforts were made at the initiation phase of the donation 
project and significant milestone points thereafter. Operational-level 
engagements were mainly carried out on a dyadic basis with the leading 
GONGO working as a hub to consolidate the initiatives. 
At the project evaluation stage, the number of companies requesting for formal 
and comprehensive project assessments post to the donation is low. The 
progress and final reports are designed to be simple and appealing rather than 
informative. Exceptions exist with business manufacturers who make donations 
by contributing their own products. In this case, business donors usually expect 
more feedback on their products in the reports. Several GONGO participants 
pointed out that sometimes business donors’ reporting requirements create an 
ethical dilemma. After the Guo Meimei Scandal eroded public confidence in the 
Chinese charity sector, some business donors, with the intention of preventing 
embezzlement and misuse of donations, sought comprehensive evaluation 
reports listing specific personal details of all beneficiaries. The donors believe 
that by requesting detailed information on specifics of donation allocation, the 
chances of misappropriating donation funds will be minimised. However, the 
GONGO participants argue that such requirements in some instances could 
seriously violate the privacy rights of the beneficiaries, especially for 
beneficiaries who are in terminal stages of illness and people who have 
imprison records. In cases like this, the GONGOs seek to convince the donors 
by encouraging more intensive engagement and effective communication 
between the businesses and the GONGOs. In cases where one-to-one efforts 
fail, the GONGOs turn to a third party, mostly an external auditor, to ensure their 
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accountability to the donors does not conflict with their accountability to the 
beneficiaries. 
In the donor-beneficiary interactions, the level of engagement of business 
donors and GONGO actors varies from case to case with an overall higher level 
of engagement on the part of the GONGOs. Most participants admitted that 
although they recognise the altruistic nature of the donation, they do expect to 
receive benefits from donation practice. The expected benefits revolve around 
improved reputation, brand image and marketing strategy. It is interesting to 
note that business actors tend to participate in donation projects by providing 
resources highly relevant to their business. All pharmaceutical companies 
identified in this study have made donations to GONGOs with medicines or 
medical products. For businesses in manufacturing industries, the donation-in-
kind is seen as a cost-effective tactic to promote the donor’s own products and 
brand recognition. Multiple GONGO participants mentioned that they had the 
experience of being approached by start-up manufacturers who wished to 
donate their products in return for market expansion. By donating products, the 
start-up companies are able to reach to a wider potential customer base who 
might be reluctant to pay out-of-pocket money for the products. In addition, the 
companies will be recognised as benevolent businesses which is beneficial to 
promoting new brands. Such donations could be problematic because the 
nature of the products might not always suit the needs of beneficiaries who 
receive them. A GONGO participant cited an example where a tampon 
manufacturer insisted on donating its products to disaster victims in the 2008 
Wenchuan Earthquake. At that time, all roads linked to the disaster areas were 
severely damaged leaving limited transportation access for delivering 
necessities of life. When the nature of the product was not on the urgent supply 
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list, delivering them would increase the burden of vital transportation channels. 
Therefore, the involved GONGO declined this donation. Unlike business 
donations in the traditional sense where the business actor usually retains the 
upper hand, GONGOs demonstrate a higher level of bargaining power in 
selecting and negotiating donations plans. Most GONGO participants attribute 
this enhanced bargaining power to their capability of remaining financially 
independent from the business donors.  
6.4.4.2 Company Acting as a Beneficiary 
Although in the majority of cases, business actors participate in joint CSR 
activities by being the resource contributors, there are instances where the 
company act as the beneficiary of GONGOs. In such cases, GONGOs become 
the contributor of resources to assist the business actors in building 
organisational capacity in order to fulfil CSR objectives. One typical example is 
identified in the narratives of a hospital’s privatisation process. For anonymity 
reasons, the names of the organisations involved are coded. A summary of 
networked actors involved in the case is listed in Table 6-7. 
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Table 6-7 A Summary of Networked Actors in the Case Example of 
Company Acting as a Beneficiary 
Hospital S is a county-level general hospital with more than 400 medical staff. 
It operates in a county in China with a population of more than 436,000 and has 
an average outpatient number of around 250,000 and inpatient number of 
around 12,000 per year. Hospital S was a public hospital fully funded by the 
government before it restructured into a private hospital in 1999. The 
Organisation 
code 
Organisation 
Type 
Organisation Description 
Hospital S 
Business 
actor 
A for-profit general hospital, operating at a 
county-level region. 
GONGO C GONGO 
A county-level GONGO unit operating in the 
same county with Hospital S, which has a 
population of 0.43 million   
GONGO D GONGO 
A provincial-level GONGO, operating in a 
region with a population of 83 million. It 
directs and supervises all GONGO units 
within its provincial territory, including 
GONGO C. 
GONGO Z GONGO 
A provincial-level GONGO, operating at 
neighbour provincial territory to GONGO D 
with a population of 38 million. 
County 
Government 
Government 
Agency 
A county-level government, operating in the 
same county with Hospital S and GONGO 
C. 
Provincial 
Government 
Government 
Agency 
A provincial-level government 
administrating the provincial territory where 
Hospital S, GONGO C, and GONGO D 
operate 
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privatisation triggered by a movement called the Public Hospital Reform in the 
late 1990s.  
Prior to the 1980s, all health care services in China were provided by public 
hospitals fully financed by the government. From the early 1980s to 1999, the 
central government reduced its investment in health care services. According 
to Tam (2010), the central government’s national health-care spending fell from 
32% to 15% from 1978 to 1999. At the same time, the central government 
transferred much of the responsibility of funding healthcare services to local 
authorities. As the state financial support dwindled, many local authorities 
sought to find alternative funding for the cash-strapped public hospitals. 
According to the Ministry of Health, 264 public hospitals were privatised 
between 1995 and 2005, and Hospital S was one of them. 
In 1999, Hospital S was instructed by the local government to start the 
privatisation process formally. By subsequently selling the managerial rights of 
multiple medical centres to private owners, the shareholding structure of the 
hospital was later fully transformed into a private entity. However, there was no 
formal process of registering the restructured hospital with the Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau, which placed the legal identity of the privatised hospital 
into a contested situation. According to the local authority’s instructive 
document to guide the privatisation process, the hospital would no longer be 
entitled to receive appropriations from the government upon the completion of 
the privatisation process. However, the hospital must remain its organisational 
nature as a public institution and fulfil all obligations and functions that public 
institutions were required to.  
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Issues with the problematic privatisation process remained silent until a severe 
natural disaster hit the hospital’s host county in 2008. During the disaster, all 
buildings of the hospital collapsed, and most medical equipment went into 
scraps. Problems emerged when Hospital S sought to secure financial support 
from the local government to restore and rebuild the hospital. Given that all 
public institutions were entitled to apply for relief funds from the government, 
Hospital S made a formal application to the local authority. However, the local 
government declined the application because it claimed that Hospital S was a 
de facto private entity. The problem became even more challenging with the 
timing. As the largest hospital in the county, Hospital S’s shutdown created a 
burden on other hospitals with an upsurge demand for medical service. 
Thousands of local patients had to resort to hospitals in neighbouring counties 
for medical services. 
 
Figure 6-5 A Case Example of Company Acting as A Beneficiary 
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As shown in Figure 6-5, Hospital S first approached GONGO D to seek viable 
financial aid. GONGO D is a county-level GONGO unit operating in the same 
county with Hospital S. Due to financial capacity constraints, GONGO D 
forwarded Hospital S’s request to its higher-level supervisor – provincial-level 
GONGO C. At that time, due to the magnitude of the disaster, all available funds 
of the provincial-level GONGO C had been assigned to projects in other areas 
affected by the disaster. To seek other possible funding sources, the request 
was forwarded through the GONGO’s national network to another provincial-
level GONGO Z. GONGO Z soon responded to the request by launching a 
formal investigation on the Hospital S’s application. Relying on an assessment 
jointly informed by GONGO D, GONGO C and the local government, GONGO 
Z approved the application and formulated a 13.6-million-yuan donation 
agreement. However, the donation agreement was not a dyadic two-party 
agreement with Hospital S. Instead, the agreement involves participation and 
supervision from multiple parties: the donor – GONGO Z, the beneficiary – 
Hospital S, and the supervisors – GONGO D, GONGO C and the local 
government. In addition to specifying the rights and obligations of the donor and 
the beneficiary, the agreement also requires the designated supervisors to 
monitor the transfer of donation funds and provide necessary support in making 
the donation funds useful to rebuilding Hospital S. To secure support from the 
local government, GONGO Z issued an official project proposal to the local 
government and its higher-level provincial government to encourage 
collaborative engagement. This donation finally became the first significant 
donation Hospital S received in the course of rebuilding the hospital. Several 
significant donations were then secured with the help of the local government 
and finally helped Hospital S to complete its rebuilding project. 
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This case is a typical example of GONGOs helping a private actor to maintain 
their social welfare function in providing a public service. To achieve this aim, 
the involved GONGOs strategically capitalised on their organisational network 
to enable mobilisation of resources across independent actors. It was also 
noticeable that the concerned GONGOs tactically enrolled local government 
into a collaborative engagement relationship. This move successfully turned the 
unresponsive local authority which appeared to be buck-passing into a 
facilitator in tackling the pressing social problems.  
6.4.4.3 Company Acting as a Strategic Partner 
Besides donor-beneficiary scenarios, a representative case scenario is 
identified where the involved GONGO seeks to establish a long-term strategic 
partnership with a business actor in pursuit of common CSR goals. To protect 
anonymity and preserve confidentiality, the names of both the GONGO and the 
company have been coded. A descriptive summary of coded organisational 
actors involved in the case is listed below in Table 6-8. 
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Table 6-8 A Summary of Networked Actors in the Case Example of 
Company Acting as a Strategic Partner 
Organisation 
code 
Organisation 
Type 
Organisation Description 
Company V Business actor 
A listed biotech company, focusing on cell 
therapy, biological resource storage, and 
genetic test. It has a nationwide business 
coverage. 
GONGO G GONGO 
A provincial-level GONGO, operating in a 
region with a population of 35 million. 
Local Government 
Office 
Government 
agency 
Administration office of a provincial-level 
government, operating in the same 
provincial territory with GONGO G. 
Local Health and 
Family Planning 
Department 
Government 
agency 
A provincial-level health authority whose 
primary responsibility is formulating health 
policies, organising and delivering health 
care and supervising health care providers 
within the provincial territory. It operates in 
the same region as GONGO G.  
GONGO G is a provincial-level GONGO operating in a region with a population 
of 35 million. One primary focus of GONGO G is to promote voluntary 
hematopoietic stem cells donation by way of cord blood donation. Cord blood 
is the blood left in the umbilical cord of newborn babies. It is a particularly rich 
source of hematopoietic stem cells now being used as an effective treatment 
for life-threatening diseases, such as leukaemia, blood disorders, and 
autoimmune deficiencies. As a baby’s umbilical cord stem cells are usually the 
perfect match for himself/herself and are more likely to be a match for siblings 
and family members, many companies, such as company V, provide cord blood 
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collection and storage services with a charge for private use. The stored cord 
blood can also become useful to other people with diseases because a 
successful treatment only requires a partial genetic match between the donor 
and the patient.  
In the province where GONGO G operates, there are no established public cord 
blood banks. The absence of a public cord blood bank means that voluntary 
donation of cord blood can only be directed to private service providers at 
personal expense. However, the expenses associated with banking the cord 
blood with private companies are high, preventing many parents from storing 
cord blood. The implication is that the cord blood sources available for the 
treatment of blood disease patients could become increasingly scarce with 
fewer reserves either by donation or by private banking. 
Since GONGO G has neither the financial capacity nor professional expertise 
to establish a cord blood bank alone, the GONGO actively sought external 
partners able to provide financial and technical support. With careful research 
on the industry, GONGO G finally identified Company V as a potential partner 
candidate. Company V is a top Chinese biotech company focusing on cell 
therapy, biological resources storage and genetic tests. Established in 1992, 
Company V was the first company offering the storage of cord blood in China 
and now has the largest cord blood bank in the world with over 300,000 cord 
blood reserve units.  
In 2009, GONGO G approached Company V and expressed its intention for a 
partnership in building a cord blood bank. The initial partnership proposal was 
simple and twofold: under partnership terms, GONGO G focused on launching 
education campaigns and encouraging public participation in cord blood 
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donation; Company V would provide free storage services for voluntary cord 
blood donations. With a highly convergent interest in promoting a cord blood 
bank, this simple dyadic proposal was later formulated into a strategic 25-year 
CSR partnership plan. Under this plan, the Company V provides a 4-million-
yuan initial capital to assist the building of a cord blood bank in the region. The 
company is also responsible for setting up the relevant Standard of Operation 
and offering technical support to the operation and maintenance of the cord 
blood bank. GONGO G is responsible for mobilising and recruiting voluntary 
donors, building and maintaining cord blood reserve database, and 
coordinating collection, storage, and transplantation services. 
At this point, very few people in the region were aware of the usefulness of cord 
blood, and even few understood the technology and services of cord blood 
storage. Through the partnership, Company V sought to capitalise on GONGO 
G’s strength in public education and promotion to raise public awareness of the 
newly emergent service. For Company V, with more population consciously and 
positively responding to technology, an increased number of people could 
become potential customers of the company. It is seen as a win-win strategy 
enabling the company to expand and develop its own business while providing 
a social good. On the other hand, what GONGO G hoped to achieve from the 
partnership was to secure funds and expertise from its partner to ensure there 
is sufficient cord blood donations and reserves within the region for supporting 
blood diseases treatment. To avoid a conflict of interest, it was agreed that 
Company V was not allowed to establish direct contact with potential donors to 
turn a voluntary donation into the purchase of services whereas GONGO G 
accepted full responsibility for recruiting and communicating with voluntary 
donors. All voluntary donations of cord blood would be reserved for public use. 
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Only when a donor explicitly expressed the willingness to store the blood for 
private use, Company V was allowed to approach the donor to offer storage 
service at the customer’s own expenses. 
 
Figure 6-6 A Case Example of Company Acting as A Partner 
As shown in Figure 6-6, to proceed with this partnership plan, GONGO G 
approached the local Government Office and the Health and Family Planning 
Department to obtain policy support and a legitimate license for establishing a 
public cord blood bank. With the government’s support, GONGO G 
subsequently approached multiple public hospitals in the region seeking 
approval for carrying out education and promotion activities in the hospitals. 
The partnership appeared to be a success at first with more than 80 voluntary 
donations obtained within three years, and Company V owned a significant 
market share by providing private storage services. Nonetheless, with an 
increase in demand on private storage services in the region, multiple service 
providers successively entered into the regional market. Most of the established 
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direct business partnerships with public and private hospitals. Unlike the 
partnership terms between GONGO G and Company V, these incoming 
providers were permitted to directly approach expecting parents and offer their 
private services at personal expenses. Company V soon found itself being 
edged out in the fierce competition of accessing and securing potential 
customers. 
Based on Company V’s market analysis, top management of the company 
prioritised private storage services over free-of-charge storage services for 
voluntary donations. Following their competitors’ move, Company V formed 
direct partnerships with multiple private hospitals in the region. Pure market-
oriented strategies, such as one-to-one marketing, were applied to defend the 
company’s market share against other rivals in the region. Since then, the 
partnership between GONGO G and Company V has faded into a dormant 
status. The breakdown of this partnership was a revealing case of failure in the 
design of networked governance approaches. Although the cross-sector 
partners are aligned by a common interest in delivering social good, the 
rewarding power embedded in the GONGO’s network fails to compete with 
more attractive incentives offered by the company’s market-oriented network. 
The shared CSR objective, therefore, fails to translate into sustainable 
engagement terms that both parties feel motivated to commit to. What is 
missing from this partnership is an effective mechanism for dialogues enabling 
balancing of interest and priorities between the two parties. An over-emphasis 
on complementarities of resources and mutual exploitation instead of mutual 
capacity-building led the joint CSR efforts being eventually compromised by for-
profit market competitions.  
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6.4.5 Network Dimensions 
For the purpose of analysis, network dimensions can be usefully employed to 
assist understanding on how GONGOs network with other actors to influence 
CSR and why certain actors tend to be enrolled more often: they are proximity 
and centrality. Proximity is a relative property measuring relative positions of 
pairs of actors in a network, whereas centrality is an absolute property 
measuring the position of one actor with reference to the whole network. 
The level of proximity between two parties rises when there are fewer 
intermediaries present in the network to separate the two parties. More 
proximate organisations are closer to one another in a network; thus, they are 
able to exchange information and resources with each other through a smaller 
number of links in the network. This measure is helpful in explaining why the 
networked actors being enrolled most frequently by GONGOs are usually turn 
government departments and other GONGOs. Proximal actors have either 
cooperated directly in the past or have engaged in cooperation with an 
overlapping set of intermediary organisations. Therefore, they are able to 
access privileged knowledge about each other at a lower cost from more 
reliable sources. When two proximal organisations enter into collaboration, they 
are able to do so with greater knowledge of one another’s capability and 
reputation than actors of more distant relations. Given that GONGOs are more 
structurally close to the government and their GONGO counterparts, trust and 
confidence are easier to establish based on their shared past experience. This 
also justifies why GONGOs often resort to local actors or actors within their own 
organisational systems to seek the empowerment of CSR governance capacity. 
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The level of the centrality of an organisation increases when it has access to a 
higher number of influential networked actors. An actor who occupies a central 
position is more well-connected and usually becomes the hub of a network. 
Given GONGOs’ hybrid identity, they often become the central actors in 
networked governance relationships by having a greater number of viable links 
connected to both state and non-state actors. For example, in different CSR 
domains, GONGOs often have access to distinct ranges of networked actors. 
In the course of screening and monitoring responsible suppliers, the GONGOs 
are able to approach government agencies, such as the Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau and the Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau. In 
cases of providing aid delivery projects, the GONGOs are able to mobilise non-
state actors, such as other service-delivery GONGOs and NGOs. The value of 
GONGO’s centrality lies in its ability to exert influence by either offering 
rewarding incentives or threatening sanctions across the governance network. 
Since information disseminated by the central GONGO travels extensively 
through the network, targeted companies are more motivated to align their CSR 
practices with the direction that the central GONGO steers. However, the 
centrality of the targeted companies also affects their responses to the 
networked governance process. For example, it is observed that more central 
companies in the network, such as SOEs participated in this research, tend to 
be more powerful in negotiating governance terms and redefining governance 
objectives. SOE informants in this study claim that their connection reach to 
government agencies largely overlap with those of GONGOs. What GONGOs 
could offer in addition to those is access to professional NGO services and their 
vast volunteer base which are beyond the SOEs’ reach. 
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The position of GONGOs in the networked governance relationship empowers 
them to propel CSR practices to a direction more aligned with their 
organisational mission and value. The vehicles GONGOs utilised, however, are 
not mechanisms in legal terms although legal actions may ultimately become a 
resort. GONGOs typically employ rewarding mechanisms to encourage 
continued participation and improvements in CSR practices. These rewarding 
mechanisms involve both direct rewards, such as awarding accreditation and 
prizes, and indirect rewards, such as disseminating praise and endorsement 
across the network. Often the power of GONGOs is not a matter of imposing 
inexorable will, but of enrolling the cooperation of the chains of actors. It is 
observed that the punitive measures are extensively deliberative in GONGO’s 
employment because they are often counterproductive. In cases where 
persuasion fails, and a GONGO become convinced that proceeding with the 
ongoing CSR cooperation could cause harm to the GONGO or jeopardise its 
reputation, the GONGO typically suspends or withdraws from the cooperation. 
By retreating or threatening to retreat from the networked governance 
relationships, GONGOs are able to exert sanctions by cutting off the companies 
access to other actors in the network. In a similar way, denunciation across the 
network is also an instrument GONGOs use to deter undesirable business 
practices. Nevertheless, it only becomes an action when there are adequate 
observations to demonstrate that a targeted company has committed major and 
repeated violations of agreement in CSR cooperation. 
6.5 Responses to Networked Governance 
GONGO’s networked governance has led business actors to formulate various 
responses to cope with its influence. This section summarises five types of 
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responses that emerged from the data analysis: improved self-regulation, 
sustained co-regulation, co-optation, forum shifting, and disengagement. 
6.5.1 Improved Self-regulation 
Improved self-regulation responses manifest in ways that business actors 
engage in discretional, voluntary CSR activities that are quite independent of 
GONGO’s ongoing participation. The improved self-regulation is characterised 
by a higher level of business actor’s voluntary commitments to internalise 
desirable norms and values promoted by GONGO into subsequent CSR 
practices. Effective networked governance on CSR tends to foster alignment of 
common interests and shared vision between the GONGO and the business 
actor after the direct networked governance engagement. When such influence 
essentially becomes part of the business’s key agenda in CSR, stronger 
commitments to self-control and assessment, such as the establishment of in-
house CSR governance bodies (CO01, CO11), dedicated CSR budget and 
evaluation (CO02, CO05, CO06, CO08, CO09, CO10, CO11), formulation of 
codes of conduct (CO02, CO04, CO06), and rolling-out of CSR disclosure 
policies (CO01, CO02, CO03, CO10) were put into place even little interference 
from GONG was perceived subsequent to prior governance engagement.  
Fully implementing a self-regulating CSR plan requires a substantial portion of 
corporate resources and attention migrating to a truly strategic CSR. Therefore, 
this response is mostly observed in large business participants, especially listed 
business participants, who have sufficient resources and strong enough 
motivations to transform CSR influence into a value-added activity to their 
business. Other than the voluntary acceptance of ethical values and norms from 
GONGOs, business actors also embraced CSR instruments, such as donation 
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project plans and assessment tools established by GONGO actors. Although 
these instruments were initially constructed to serve particular joint CSR 
projects, business actors typically regarded such plans as best-practice 
templates that could be incorporated in their own organisational policies and 
voluntary CSR governance framework. 
6.5.2 Sustained Co-Regulation 
In some cases, the CSR governance effort was accompanied by a sustained 
co-regulation in which oversight and ratification were partially contributed by 
GONGOs. With such a response, GONGs are able to channel deliberate 
influence through ongoing transaction-based control driven by economic 
incentives (CO06 and CO09), legal-based control driven by liabilities and 
obligations under contracts (Interviewee CO04, CO06, CO09), and dialogue-
base control driven by information and knowledge sharing (Interviewee CO01, 
CO02, CO07, CO10). The sustained co-regulation suggests a bilateral control 
over socially responsible business policies and practices that may involve the 
participation of other stakeholders. When business actors accept to participate 
in these co-regulation arrangements, they mostly agree to engage in and 
negotiate standards of expected social and environmental performance with 
GONGOs and other stakeholders involved. The institutionalisation and 
formalisation of co-regulation integrated design and development of CSR 
governance control mechanisms, including agreeing upon expected goals and 
standards, formulation of regulatory frameworks, and the creation of 
enforcement and evaluation mechanisms. Different from the self-regulation 
approach, co-regulation presents opportunities to deliver socially beneficial 
outcomes through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination. In this sense, 
CSR co-regulation presents platforms to transform CSR from a voluntary 
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engagement to corporate accountability, integrating internal voluntary initiatives 
and external enforcement mechanisms. The additional benefits and motivations 
perceived by a business actor to apply co-regulation range from reputation 
management, risk sharing, to accumulating social capital through interaction 
with stakeholders. 
6.5.3 Co-optation 
GONGOs’ networked governance efforts also yield co-optations, where the 
corporate executives are absorbed into the GONGO’s board, or the company 
is officially transformed into an organisational member of the GONGO. This 
observation is contrary to the conventional relations observed from NGOs-
businesses relations where usually it is the NGOs who are co-opted to work in 
favour of corporate interests (Baur & Schmitz 2011; Burchell & Cook 2013). 
 
*Presented with latest available data collected from the RCSC participants 
Figure 6-7 Membership Composition of a Provincial-Level RCSC 
Council in 2017 
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At the individual level, the co-optation response is explained by an example of 
the membership composition rate illustrated in Figure 6-7. At the specific 
provincial-level RCSC council, 27% of the council members in 2017 were 
business members, and most of them had prior CSR engagement history with 
RCSC. Among all business members, the majority of members (56%) came 
from companies operated in the health industry which the RCSC is closely 
related to.  
 
*Presented with latest available data collected from the RCSC participants 
Figure 6-8 Statistics of Companies using the Emblem, the Name, and/or 
the Logo of RCSC 
At the organisational level, a large number of organisations’ co-optation 
manifest in signing up for organisational membership of RCSC, establishing in-
house RCSC units within the organisation, or becoming approved users of the 
emblem, name, and/or logo of RCSC. Figure 6-8 provides an indication of the 
number of companies using the emblem, the name, and/or the logo of RCSC 
with latest available data collected from the RCSC. Among all business 
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participants in this study, three individuals claimed current or former council 
membership of RCSC, two company had organisational membership with 
RCSC, and two companies had in-house GONGO units. These individual and 
organisational co-optation responses are all made after joint CSR 
engagements with RCSC. 
6.5.4 Forum Shifting 
Forum shifting refers to a shift of the company’s CSR agenda from a GONGO 
to another operational space in search for a more hospitable venue when the 
original GONGO becomes non-responsive in the networked governance 
process. Forum shifting can be made by moving an agenda from one GONGO 
to another, abandoning the agenda with a particular GONGO, or pursuing the 
same agenda in more than one GONGO or NGO. The rationale companies use 
to support forum shifting is to negotiate better terms and optimise most 
favourable outcomes. Multiple informants from RCSC cite examples in which 
potential business donors threaten to take their donations to other GONGOs to 
seek higher levels of positive publicity. The case scenario discussed in 6.4.4.3 
also constitutes an example of a business actor seeking more appealing 
rewards by shifting forum. 
Different GONGOs have different levels of governance capacity and therefore 
offer different rewards and sanctions. The design and modes of governance of 
each GONGO constitute a particular set of inducements that a company may 
expect to receive. Forum shifting is deliberately used as a tactic by business 
opportunists as a way of creating a new status in governance interaction. 
Facing defeat or a suboptimal result in one forum, a business might simply 
choose to pursue a better result by shifting its agenda to a new forum rather 
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than making improvements in the current forum. Therefore, as the perceived 
networked governance impact deviated from the expectation or affordability of 
targeted companies, the company would shift its CSR agenda to other 
GONGOs or NGOs to attain additional benefits or minimise adverse risks. 
6.5.5 Disengagement 
GONGO’s networked governance on CSR may not always lead to a satisfactory 
outcome. Multiple informants from RCSC discussed their experience in which 
business actors disengage from CSR programs jointly carried out with the 
RCSC. The disengagement was mainly due to two reasons: first, in cases 
where the governance approaches were poorly designed, and the targeted 
company lacked the capacity to make an expected response, the target 
company in these circumstances might opt out and abandon CSR engagement 
activities; second, in cases where the GONGO failed to identify proper target 
business actors. It is observed that companies tend to avoid CSR projects that 
are economically wasteful and reputationally risky. For example, GONGOs’ 
offering of rewards to encourage corporate philanthropic initiatives was able to 
motivate companies which aimed to enhance their reputation and public image. 
However, their impacts on financially constraining companies were inherently 
limited. No matter how beneficial the program was, the decision to participate 
in such initiatives remained incidental to the company’s financial capacity and 
expected advantages offered by the engagement. At local level, GONGO 
branches with little CSR governance experience might simply choose to target 
the most famous or successful local companies. This move was merely a 
strategy to draw attention to a material issue identified by the GONGO; even 
those companies could actually have little tangible impact on the specific issues. 
Such failures and the subsequent rendering of disengagement by companies 
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were more of outcomes of poor choice of governance target rather than poor 
design of governance approaches.  
6.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrates findings on how networked governance impacts on 
business actors and how business actors perceive and respond to such 
governance. It is found that different actors involved in the networked 
governance relationships align themselves with different interpretations and 
principles of CSR. To express their respective understanding of CSR, most 
GONGO participants linked CSR with notions such as corporate philanthropy, 
volunteerism, and ethical business practices while business participants mostly 
describe CSR as an important component of economic responsibilities, 
corporate culture, public relations management, responsible leadership, and 
corporate political responsibility. What is suggested from the dissimilar foci is 
that different actors tend to interpret CSR with notions which can help secure 
objectives that they consider most important. On the one hand, the GONGO 
participants conceptualise CSR as a principle consistent with their 
organisational mission to benefit those they are committed to serving. On the 
other hand, the notions conveyed by business participants are more 
instrumental in business discourse. It is observed, however, the variances on 
CSR perception do not necessarily hinder the alignment of objectives and 
cooperation in specific CSR actions when joint engagement from multiple 
actors is expected. The overall CSR-focus areas and plans prescribed by the 
central and local governments act as catalysts to compel pragmatic 
coordination among GONGOs and business actors. The findings demonstrate 
that GONGOs capitalise on the proximity and centrality of their network to exert 
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influence on CSR practices by coordinating escalation of rewarding incentives, 
threatening punishment, and capacity building assistance with networked 
actors. Such networked governance efforts yield mixed CSR responses from 
business actors in which improved self-regulation, sustained co-regulation with 
GONGOs, institutional co-optation into GONGOs, forum shifting, and CSR 
disengagement are observed. 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This research aims to offer an in-depth, rich in-context empirical insight in 
understanding the role of GONGO’s networked governance on CSR in China. 
This aim is achieved by employing a two-stage case study design. The first 
stage starts from the perspective of the centric GONGO – the Red Cross 
Society of China – to investigate its hybrid organisational structures, CSR 
commitments, and networking activities which have significant implications on 
its CSR governance capacity and legitimacy. The second stage focuses on the 
perspective of associated companies to understand how networked 
governance affects business actors and how business actors perceive and 
respond to the GONGOs’ direct and indirect CSR influence. This section seeks 
to provide an integrated discussion on the findings from the two stages and 
meaningfully interpret the results with reference to previous studies. 
7.2 The Hybridity and Blurring Boundary of GONGOs 
The findings of this study confirm that GONGOs in China are characteristically 
distinguished from other NGOs by their degree of closeness to the state 
(Hasmath, Hildebrandt & Hsu 2016). Much of the discussion over GONGOs 
and other NGOs in China is examined through theoretical frameworks such as 
corporatism and civil society, or variations thereof such as ‘socialist corporatism’ 
(Pearson 2000), ‘agency corporatism’ (Ru & Ortolano 2007), ‘semi-civil society’ 
(He 2016), or ‘state-led civil society’ (Frolic 1997). The general consensus in 
these studies is that some form of compromise between corporatism and civil 
society frameworks could better encapsulate the mixed elements in GONGOs. 
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However, the manifestations of GONGOs in China have become far too 
complex and dynamic to be captured by any single concept. One problem with 
applying only one of these existing frameworks alone is that they tend to focus 
on one particular mode or dynamic, to the neglect of other modes. For example, 
while state corporatism emphasises the mode of control, coordination, and 
regulation by a domineering State over compliant GONGO actors, it pays little 
attention to negotiations between the two parties, or to bottom-up initiatives by 
GONGO actors. The civil society approach, on the other hand, emphasises the 
efforts of GONGO actors in expanding their autonomy relative to the state and 
confronting state power, but neglects the interdependent relationships and 
reciprocal exchanges that take place between GONGOs and governments. 
Findings of this study demonstrate the hybridity of GONGOs play a crucial 
role in shaping accountabilities differently from typical NGO accountabilities. 
Along the upward-downward dimension, previous studies suggest that the 
accountability of NGO’s skews upwards due to asymmetries in power and 
resources in donor-beneficiary relationships (Ebrahim 2003a, 2005a; O’Dwyer 
& Unerman 2008). Findings of this study suggest that the de facto division of 
government-sponsored operating resources among GONGOs and donor-
sponsored project resources strengthens negotiation power against the upward 
non-government donors. However, government support in forms of non-
financial sponsorship and privileged status entices additional confusion in 
identifying GONGO’s principal upward account holder. While the Go-ish 
features prove to be highly effective in ensuring functional accountability 
(Ebrahim 2003b; Najam 1996) for GONGO’s specific service delivery projects, 
they become constraining factor limiting GONGO’s potential to be accountable 
for the organisation’s growth and strategic capability development. Along the 
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relational-identity accountability dimension, previous research (Unerman & 
O'Dwyer 2006b, 2010) found that identity accountability occurs at the expense 
of addressing accountability to external stakeholders. However, findings of this 
study illustrate the positive role of dual-identity recognition in easing this tension. 
The tension-ease effect varies at different GONGO levels because the 
closeness of their identity-hosts is not fixed. Higher-level GONGO actors enjoy 
a higher level of proximity with the NGO identity-host (the International Red 
Cross movement), whereas the lower level GONGO actors have more direct 
and intimate interaction with the government identity-host. While previous 
research suggest that GONGOs operate as arms of the state and owe their 
principal answerability to the government (Naím 2007; Spires 2011a; Zhan & 
Tang 2016), findings of this study reveal that GONGOs are able to launch 
meaningful and tactful negotiation relationships with the government. 
Especially at local levels where the GONGO leadership enjoy direct dynamics 
with the government agencies, the leaders are able to capitalise on informal 
forms of accountability to elicit consensus from the government. As relational 
accountability is contingent upon contexts and interactions, the compound of 
GO-ish identity and NGO-ish identity enable GONGO practitioners to tactically 
exploit the ambiguity of organisational identity to blend external requirements 
with internal goals in a more flexible manner. Along the imposed-felt 
accountability dimension, our case suggests that the government acts as the 
dominant enforcer of exerting external control, claiming formal accounts, and 
setting explicit regulatory requirements on GONGOs. However, while these 
coercive pressures impose excessive compliance requirements on GONGOs, 
the sanction means and threats that usually follow imposed accountability are 
limited at the organisational level. Given the historic and political significance of 
GONGOs in China, typical sanction threats, such as withdrawal of funds and 
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support, denunciation, and revocation of the license to operate as GONGOs 
are not made applicable for the government. Instead, the external control and 
monitor mechanisms are transformed into holding the GONGO leadership 
personally accountable for the performance of the organisation. The connection 
between organisational accountability and personal accountability is then 
reinforced by employing auditor commissions and anti-corruption commissions 
to assess the performance of the top executives. The shift of accountability from 
organisational level to individual level elicit felt accountability being perceived 
more in consistency with imposed accountability. This echoes Fry’s (1995) 
argument that the alignment of external accountability requirements and felt 
accountability critically depends on the congruence of intent and the history of 
exchange. 
This study argues that exploration of the GONGO phenomenon is moving away 
from investigating a mere label to a thick theoretical and empirical examination. 
This requires a vigorous approach to define, identify, and analyse GONGOs 
rather than only characterise them. Theoretical conceptualisation on such a 
phenomenon usually requires going beyond a specific institutional setting of a 
particular region or political arena. However, context matters because there are 
many contradictory yet powerful influences embedded in the policy 
environment that do not only drive organisations to flex their structures in 
different sectoral directions but also require them to maintain distinctiveness at 
their core. Under the umbrella term of GONGOs, the organisations are 
continuously shaped by their different legal structures, regulatory requirements 
and development paths. Even within narrowly defined GONGO categories, 
diversification and inconsistencies in GONGO’s hybrid features persist as the 
orientation and local contexts differ. The findings of this study suggest that while 
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GONGOs straddle across the boundary between government agencies and 
NGOs, they are also easily perceived as marginalised actors by both camps. 
While GONGOs are not officially recognised as part of the government because 
they do not possess administrative powers similar to other government 
agencies, neither do ordinary NGO actors fully accept them as counterparts. 
This study proposes that GONGOs should be viewed as comprising multiple 
segments and layers where the boundaries of the organisation are porous, and 
its flexibility means that it can permeate and co-opt the space of other sectors. 
Pragmatically, the flexible boundaries of GONGOs should translate to mean 
that GONGOs are capable of expanding into areas predominantly occupied by 
public and private actors rather than to mean GONGOs’ incompetence in 
safeguarding an uncontaminated identity. This research argues that it is 
precisely the hybrid features that enable GONGOs’ design of flexible, timely, 
and responsive networked governance approaches. 
7.3 From Dyadic Governance to Networked Governance 
The notion of networks is highly relevant for queries on governance issues 
because it offers a richer description of how actors, interactions and processes 
change in contemporary governance domains. Observations from this study 
confirm that a general shift from linear, dyadic, and bilateral explanations of 
CSR governance toward a more contextual, participatory, and systemic 
consideration of governance dynamics is inevitable (Albareda & Waddock 
2016; Zou et al. 2019). The findings of this study suggest that networking 
activities are increasingly embraced in CSR governance practices as the 
expanding view of CSR and regulation prompt a broader consideration on 
strategically enrolling multiple parties into the CSR governance process and 
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collective construction of cost-effective and contextualised solutions to CSR 
issues. This network-level broadening view on CSR governance enriches and 
extends the conventional conceptualisation of regulation that typically assumes 
a single regulator (Gunningham, Neil & Sinclair 1999). 
The observations from the participant organisations show that under the CSR 
umbrella, each governance domain, either defined by territory boundary or 
sector boundary, has a distinct range of actors upholding different principles 
and deploying different governance mechanisms. Actively or passively, 
regulatory actors and targeted companies seek to link or be linked to a range 
of other actors through a network of influences. In addition, governance in the 
form of a network is also promoted because abuse of power might be better 
avoided when substantive sanctions and rewards are restrained or have to be 
delivered with the presence of multiple parties. The established governance 
order and relationships in the network could be shaped by actors’ own 
resources and capacity as well as other actors’ joining, quitting, or shifting in 
the network. Therefore, the findings from this research support the notion that 
CSR governance, as a complex regulatory domain, cannot be well understood 
at the scope of individual actors and bilateral governance engagements 
(Provan, Isett & Milward 2016; Provan & Kenis 2007; Rowley 1997). As Van 
Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan (2003, p. 193) explain, networks have become an 
essential foundation of governance in the context of ‘wicked problems’ which 
cut across policy fields and which are persistent despite ongoing attempts to 
resolve them. The interactions among actors and their promoted principles and 
governance mechanisms will constitute a distinctive dynamic which could only 
be meaningfully understood with a contextualised network-level examination. 
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This study also supports the idea that careful distinction should be drawn 
between networked governance and governance network, which are 
qualitatively different concepts but both deserve in-depth scrutiny (Fenwick, 
Van Uytsel & Wrbka 2014; Parker, R 2016). A distinction should be made as 
networked governance refers to the governance approach actors employ to 
achieve common goals, whereas governance network emphasises the 
structure and arrangement of networked actors’ individual qualities and 
relations. In order for a network to qualify as a form of governance, it must have 
the necessary structure and resources in place to enable steering, influence, 
and interacting behaviour. The case examples of this study show that 
networked governance is more than mere sums of nodal organisations. The 
influence embedded in the RCSC’s networked governance relationships is 
constructed through dynamics of dialogue, punishments, rewards, and capacity 
building assistance. The interactions among the networked actors do not only 
evoke the flowing of tangible and intangible resources towards weak actors but 
also foster reciprocal relations and trusts among strong ones. Previous studies 
have examined the empowerment process from weak actors’ perspectives, 
such as indigenous people (Drahos 2014), small farmers in developing 
countries (Hutchens 2009) and scientists fighting for opensource principles 
(Hope 2007). Findings from this research usefully enriched the empirical insight 
of the networked governance dynamics from the hybrid GONGO’s perspective.  
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7.4 GONGO’s Shadow Pyramid Model 
 
Figure 7-1 NGO’s Dual Pyramid Model 
Reflecting on the responsive regulation pyramid models in the literature, the 
escalation of regulation strategies in the Pyramid of Sanction and the Pyramid 
of Support usually works side by side, in a parallel and discrete manner as 
illustrated in Figure 7-1 above. While the Pyramid of Sanction aims to deter 
harm and control irresponsible business behaviour, the goal of Pyramid of 
Support is to encourage and support opportunities of continuous improvements 
in ethical conduct (Dukes, Braithwaite & Moloney 2014). Although this Dual 
Pyramid Model offers possibilities of combination of rewards and punishments 
that a single compliance pyramid model alone could not provide, it implies a 
discontinuity in shifting across encouragement-based, and sanction-based 
governance approaches. The two separate pyramids indicate that the punitive 
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approaches and rewarding approaches are escalated in a linear progression 
manner along two relatively independent pyramids. This design, however, fails 
to capture the governance demands for making immediate shifts between 
escalated punishments and rewards across the pyramids. Therefore, the Dual 
Pyramid Model lacks in its adequacy to address the wide continuum of 
connectivity between sanctions and encouragements in CSR governance.  
7.4.1 Visual presentation of the Shadow Pyramid Model 
Taking into consideration the complexity and uniqueness of GONGO’s role in 
networked governance relationships, this research proposed a Shadow 
Pyramid Model to better reflect the GONGO’s pyramid model.  
 
Figure 7-2 GONGO’s Shadow Pyramid Model 
As illustrated in Figure 7-2, it is proposed that GONGO’s networked governance 
model should be more accurately demonstrated in a Shadow Pyramid Model in 
which the Pyramid of Rewards and Pyramid of Punishments work in conjunction 
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and the punishment pyramid always tag along with the rewarding pyramid. As 
GONGOs strategically trade on its hybridity to leverage simultaneous 
inducement and deterrence, it enables the punishment shadow to be always 
looming at the backdrop while the rewarding pyramid is presented in the front. 
This impels the targeted companies to think harder when playing fast and loose 
in CSR practices. The implication is that not only an offer of reward could be 
revoked, a corresponding punishment might also be forthcoming. 
7.4.2 Building Rewards and Punishments into the Model 
Building forgiveness and reward into the enforcement and support pyramid 
brings reasonableness and effectiveness because cost-efficient persuasion is 
tried before stringent coercions (Drahos 2004). However, it is proposed in the 
Shadow Pyramid Model that punitive elements and persuasive elements should 
not be treated as parallel strategies of equal potency. Instead, the Pyramid of 
Rewards and the Pyramid of Punishments are not symmetrical governance 
structures, and they should not be. In the design of the enforcement pyramid, 
the “big stick” at the peak of the pyramid is infrequently used but is made 
looming at the backdrop (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). Previous study suggests 
that the occasional use of the big sticks amplifies the intensity of governance 
deterrence which prompts the targets of enforcement at lower levels of the 
pyramid think harder about the potentially high costs of non-compliance 
(Braithwaite 2002, 2011). However, the findings of this study show that the 
same rule does not apply to the “big carrot” approach to influencing CSR 
behaviour. The occasional use of “big carrots” on target companies could 
project possible selection bias from the regulators. The targets of reward at 
lower levels of the pyramid might be demotivated because elevated rewards 
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are only offered to a limited number of companies. The target responses could 
consequently backfire at the rewards giver’s governance legitimacy. Therefore, 
in the Shadow Pyramid Model, the Pyramid of Rewards is designed to reflect 
that reward-giving requires a wide and consistent application which makes the 
pyramid short and spacious. The design of Pyramid of Punishments should 
favour infrequent use of the most punitive and costly governance approaches 
to optimise allocations of governance resources, which renders the pyramid 
long and pointy. 
The findings of this study show that responsive rewarding mechanisms are 
useful governance tools to elicit cooperative CSR responses from companies. 
The empirical evidence based on the RCSC shows that the available rewarding 
mechanisms for GONGOs are not only legitimised through organisational 
reputation but also legally safeguarded by the State. However, it should also be 
noted that offering rewarding incentives in governance mechanisms warrants 
delicate consideration and assessment. The danger of motivating companies 
purely based on tangible rewards is that business actors might simply 
disengage without making efforts to rectify faults when rewards are not 
promising. The evidence observed from the falling apart of partnerships 
between the GONGO G and Company V in section 6.4.4.3 substantiates this 
idea. The implication is that if the GONGO actor fails to design rewarding 
incentives that allow the target company to truly internalise CSR values and 
align CSR commitments with business activities, rewarding incentives could be 
of limited potency while incurring substantial costs to the GONGO. In addition 
to supporting the idea that rewarding mechanisms need to be designed to 
secure sustainable commitments and enable comprehensible connections to 
the bigger regulatory objectives (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite, Makkai 
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& Braithwaite 2007), this study calls for more contextualised deliberations in the 
formulation of networked governance instruments to incorporate tailored design 
for particular business actors and periodically reviews and updates reflecting 
the constant changing contexts. 
7.4.3 Costs of GONGO’s Networked Governance 
Another key point worth noting is that the governance costs to secure CSR 
objectives are disproportionate to regulators and regulatees. While rational 
business actors could be persuaded into CSR compliance and continuous 
improvement after a cost-benefit analysis (Braithwaite 2008; Braithwaite & 
Drahos 2000), rational GONGO actors also perform calculations. Main merit 
largely embraced by proponents of responsive regulation is that it saves 
regulation resources because expensive strategies are preserved for most 
needed cases (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). However, the findings of this study 
show that while a persuasive instrument may be welcomed by a target 
company, it could be much more costly to the GONGO regulator than the costs 
of directly applying low-cost, coercive punishments. The reason is that soft and 
persuasive measures are usually more time-consuming and require higher 
degrees of repetitive negotiation. There is a danger that an irresponsible 
regulator may opt to the more convenient, low-cost, and self-serving 
governance approaches by transferring unnecessary compliance cost to the 
regulatees. Especially in a networked governance context, regulatory power 
and influence are often “borrowed” from or strengthened by other networked 
partners (Braithwaite, J 2006). How to ensure that regulators will make a fair, 
and responsible governance response could be challenging. Findings from the 
GONGO participants also demonstrate a higher level of reluctance to escalate 
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through coercive measures than rewarding measures. It is observed that when 
the demands of GONGOs employing highly coercive measures arise, complete 
disengagement from CSR governance relationship is prioritised over seeing 
through the enforcement of sanctions, even though the GONGO actors argue 
that disengagements are a practical form of punishment. This research, 
therefore, argues that equal consideration on regulation cost should be given 
to both regulators and regulatees in the design of governance instruments to 
secure fairness, sustainability and efficacy in networked governance. 
7.4.4 GONGO’s Pre-emptive Network Building 
Previous models of the networked governance pyramid by NGO emphasise a 
reactive networking process that only arises after being compelled to make 
responses to imminent governance issues and complexity (Burris, Drahos & 
Shearing 2005). Networked actors are forced to create a concentration of power 
in the network in order to exercise governance plans (Burris, Drahos & Shearing 
2005; Drahos 2004). 
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Figure 7-3 GONGO’s Pre-Emptive Network Building Model 
As illustrated in Figure 7-3, one different point this study shows is that the wide 
participation of GONGOs in networking activities is based on pre-emptive 
considerations rather than reactive responses. Even without a specific 
regulation target at hand, GONGO actors still actively engage in expanding, 
maintaining, and strengthening their network at inter-organisational levels and 
intra-organisational levels. Within the Red Cross systems, individual RCSC 
branches participate in nation-wide exchanges and sharing of CSR governance 
information and resources while coordinating outreach to the international Red 
Cross community to elicit CSR governance experience. At respective regional 
sites, RCSC organisations enrol local governments, NGOs, and other 
GONGOs to enhance their existing CSR governance capacity and legitimacy. 
Through the pre-emptive construction of a network, the networked partners 
become facilitators of the escalation of governance interventions and enablers 
of dynamic shifts and coordination across rewards, punishments, and capacity 
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building approaches. Such strong commitments are seen to have been 
embedded in GONGOs’ routine operation and are perceived as critical factors 
enabling organisation growth and capacity building.  
A pre-requisite of ensuring the success of networked governance is to capture 
the target within the network reach from possible escape. It is observed that 
corporate regulatees may act as strategic opportunists by shifting their agenda 
from GONGOs with whom they encountered more difficulties to similar 
GONGOs with whom they are more likely to negotiate favourable terms. This 
observation is consistent with Drahos (2004) who claim that in facing defeat or 
a suboptimal result in a particular regulatory forum, the target might seek to 
gain a better result by shifting its agenda to a new forum. The underlying reason 
for forum shifting is that it increases the forum shifter's chances of successfully 
obtaining an expected outcome. The implication is that regulators have to 
pursue continuous organisational capacity building and enlist necessary 
rewarding enablers, thereby ensuring the ability to operationalise governance 
approaches and economising on the costs of the governance instruments. 
GONGO’s pre-emptive network building activities present substantial efforts 
made to address these demands.  
7.4.5 GONGO’s Role in Networked Governance 
Non-state actors, including both NGOs and GONGOs, are perhaps the most 
likely potential actors to be involved in the CSR networked governance process. 
While governments and other regulatory bodies rely heavily on top-down 
enforcements (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge 2012; Black 2002a), networked 
governance is of particular value to GONGOs as their relative lack of coercing 
capacity in pursuing direct, hard, and mandatory modes of governance. 
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Admittedly, governments in China exercise a powerful influence over NGOs and 
GONGOs, placing considerable limits and constraints on their own operation 
and possible governance activities targeted at other parties (Spires 2011c; 
Zhan & Tang 2016). This study shows that the GONGO actor is not a regulator 
in the conventional sense, but rather a network coordinator of other regulatory 
actors and regulatory resources. A GONGO actor may undertake direct 
punishment or persuasion individually in some instances, such as revising 
targeted companies’ CSR strategy where the business actor is not 
knowledgeable or capable of doing so and publicly denouncing identified 
irresponsible businesses. However, more often, GONGO actors borrow 
regulatory power from other actors through formal and informal networking 
efforts to exert influence on the targeted companies. Information sharing 
through the formal platforms, such as formal documents and the nationwide 
Social Credit System, and informal channels based on personal connection and 
communication is critical in the process. This confirms the idea that networked 
governance bases its practice in dialogue and exchange (Parker, R 2016; 
Stoker 2016). Such information exchanges happen not only between 
networked regulators but also incorporate dynamic conversation with targeted 
companies into a whole network of influence. Therefore, the strength of 
GONGO’s networked governance is seen to rest on its ability to steer CSR 
efforts towards a direction that is both desired by the regulators and the 
regulatees. 
7.4.6 Sites of GONGO’s Networked Governance 
The findings also show that local spaces become more prominent sites for 
making timely responses to issues involving the steering of events and 
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formulation of CSR strategy. This result is consistent with Parker’s (2016) 
finding that local networked governance is a characteristic of contemporary 
modes of social, economic and political governance. The study shows that 
more participatory forms of governance activities occur at the local level, 
enabling networked actors to establish sensitivity to cross-regional context 
variations. One challenge to responsive regulation is that mutual consents and 
commitments are difficult to secure without iterated encounters (Braithwaite & 
Hong 2015). In mapping RCSC national network, it is found that an added virtue 
of having their dense network and resident units in local spaces is to allow the 
values and norms of the GONGOs to continue to be preached over to targeted 
companies. This study, therefore, argues that the effectiveness of networked 
governance highly depends on the availability of networked actors residing at 
the operational level and the intensity of repeated interactions between the 
regulators and regulatees. Also, the investigation of GONGOs’ responsiveness 
in local contexts leads this study to argue that the emphasis on networked 
governance approach should be further shifted towards flexibility and agility 
customised to local sites of governance rather than on following a prescribed 
sequence of responses.  
7.4.7 Network Dimensions of GONGO’s Networked Governance 
The findings of this study support that the network structure dimensions such 
as centrality, proximity, density, and size are considered highly relevant to 
networked actor’s governance capacity (Burris, Drahos & Shearing 2005; 
Christopoulos 2008; Fenwick, Van Uytsel & Wrbka 2014; Parker, R 2016). In 
addition, the results also suggest that network locations are necessary 
conditions for eliciting embedded resources (Lin, N 2017). To preserve and 
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maintain resources, denser networks have a relative advantage. The RCSC 
organisations largely benefit from its dense and closed networks in which the 
embedded resources are preserved, reproduced, and shared with trusted 
networked actors. On the other hand, to search for and obtain additional 
resources, establishing new ties and extending the scope of the current network 
are more useful tactics employed by GONGO actors. This is witnessed in cases 
where GONGO actors enlist partners beyond its regular contacts and operating 
regions to seek governance capacity empowerment. This finding supports that 
a denser network would be more likely to promote a sharing of resources, and 
in turn maintain resources for the collective network; while an extension from 
the current network is more likely to access advantaged positions and enhance 
the opportunity to obtain additional resources (Lin, N 2017). Taking a central 
position in the network carries some appealing value. However, the findings of 
this study show that the costs associated with maintaining and securing such a 
position are equally expensive.  
In addition, this study supports the idea that network locations should be treated 
as exogenous factors rather than endogenous factors to maintain social capital 
acquired from other networked actors (Lin, N 2017). It could be misleading to 
assume that an absolutely objective network location could be produced by 
individual networked actors. The location an actor positions itself in the network 
is actually based on dynamic expressions, relative perceptions, and constant 
changes of other actors in the network (Coen & Thatcher 2008; Drahos & 
Krygier 2017). In a networked governance relationship, the rewarding and 
sanctioning power afforded by the network is also highly contingent upon other 
participating actors. In cases where a networked actor’s self-identified location 
is different from what other actors perceive where it should be. The actor could 
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misestimate the actual resources it is entitled to from the network and 
subsequently be disappointed at the outcome of its governance efforts. This 
study argues that network locations should facilitate, but not necessarily 
determine, the access to a higher level of embedded resources. These 
considerations suggest that network locations should be treated as exogenous 
variables rather than endogenous variables for capacity empowerment and 
resources acquisition in networked governance relationships. 
The results of this research further highlight the roles, nodes and ties, play in 
the network. Nodes in the networked governance are often assumed to be 
organisations (Agranoff 2006; Burris, Drahos & Shearing 2005; Drahos 2004; 
Provan & Kenis 2007). However, this research shows that the nodal actors 
could be individuals even though the individuals are not affiliated with the nodal 
organisations in the network. Although some individuals’ current professions 
are remotely located from the shared domains of the networked organisations, 
their informal connections and prior employment experiences can become the 
key to bring unknown actors together. The role ethical leadership plays in the 
business camp and the role resourceful leadership play in the GONGO camp 
both underscore the value of individual actors. In the networked governance 
relationships, individual actors often act as a single multilateral agency. In the 
absence of such individuals who are capable of connecting and coordinating 
other discrete nodes, the concentration of resources and regulatory powers are 
unlikely to be attained. The power of wielding personal ties and informal 
contacts is a critical indicator of the connectivity of a network and thus constitute 
a key element to secure the success of networked governance. 
252 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter synthesised findings from stage one and stage two of the study 
and discussed the results in relation to their implications and new insights 
discovered with references to prior literature. Integrating analysis from the two-
stage case study, this research argues that GONGOs, as a hybrid organisation, 
should be understood as accommodating actors whose organisational 
boundary is porous and who strategically trade on a mixed identity to enable 
the responsive implementation of networked governance approaches. This 
chapter highlights an overall pattern that governance mechanisms on complex 
and challenging CSR issues has inevitably moved from a dyadic approach to a 
networked approach. Reflecting back to the pyramid models existed in the 
extant literature, this chapter proposes an alternative Shadow Pyramid Model 
to better illustrate GONGO’s networked governance approach. This Shadow 
Pyramid Model also served as useful visual assistance to compare and contrast 
GONGO’s networked governance processes with those of other NGOs. Other 
topics and implications associated with such comparative analysis are provided 
accordingly, including building rewards and punishments into the shadow 
pyramid model, costs of governance approaches, motivations and 
considerations on network building, GONGO’s multifaceted roles in networked 
governance relationships, the shifts of principal sites of governance activities, 
and application of network dimensions in networked governance analysis. 
 
 
  
253 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The overall objective of this research is to offer an in-depth, rich in context 
empirical insight in understanding the role of GONGO’s networked governance 
on CSR in China. This overarching objective is achieved by two specific aims. 
First, this research aims to investigate GONGO’s internal network structure and 
external interactions with networked actors through which GONGO’s 
governance capacity on CSR is generated. Second, this research aims to 
investigate how networked governance approaches are applied to business 
actors and how the target companies perceive and respond to GONGO’s 
networked governance. This research purposively selects the Red Cross 
Society of China (RCSC) as the focal case based on its representative and 
revelatory merits and develops the following research question: 
How does GONGO’s hybridity shape its capacity and application of 
networked governance to influence CSR practices in China? 
This chapter summarises the key findings from the two-stage case study to 
address the research question. Theoretical and practical contributions offered 
by the study is then be discussed. This is followed by outlining the limitations of 
the study. Recommendations regarding future research directions are then 
identified. 
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8.2 Summary of Key Findings 
This research finds that different actors involved in the networked governance 
relationship align themselves with different interpretations and principles of 
CSR. To express their respective understanding of CSR, most GONGO 
participants link CSR with notions such as corporate philanthropy, volunteerism, 
and ethical business practices while business participants describe CSR as an 
important component of economic responsibilities, corporate culture, public 
relations management, responsible leadership, and corporate political 
responsibility. What is suggested from the dissimilar foci is that different actors 
tend to interpret CSR with notions which can help secure objectives that they 
consider most important. On the one hand, the GONGO participants 
conceptualise CSR as a principle that is more consistent with their 
organisational mission and values to benefit those whom they are committed to 
serving. On the other hand, the notions conveyed by business participants are 
more instrumental in business discourse. It is observed, however, that the 
variances on CSR perceptions do not necessarily hinder the alignment of 
objectives and cooperation in specific CSR actions when joint engagement from 
multiple actors is expected. The overall CSR-focus areas and plans prescribed 
by the central and local governments in China act as catalysts to compel 
pragmatic coordination among GONGOs and business actors. 
It is also observed that the hybridity of GONGOs plays a crucial role in shaping 
its governance and networking capacity. Using the RCSC as the representative 
GONGO case, a systematic tracing of its organisational network reveals that 
while the Red Cross organisations are widely recognised as NGOs at the 
international-level network, the RCSC’s identity is perceived as a highly 
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hierarchical-structured GONGO in the Chinese context. The perceived GO-ish 
attributes revolve around the organisation’s intimate relationship with the 
Communist Party of China, institutional structure embeddedness into the 
government, financial dependency on government funding, government-like 
human resource management system, and the government-compatible 
operation modes. At the same time, its NGO-ish perceptions are mainly derived 
from its voluntary membership base, specialised work orientation and area, 
dialogue-based work approach, and recurrent collaborative and competitive 
interactions with other NGOs and GONGOs at operational levels. This study 
argues that the attributes of GONGO actors are too complex and dynamic to 
be captured by the dichotomy between the corporatism and the civil society 
framework. Instead, they should be viewed as accommodating entities whose 
organisational boundaries are porous and who strategically trade on mixed 
identity. Observations from this study illustrate that Chinese GONGO tactically 
exploit organisational dual-identity in addressing competing accountabilities 
within and across accountability dimensions. The implication of this finding is 
that hybrid features of organisations significantly shift how accountability 
tensions are identified, shared, projected, and accepted by practitioners. While 
not all accountability tensions are necessarily negative, fundamental to 
reconciling these accountability tensions is whether organisations are able to 
engage in deliberate efforts working with, in, and around the accountability 
claims that are inherent to their complex, hybrid nature. Therefore, it is more 
helpful to translate GONGOs’ hybridity to mean that their capacity permeates 
across sectors for resource mobilisation and power leverage than to deny 
GONGOs as either authentic government agencies or authentic NGOs. 
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The findings demonstrate that GONGOs capitalise on the size, density, 
proximity and centrality of their network infrastructure to exert influence on CSR 
practices by coordinating escalation of rewarding incentives, threatening 
punishment, and capacity building resources with networked actors. The 
RCSC’s CSR engagements are primarily developed along two lines. The first 
is operational, which includes designing, delivering, and reporting specific CSR 
projects with particular business actors. The second involves promoting 
humanitarian conduct and Principles of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement to the private sector. Along both lines of RCSC’s work, 
collaborative strategies such as persuasion, education, negotiation and 
cooperation are primary instruments used by RCSC to influence CSR practices 
while direct opposition and confrontations are less frequently applied. It is 
observed that given GONGOs are more structurally proximate to government 
agencies and their GONGO counterparts, these actors are enrolled most 
frequently by GONGOs in networked governance relationships. GONGO’s 
centrality in the network enables it to exert inter-organisational influence by 
either eliciting rewarding incentives or threatening sanctions across its 
extensive governance network. In a similar vein, by retreating or threatening to 
retreat from the network, GONGOs are able to exert punitive power when 
cutting off the companies’ access to other powerful actors in the network. While 
discretional persuasions and sanctions are operationalised at discrete networks 
formed by individual GONGOs, they are further reinforced by broader regulation 
systems such as the national social credit system in which rewards and 
punishments are jointly enforced by government agencies and GONGOs. 
Such networked governance efforts yield mixed CSR responses from business 
actors in which improved self-regulation, sustained co-regulation with GONGOs, 
257 
 
co-optation into GONGOs, forum shifting, and disengagements are observed. 
In cases where the targeted companies fail to make intended responses due to 
organisational constraints, a capacity building approach is utilised as a 
facilitating governance design. The findings of the study reveal three broad 
scenarios in which GONGOs initiate a capacity building approach to influence 
CSR, depicting the business actors as the GONGO’s donor, beneficiary, and 
strategic partner, respectively. In the scenario where the company acts as the 
donor, the GONGO’s governance mechanisms principally take effect by using 
its internal network expertise to help business donors redefine their CSR 
strategy and resort to its external networked actors to direct CSR donation 
resources to the most-intended beneficiaries. In the scenario where the 
company acts as the beneficiary, the GONGO strategically leveraged its 
political network to turn the buck-passing local government into a capacity-
building facilitator in assisting the private actor in fulfilling its social functions. In 
the scenario where the company acts as a strategic partner, it is found that the 
failure of networked governance could occur when rewarding power entailed in 
the GONGO’s network fails to compete with more appealing incentives offered 
by the company’s market-oriented network. The implication is that although 
targeted companies must be responsive to GONGO-imposed pressures and 
expectations regarding CSR practices, they must also be responsive to their 
own profit-seeking needs and the competitive pressure from their rivals. An 
over-emphasis on the complementarities of resources and mutual exploitation 
instead of mutual capacity-building in governance interactions could lead the 
joint CSR efforts being compromised by for-profit appeals. Therefore, this study 
calls for more contextualised deliberations in the formulation of networked 
governance instruments to incorporate tailored design for particular business 
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actors and periodically reviews and updates reflecting the constantly changing 
contexts. 
8.3 Research Contribution 
This study calls for attention on how GONGOs in China, who seemingly 
possess a hybridity of both governmental and non-governmental attributes, 
could leverage both government’s enforcing power and NGO’s persuasive 
power in pursuit of shaping CSR practices. Prior studies have given attention 
to investigating NGO-business relationships as one-to-one interactions, 
whereas seldom examining such relationships as a dynamic web of 
relationships (Grosser 2015; Rowley 1997; Yaziji & Doh 2009). This research 
seeks to address the problem by offering a network-level exploration and a 
response to the call for more contextualised research on CSR in China (Davis, 
SM & Moosmayer 2014; Moon, J & Shen 2010; Tilt 2016). This exploration 
sheds light on how GONGOs in China have been and can be mobilised to 
achieve CSR governance objectives when the government’s and the 
businesses’ individual effort alone tend to be costly and inadequate. Bringing in 
a governance theoretical perspective, this thesis frames GONGOs in China as 
a critical regulatory actor who, through a networked governance process, can 
exert substantial influences on CSR practices. By doing so, this study enriches 
the extant literature in understanding stakeholder’s governance role in CSR.  
More specifically, this research contributes to the existing literature in three 
important ways. First, this study extends the body of knowledge on GONGO’s 
impact on CSR to a network-level understanding. Regarding the CSR theme, a 
focus on dyadic NGO-business relations preoccupies CSR research while 
considerations of network relations are given short shrift. Focus has been given 
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to address NGO-business relationships in terms of one-to-one interactions 
(Rowley 1997), delineating them as either intimate alliances strategically aiming 
to maximise common interest or hostile opponents advocating divergent self-
regards (Dahan et al. 2010; Doh & Guay 2004; Yaziji & Doh 2009). Prior 
literature has extensively examined NGOs’ role with regard to CSR as 
isomorphic actors (Doh & Teegen 2002; Teegen 2003; Vachani, Doh & Teegen 
2009), substantial pressure enforcers (Deegan & Blomquist 2006; Deegan & 
Islam 2014; Islam & Deegan 2008; Tilt 1994), underrepresented stakeholders 
(de Bakker & den Hond 2007; Hossain et al. 2016; O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer 2009a) 
and professional agents with expertise (Doh & Guay 2006; Guay, Doh & Sinclair 
2004; Jamali & Keshishian 2008). However, careful investigation of NGO’s 
influences on CSR from a governance perspective is still scant. In addition, it 
remains unknown how NGOs integrate collaborative supports and deterrent 
sections by enlisting various actors to achieve intended CSR governance goals 
within a dynamic web where the actors interact in a multilateral fashion. 
Embracing a different theoretical perspective – the networked governance 
perspective under responsive regulation theory (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992; 
Braithwaite, J 2006; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) – this research seeks to enrich 
rather than challenge conventional CSR theoretical perspectives. The 
alternative offered here is to understand the role of GONGOs in Chinese CSR 
in a different way so as to include a wider range of considerations on 
stakeholders’ governance potency on CSR. Therefore, this research 
contributes to the literature by providing a network-level understanding of CSR 
governance mechanisms. This is the first known study to specifically explore 
GONGO’s governance role in CSR. 
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Second, regarding the research approach, this study responds to the call for a 
more contextualised research on CSR in China integrating both macro and 
micro considerations (Davis, SM & Moosmayer 2014; Tilt 2016; Whitehead 
2014). To address the under-researched aspects in Chinese CSR literature, this 
study fills the knowledge gap by focusing on the stakeholder’s perspective, 
addressing social issues, and offering rich qualitative insights. Therefore, by 
incorporating considerations on Chinese political, economic and social factors, 
the evidence generated by this research will potently respond to prior calls for 
a higher level of sensitivity in conducting CSR research in China. In addition, 
regarding the research focus, targeting at Chinese NGOs in particular, an in-
depth investigation on GONGOs is expected. Although GONGOs have 
exhibited uniqueness and significance across the public and the civil society 
sector, it is evident that current knowledge of this phenomenon is thin (Ho 2016; 
Wu 2002). Holding considerable political leverage and networking capacity, 
GONGOs continue to play a dominant role in China. This research purposively 
selects the Red Cross Society of China (RCSC) as the research object to 
pursue pertinent queries. While highlighting the distinctive context of China, this 
paper empirically contributes to the literature by providing novel insights from 
the under-explored GONGO phenomenon. From an accountability lens, the 
contribution this research offered is a timely update of understanding about 
accountability tensions experienced in organisations with hybrid features. 
Extending NGO accountability literature, this study shed light on how hybrid 
attributes of GONGOs shape accountabilities differently from typical NGOs. 
Given the RCSC is a GONGO officially listed in the national administrative setup 
and operates under the State Council of PRC (State Commission Office for 
Public Sector Reform of PRC 2010), its representativeness and revealingness 
can facilitate investigation of the GONGO phenomenon. Insights and evidence 
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generated from this study significantly contribute to the ongoing exploration of 
the GONGOs phenomenon in China. 
Thirdly, the outcome of this research is expected to make significant practical 
contributions. The results of this research are able to prompt relevant 
policymakers, GONGOs, and business practitioners to reconsider their 
strategic and operational approaches in mobilising the network they are 
embedded in or close to. For regulators who seek to hold companies 
environmentally and socially accountable, this research provides evidence on 
how to achieve their regulatory goals in a more collaborative and cost-effective 
manner. From the companies’ perspective, the findings are able to help them 
to identify how to respond efficiently and effectively to external CSR 
expectations. Also, this research contributes to raising an overall social 
awareness on how to maximise a network-level efficacy to overcome 
environmental and social challenges and achieve CSR visions. 
8.4 Limitation of the Research 
While this research is able to provide answers to the research question and 
made considerable theoretical and practical contributions, the results and 
findings of this research are not derived without limitations. 
The first limitation of the study is the employment of embedded single case 
study design. Given single case studies are subject to criticism about having a 
narrowly defined focus and scope, the conclusions generated from a specific 
single case usually cannot be generalised to other cases. However, this is not 
necessarily a disadvantage for qualitative research featuring exploration nature. 
As explained in Chapter 4, the value and merit of case study precisely rest on 
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its ability to capture the uniqueness of the cases rather than building wider 
generalisation based on it (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster 2000; Stake 1995; 
Yin, RK 2009a). For qualitative research, the generalisability of case studies is 
attained by “analytical generalisation” in which the research findings are 
generated from the data to the theory rather than from a sample to the 
population. Furthermore, the generalisability of case studies is also built on the 
resonant relationship between the reader's experiences and the case study 
itself. The results produced by case studies can resonate with the knowledge, 
perception, and experience of a broad variety of audiences, thereby facilitating 
a wider, generalised understanding of the phenomenon. In this research, the 
single case design limitation was addressed in two ways. First, this research 
explicitly employs a theoretical framework – the networked governance 
perspective of responsive regulation (Braithwaite 2006; Braithwaite & Drahos 
2000) – as a directional logic facilitating analytical generalisation from the case 
analysis to the theory. Second, a clear and compelling rationale of purposive 
case selection criteria is provided, which enables a naturalistic generalisation 
from the specific case to the experience of the broad audience. 
The second limitation is that when analysing the networked governance 
process, the study does not employ quantitative measurement techniques in 
social network analysis to algorithmically map the actors and their ties in 
networked governance relationships. This study emphasises the networks that 
forge meaningful ‘webs of influence’ (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000, p. 550) rather 
than a mere presentation of physical structures of networks per se. 
Organisational actors could be embedded in or connected to multiple networks 
without any of them constituting a network of meaningful and actual influence. 
Webs of influence are constructed by dialogue and interaction, dynamic control 
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of mutual rewards and sanctions, and accumulation of shared understanding 
and experiences. In addition, quantitative measurements of a network often 
lack vibrant and contextual indicators to capture the complex and intangible 
elements embedded in such webs of influence, especially the informal networks. 
The focus of this research, therefore, is predominantly on the dynamics within 
these exchanges and processes and on the route GONGOs take to empower 
their governance capacity. The precisely quantified metrics of network as an 
instrument is beyond the intention and scope this study seeks to address.  
The third limitation is the interpretation of research results with regard to the 
responsive regulation theory (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). The governance 
prescription this theory offers is that persuasive governance approaches should 
be tried before enforcing sanctions because regulatory resources should be 
allocated wisely whereas procedural justice and governance legitimacy need to 
be built in the course of establishing governance interactions. This model is 
proposed as an ideal and cost-effective approach for regulators to secure 
compliance and continuous improvements from the regulatees. However, this 
does not mean that all governance contexts will precisely follow the ideal model 
in practice. Individual regulators with varying experience and motivations might 
have different judgements and discretion on deciding preferred governance 
approaches to be employed. Therefore, interpretation of research results 
warrants caution in linking them to the theory. In this research, this limitation 
was addressed by providing a thorough discussion of governance contexts in 
each CSR governance case example. A rich description of the case background 
and all steps taken by GONGOs, networked regulators, and business actors 
constitute sufficient evidence to support interpretation of results by linking, 
extending and challenging the embraced theory. 
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The last limitation of the study is the time scope of the employed data. The 
policies, regulations and practices in China, especially regarding CSR and the 
NGO sector, have rapidly evolved in recent years. These contingencies could 
alter the motivation and practices of some organisational participants after the 
data collection period of this study. Although the post-variation of contextual 
factors might not be able to be captured in this study, the findings of the 
research also constitute a timely update on understanding about the 
relationships, mechanisms, and process of GONGO’s networked governance 
on CSR in China. 
8.5 Future Research Directions 
The topics and themes that emerged from this study offer fertile grounds for 
additional research. With the ample opportunities remain to be explored in the 
future, some recommendations are provided here.  
This study observes that the hybridity of GONGOs could be derived from both 
the general impression of hybrid identity and the functional significance of their 
operationalised hybrid features. Future research could further look into how 
hybridity in appearance and practice might lead to varying degrees of 
governance capacity and legitimacy. Such research will help to further 
conceptualise the criteria, boundaries and identification of hybrid organisations’, 
including GONGOs’, role in networked governance relationships.  
This research reflects the networked governance approaches from the 
perspective of a single typical GONGO – the RCSC. The predominant work 
area of the organisation is humanitarian relief, and the principal ways of its work 
are delivered through service provision. Future research could explore the 
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query from other GONGO’s or NGO’s perspective to understand whether the 
rewarding, punishing, and capacity building approaches would be different in 
NGOs with other work orientation and nature, such as representative NGO and 
advocacy NGO. 
Also, as NGOs incorporate hybrid elements growing and evolving in different 
ways, the conceptualisation of hybrid NGOs’ networked governance 
mechanisms could be extended to other forms of NGO mutants and in other 
contexts. How the empowerment of governance capacity and the design of 
governance approaches are operated differently in NGOs with different levels 
of hybridity could also illuminate our understanding of the increasingly 
complicated CSR governance process in remarkably diverse hybrid NGOs 
contexts. 
8.6 Conclusions 
This research employs a two-stage approach to address the research question. 
The first stage starts from the perspective of the centric GONGO – the RCSC 
– to investigate its organisational principles, CSR commitments and network 
activities highly relevant to CSR governance engagements. Tracing from its 
operational events, other regulatory actors embedded within the same 
networked governance relationship are identified to examine their relevant 
interactions and joint efforts concerning CSR practices. The second stage 
focuses on the perspective of the associated companies to understand how 
GONGO’s networked governance efforts affect business actors and how the 
target companies perceive and respond to GONGOs’ direct and indirect 
influence. This is followed by a comprehensive interpretation incorporating 
findings from both stages. By linking stage one and stage two, such a research 
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cycle renders a coherent and holistic exploration of both the actor-level and the 
network-level phenomenon. 
Observations from this study suggest that a general shift from linear, dyadic, 
and bilateral explanations of CSR governance toward a more contextual, 
participatory, and systemic consideration of governance dynamics is inevitable. 
The findings of this study suggest that networking activities are increasingly 
embraced in CSR governance practices. Supporting the expanding view of 
CSR and regulation, this study presents a broader consideration on 
strategically enrolling multiple parties into the CSR governance process to 
construct cost-effective and contextualised solutions to CSR issues. This 
network-level broadening view on CSR governance enriches and extends the 
conventional conceptualisation of regulation that typically assumes a single 
regulator. This research specifically extends the work of John Braithwaite and 
his colleagues’ work on networked governance perspective of responsive 
regulation (Braithwaite 2006; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) to the CSR arena. 
While highlighting the distinctive features of the Chinese context, this research 
is the first known study to specifically explore GONGOs governance role in CSR. 
Insights from this study contribute to the CSR literature by directing attention to 
a network-level understanding of governance mechanisms in contrast to dyadic 
NGO-business engagements in conventional wisdom. The significant practical 
contribution this research offered is a timely broadening of understanding about 
governance options in Chinese CSR, which has the potential to be extended to 
similar CSR governance contexts outside of China. For regulators, this 
research provides evidence on how to mobilise various social forces to achieve 
regulatory goals in a more collaborative and cost-effective manner. For 
regulatees, this research provides suggestions on how to respond more 
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efficiently to favour rewards and capacity building rather than onerous modes 
of enforcement. 
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APPENDIX I  
THE LIST OF CODED INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
Participant 
Code 
Organisation Type Position 
RC01 RCSC Headquarters Vice President 
RC02 RCSC Headquarters Vice President 
RC03 RCSC Headquarters Head of Department 
RC04 RCSC Headquarters Head of Department 
RC05 RCSC Headquarters Former Head of Department 
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RC06 RCSC Headquarters Deputy Head of Department 
RC07 RCSC Headquarters 
Director of Health Services, 
Head of Service Delivery Centre 
RC08 RCSC Headquarters 
Executive Deputy Head of a Service Delivery Centre, 
Former Executive Vice President of an RCSC Provincial Branch 
RC09 
Institution directly under the RCSC 
Headquarters 
Secretary-General 
RC10 
Institution directly under the RCSC 
Headquarters 
Secretary-General 
RC11 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
RC12 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
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RC13 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
RC14 Province-Level RCSC Chief of Office 
RC15 Province-Level RCSC Vice President 
RC16 Province-Level RCSC Executive Vice President 
RC17 Province-Level RCSC Secretary 
RC18 Province-Level RCSC Vice President 
RC19 Province-Level RCSC Head of Department 
RC20 Province-Level RCSC Head of Emergency and Relief Department 
RC21 Province-Level RCSC Head of Public Relations Department 
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RC22 
Institution directly under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Deputy Head 
RC23 
Institution directly under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Head 
RC24 
Institution directly under province-level 
RCSC branch 
Deputy Head 
RC25 Prefecture-Level RCSC Executive Vice President, Field Worker 
RC26 Prefecture-Level RCSC Executive Vice President, Field Worker 
RC27 County-Level RCSC Executive Vice President, Field Worker 
RC28 County-Level RCSC Secretary of CPC Group, Field Worker 
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RC29 County-Level RCSC Secretary-General, Field Worker 
RC30 RCSC Grassroots Unit Field Worker 
NR01 Government Department Deputy Head 
NR02 Government Department 
Division Chief, 
Former Chief of Office in a GONGO 
NR03 Government Department 
Head of Department, 
Vice President of a GONGO 
NR04 Government Department 
County Mayor, 
Former Executive Vice President in a GONGO 
NR05 Government Department Vice Secretary, 
Deputy Director of General Office of Provincial Administration of Civil 
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Service, 
Former Deputy Chief of Office in a GONGO 
NR06 GONGO Vice President 
NR07 GONGO Chief of Office, Secretary-General 
NR08 NGO Cooperation Coordinator of Regional Delegation for East Asia 
NR09 NGO 
Manager of Partnership and Resource Development in Country Cluster 
Support Team 
NR10 NGO 
Chairman, 
Council Member of RCSC 
NR11 Academic Research Centre 
Professor of Sociology, 
Director of GONGO Research Centre 
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CO01 Company Head of Operation Department 
CO02 Company Chief of Office 
CO03 Company 
CEO, Vice Secretary of CPC Group 
Council Member of multiple GONGOs 
CO04 Company President 
CO05 Company Vice President, Secretary of CPC Group 
CO06 Company General Manager 
CO07 Company Vice President, Secretary-General of CPC Group 
CO08 Company General Manager of a Provincial Branch 
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CO09 Company General Manager of a Provincial Branch 
CO10 Company Head of Public Relations and Corporate Culture Department 
CO11 Company Head of Institutional Cooperation Department 
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APPENDIX II  
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
 
Research objective 
The overall objective of this research is to offer an in-depth, rich in context 
empirical insight in understanding the role of GONGOs’ networked governance 
on CSR in China. This overarching objective will be achieved by two separate 
aims. First, this research aims to start from the GONGO’s standpoint to trace 
its internal organisation structure and external interactions with networked 
actors which have significant influences on CSR practices. Second, to put 
together the other half of the puzzle, this research aims to investigate how 
networked governance approaches are applied to business actors and how 
business actors perceive and respond to GONGO’s governance. 
Structure of the interviews 
1. Opening statement: self-introduction and explaining the project 
2. Ask questions and lead to open-ended discussions relating to the 
research objective 
3. Debriefing interview 
4. Snowballing 
1. Opening statement: self-introduction and explaining the project 
My name is Dudu Luo from RMIT University. 
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Thank you for your willingness to participate in the interview today. This 
interview aims to understand your views and experiences in networked 
governance on corporate social responsibility practices. The interview 
will touch on the networked governance relationships and CSR activities 
you have observed, participated, or supervised. This interview will be 
audiotaped and analysed in conjunction with the interview notes taken 
to understand your views on the associated issues. The interview will 
take about 40 to 60 minutes.  
Before we start, do you have any question? 
2. Ask questions and lead to open-ended discussions relating to the 
research objective 
For Stage I Interviews: 
1) Could you give a general introduction to your organisation and your role? 
2) What activities concerning corporate social responsibility (CSR) does 
your organisation undertake in the daily operation? 
3) Could you tell me about your current or past involvement in CSR related 
activities? (What was your view and experience in CSR?) 
4) What are the implications when a company violates/outperforms your 
organisation’s CSR expectation? How may your organisation respond? 
5) How is your organisation connected to the government (or any of its 
department)? Please explain this relationship. How does this 
relationship affect your work on CSR? 
6) To whom (roles not names) do you connect and communicate with most 
closely concerning CSR related activities? 
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7) Could you please describe under what circumstances you establish a 
connection with this person/organisation? 
8) Can you give me some examples of what activities are undertaken 
during the networking process? 
9) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the network and your 
networking efforts? 
10) Do you see such connections as formal networking or informal 
networking? (Please explain with examples the formal and informal 
networking.) 
For Stage II Interviews: 
1) Could you give a general introduction of your organisation (and your role)? 
2) What does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mean to your 
organisation? How do you understand CSR? 
3) What activities concerning CSR does your organisation undertake in 
daily operation? 
4) Could you tell me your current and/or past involvement in CSR related 
activities jointly participated with the Red Cross Society of China (or 
other connected GONGOs)? 
5) How do you understand the GONGO identity and features of the Red 
Cross Society of China? In your view, how is it different from government 
agencies and other NGOs? 
6) Could you please describe what kind of CSR influence (both directly and 
indirectly) does your organisation perceive from the Red Cross Society 
of China? How does that influence change your CSR perception and 
practice? 
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7) What are the implications if your organisation violates/outperforms the 
CSR expectation of the Red Cross Society of China (or other connected 
GONGOs)? How may your organisation respond? How may your 
response change the situation? 
8) To whom (roles not names) do you communicate with most frequently 
concerning CSR related activities? 
9) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of your CSR engagement with 
the Red Cross Society of China? 
10) How do you report and disclose CSR activities engaged with the Red 
Cross Society of China? 
3. Debriefing interview 
I have no further questions. Please allow me to summarise the main 
points that I have learnt from our conversation just in case I missed or 
misunderstood your view.  
Is there anything else you would like to add or ask about before we finish 
the interview? 
 
4. Snowballing 
Do you know someone else in your organisation/network that will be 
suitable to participate in this research project?  
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